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ABSTRACT

This study explores the evolution of China’s foreign investment policies and laws between 19782016. The main goal of this study is to provide an objective narrative about the past and
present development of Chinese foreign investment from a legal perspective. The study includes
discussions about the creation, development, and reforms of these policies and laws. In
addition, this project considers problems and opportunities of Chinese foreign investment
regulatory regime. The first chapter is the introduction, which offers detailed explanations for
the main focus, issues, and structure of the thesis, the methodology of the study and the reason
for conducting this study, an executive summary for each chapter is provided at the end.
Second, the third, and the fourth chapter will respectively focus on China’s foreign investment
regulatory framework during 1978-1991, 1992-2005, 2006-2016. A short summary is provided at
the end of chapter four to conclude this study.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
The main focus of this study is the evolution of the FDI policy and law in China
from 1978-2016. This study considers two important issues: first, what is the FDI
regulatory framework and how has it developed and been reformed. It considers and
analyzes the effectiveness and impact of such framework from a legal perspective.
Second, what is the implication of China’s FDI regulatory framework for China’s
investment environment within the context of the rule of law? It considers and analyzes
the dynamic relationship between the regulator and market within the context of the
FDI regulatory framework.

1. Concept definition
“Law” and “Policy.”
“Law” and “Policy” in this study refer to a general view shared by academics and
public and internal views among those working within the system.1 In this sense, “law”
refers to a structure of norms, regulations, and rules made by the authority for the
purpose of social governance with specific enforceable details. The modern
constitutional theory within the Chinese paradigm would strictly define law as rules
made by the National People’s Congress and applied by the court. Government
Ordinances, Decrees, or Regulations are rules made by the People’s Government with

1

Peerenboom, Randall, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002): 567.
9

power authorized by the Constitution.2 “Policy” refers to a structure of guidance with
abstract principles produced by governing entities. It is quite common that “law” would
adopt recommendations or goals established by “policy.”

A discussion about China’s foreign investment policy and law during the 1980s
would be a challenge to the modern definition on “law” and “policy.” It is important to
note that rules and “recommendations” made by the government were prevalent in
China’s foreign investment regulatory framework, especially during the 1980s when
China did not have a functioning commercial legal system. Also as one problem in
China’s rule of law system, policies sometimes function as government rules, and
government rule operates as the law. Thus, this study adopts a broader meaning of law
and policy: the law and policy both refer to structures that guide people in a given area.
Unless otherwise emphasized, Law could refer to rules made either by the National
People’s Congress and government agencies.

FDI
Western scholars identified that Chinese adopt a broader definition of FDI, which
considered all usage of foreign funds for commercial activities, such as equity joint
venture (EJV), Wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE), and cooperative ventures,
cooperative development of oil resources, compensation trade and even processing and

2

Larry Catá Backer, Wang Keren, “The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with
Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Constitutional Order,” Rim L. &
Pol'y J 23 no.2, (2014): 20. Accessed July 31, 2017, http://hdl.handle.net/1773.1/1365.
10

assembly arrangements. For example, the 1982 Foreign Investment Commission listed
six forms of foreign investment:
1.

Foreign loans

2.

Foreign investment in joint ventures

3.

Compensatory trade and cooperative management

4.

Joint exploration and exploitation of offshore oil

5.

Foreign investment in SEZ

6.

Investment through China International Trust and Investment Corporation CITIC 3

A declassified 1984 CIA study on Chinese economic policy found that, “both
forms of joint ventures, as well as joint oil exploration agreements and wholly owned
foreign subsidiaries, would be considered as foreign direct investment.” The CIA study
further pointed that the “Chinese would include other forms of business arrangements,
such as licensing, processing, and compensation trade agreements, even though no
foreign claims on real assets located in China exist as foreign investment. The Chinese
sometimes use the term foreign investment loosely to refer to all forms of foreign
participation, even including foreign loans to Chinese enterprises.” 4 It is noted that
“compensation trade” was later removed from “FDI” under government statistics in the
90s.

3

CIA, “Directorate of Intelligence,” 20 Nov, 20, 1984, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00287R001001060001-5.pdf
4
Ibid.
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2. Structure of the thesis
This study is organized in four chapters in chronological order. The first chapter
is the introduction, which explains the purpose, intent, and methodology of the study. It
provides an executive summary of each chapter to illustrate the purpose, main content,
and structure of these chapters. The second chapter focuses on the FDI framework
between 1978-1991. The third chapter concentrates on the FDI framework between
1992-2005. The fourth chapter concentrates on the FDI framework between 2006-2016.
In the end, it will provide a short summary to conclude the study. In addition, the thesis
follows a simple structure for each chapter. Each chapter starts with a section of the
introduction, which explains the focus and main issue of the chapter. Then it is followed
by a section of the ideological and constitutional framework, which examines the
constitutional and political context of the FDI legal framework during the time. The next
section will concentrate on the legal framework for foreign investment. In order to help
readers identify arguments and discussions in these two sections, each section would
start with a mini introduction explaining the main focus and findings. Each chapter will
end up with a short conclusion.

Why discuss the ideological and constitutional framework in each chapter
First, Chinese foreign investment policy and the law is an expression that is
embedded within the overall political, ideological and social institutional framework: it
reflects an agenda to revitalize national prosperity and to restore decent living and self-

12

respect, goals are also shared by individual private citizens. Many studies considered
that Chinese culture is one important element in explaining China’s business practice,
and the lack of the rule of law. But this study argues that Chinese culture does not have
significant explanatory power for the creation and quality of China’s FDI framework.
Chinese culture may explain a certain aspect of the policy tendency, but this study
considers the ideological and constitutional framework to provide a theoretical and
conceptual foundation for the creation and enforcement of laws and policies. These
laws and policies are also common extensions of China’s ideological and constitutional
framework.

Second, by outlining and discussing the political principles proposed by Chinese
Communist Party, and how these principles and reform agenda are textualized by the
Constitution of People’s Republic of China, the ideological and constitutional framework
section can provide a necessary context to illuminate the form and substance of the law
and policy, and the pattern of the development. Thus, each chapter provides a short
section about China’s ideological and constitutional framework before the discussion of
the legal framework for a better understanding of the subject.

Why exclude pre-1978 period from this study
1978 marked the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution
is one of the most important events in China’s history. It provided rich and meaningful
implications that reshaped the politics, ideology and cultural system. The significance of

13

the Cultural Revolution is undeniable. However, this study will not include discussion of
this topic mainly because it would distract from the main theme of the study.

The main purpose of this thesis is to provide an objective account of China’s
foreign investment policy and law from the legal perspective. It is noted that politics and
ideologies are an important part that shapes the view of the society and the substance
of the law, which is why each chapter will include a section that discusses the ideological
and constitutional framework. However, in the process of research and study, this study
found the origins and development of the Cultural Revolution to be interesting and
complex. The historical background is rich: the progress of domestic law and policy was
largely influenced by the entanglement of China’s domestic political and economic
agenda and international geopolitics during the Cold-war era. In addition, there was no
meaningful FDI and no functioning legal framework during the Cultural Revolution.

Although the Cultural Revolution provides a rich and interesting insight into
political leaders’ interpretation of China’s socialist system, an objective discussion on
the subject would require extensive debates that may distract from the main theme of
the study: a study of China’s foreign investment law and policy through a legal
perspective. For this reason, the thesis would start the discussion right after the end of
the Cultural Revolution in the late 70s.

14

3. Data and method
The information and data supporting this thesis come from two sources. One
includes published journals, books, and newspapers. A significant amount of the
published materials were collected electronically through online databases, university
library services and other commercial databases such as Jstor. The second source of
information comes from Chinese news media, databases, and official government
websites. Unless cited otherwise, the majority of the Chinese law and policies cited in
this study were collected from the Westlaw China database. Unless otherwise noted,
the English translation of the laws and policies are provided by Westlaw China. For the
convenience of the reference, this study does not change the translation provided by
Westlaw China; this does not mean the author agrees with the translation. In addition,
special thanks to those who work for government agencies who offered their personal
views and insights on the function and operation of government policy, which provided
necessary help in understanding certain issues.

4. Rationale for topic choice
It is in-part a personal reason for the author to choose this subject. I was born at
the end of the 1980s, almost a decade since the Reform and Open Up policy. In fact, I
consider myself as a beneficiary of this policy. I witnessed the transformation of China’s
landscape, physically and metaphorically. I remembered the time when the grown-ups
talked about life under the Planned Economy, and I was amazed by those stories. The
evolution of FDI for the past decade and the change of China is the story that I live and
breathe every day. It intimately affects everyone but still seems mysterious. Such
15

mystery facilitates a channel for exploration: to explore the meaning of myself and the
other various academic interests.

I still vividly remember the first time when I dined at the first McDonalds in my
city when I was 7 years old. Like the younger generation standing in line waiting for the
first iPhone, my parents, along with many other thousands of people on that opening
day in 1993, took me to this American restaurant to experience the taste of U.S.A. A
piece of yellow square thing in the Big Mac was the first cheese I ever had in my life. “It
tastes interesting, but what is that?” I still remember it. As one of the members of the
post-cultural revolution generation, we have the luxury to consume, discuss, engage and
be influenced by the West, or a certain form of the West created by certain views and
imageries from the movies, magazines, music, and English textbooks. We do not have
the historical burden with the West as my previous generation does. I still remember
the security guard at my elementary school joking about “imperialist capitalist
American” when he saw the letter of “U.S.A” on my friend's jacket. I also understand
that the reality is always way more complex than what the surface shows us. As many
Chinese students first come to the U.S., they are shocked that America is not the
concrete jungle depicted by Hollywood but with different regional cultures and
personalities. On the contrary, China has been trying to transform its urban landscape
with more and more skyscrapers. I was also shocked and later understood there are
more stories behind the separation of power; there are more shades under freedom of
speech, and also there are more stories about my country and history.

16

The stories and meaning behind that Big Mac are way larger than what I can
imagine when I first had it. Indeed, my personal experience is a representative slice of
the experience of the larger post-Cultural Revolution generation. This generation of
Chinese can be seen as beneficiaries or product of a society that was formed and shaped
by many characters, teachers, politicians, academics, entrepreneurs, and most
importantly, foreigners. Under globalization, foreigners in China bring in fresh new
views, cultures, and perspectives. The Big Mac I had, the computer I typed on, and
movie I watched are the creations of those foreign investors, Chinese partners, Chinese
regulators, global treaties, and global banking infrastructure.
Today, a Chinese can sit in his or her apartment in Beijing and order a bottle of
French wine from a French vineyard from the cell phone and have it delivered in a week.
Decades ago, investors needed to work years of preparation and administration process
to provide the same product to Chinese customers. “We, humans, crave myth, first
because they are good stories, but second because they nurture our desire for meaning.
We see struggle transformed into a righteous cause and from that, we draw purpose of
applying in our own lives. The purpose is the catalyst for our actions. The purpose,
therefore, sparks where we want to go (vision), what we want to accomplish (mission)
and what we believe (values).” 5 I consider the evolution of FDI policy and law in China
to be a great story with many interesting twists. It is a story of my generation. More
importantly, it helps me understand my country, my culture, and my people.

5

John Baldoni, “Dunkirk: When Valor Becomes Myth,” Forbes, August 3, 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbaldoni/2017/08/03/dunkirk-when-valor-becomesmyth/#fcfe1a969d79.
17

5. Limitation of the study
FDI policy and law is a huge subject with various interests and focuses. It is impossible to
cover all aspects of the FDI policy and framework in one essay. This study acknowledges
the limits of the research and study due to such limitations. In order to illustrate the
object of this study, it selects and highlights some areas of the FDI framework, including
the registration and verification rules, the foreign exchange control framework in China,
and the corporate governance under Chinese company law. Also, it considers the issue
of corruption in relation to Chinese FDI regulatory framework. However, this study did
not provide a comprehensive overview of China’s tax policy and law.

6. Executive summary of each chapter
Chapter 2 FDI Policy and Law 1978-1991
The main focus of this chapter is the FDI framework during 1978- 1991. The main
theme of this period was the introduction of foreign investment under Chinese reform
and Open Up program. The main issues are, first what was the basic framework of
foreign investment in China at the beginning of the reform, and second, how it worked
under Chinese centralized planning economic system. The main findings are, first, the
Reform and Open Up reshaped China’s history with foreign investment. The foreign
investment introduced new elements to Chinese centralized command system, which
18

facilitated economic, political and constitutional reform. Second, the basic legal
framework of FDI contained many features of the centralized economic system, which
caused massive criticisms from the investment community and criticisms from
conservative politicians for being not centralized enough.

Chapter 3 FDI Policy and Law 1992-2005
The main focus of this chapter is the FDI Policy and Law in 1992-2005. The main
theme during this period was the establishment of the socialist market economy with
“Chinese characteristics,” which protected the private interest and promoted market
competition. The main issues are, first, how FDI framework developed in this new
period, and second, how foreign investment worked under these new developments.
The main findings are, first, China developed a dualist commercial legal system, one
exclusively for domestic firms and another designed for foreign investors. This system
not only insulated SOE sector from competition but also created unfair treatments for
foreign investors and domestic investors. Second, the FDI framework retained many
central planning elements. In addition, these central planning elements raised the
concern of corruption and problems for the rule of law.

Chapter 4 FDI Policy and Law 2006-2016
The main focus of this chapter is FDI Policy and Law 2006-2016. The main theme
during this period was the new challenges and opportunities for Chinese FDI framework.
The main issues are (1), Chinese traditional “dualist commercial” system proved to be

19

insufficient in further serving China’s new conditions. The traditional export-oriented
FDI policy first cannot attract high-quality FDI, and secondly, the benefits of the policy
reached its limits, causing China’s imbalanced trade relationship. (2) The dualist
commercial system discriminated and alienated private sectors from the Chinese
market, which caused capital outflow with possibly more restrictions to deter such
outflow. The main findings are that, first, Chinese authorities acknowledged the issue
with traditional FDI policy and dualist commercial system. The Shanghai Free Trade Zone
experiment was designed to offer unified and fair market access for both domestic and
foreign investors. In addition, China has been working in close collaboration with the
international legal framework by promoting a new “public disclosure” scheme to create
a robust regulatory framework. In addition, the development of China’s Wechat
economy structure introduced an alternative regulatory approach to Chinese FDI
framework, which empowers the individual consumer to enforce values and orders
promoted by a central authority.

20

Chapter 2 THE FDI POLICY AND LAW BETWEEN 1978-1991

Changes occurred at the end of the 1970s that led to Chinese reform and Open
Up. Externally, China returned to the world stage. For example, in 1971, China admitted
to the UN. Nixon visited China in 1972 and started negotiation for establishing
diplomatic relations. 6 In 1979, China and US signed the Economic Cooperation
Agreement, which awarded China Most Favored National (MFN) status.7 China joined
the IMF and World Bank in 1980. During the late 1970s, the Chinese government
launched many overseas economic delegations participated in by Chinese industrialists;
bank, finance, and trade officials; and economists. These state-sponsored high-level
economic delegations normally took weeks or even months touring a specific region of
the world with a particular agenda: to learn firsthand information on modernization and

6

Shanghai Communiqué laid out the foundation for the normalization of Sino-U.S. relationship,
which removed many political obstacles for later rapprochement with the West. “Shanghai
Communiqué, which laid the basis for future cooperation between the two countries even while
acknowledging continuing disagreements on the subject of Taiwan…” See “China Policy,”
Department of the State, Office of the Historian, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy.
7
“China was first awarded MFN in 1979, during the Jimmy Carter Administration. Two-way trade
between the two countries more than doubled in a year, to $4.9 billion in 1980 from $2.4 billion
the year before. By 1990, China enjoyed a $10.4-billion annual surplus in its trade with the
United States, with exports totaling $15.2 billion and imports of U.S. goods worth $4.8 billion.
U.S. officials have predicted that China's surplus will be even larger this year. Chinese officials
have said that over the long term, they seek balanced trade. But meanwhile, this surplus places
China in a stronger position to service foreign loans and to finance future imports.” See, David
Holley, “Briefing Paper : Most Favored Nation: What It Means for the Chinese,” LA Times, last
modified June 4, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-04/news/wr-114_1_favored-nationtrading-status, (accessed August 10, 2011)
21

economic reform. 8 These missions respectively produced great information as a
resource for policy makers, which later contributed to the creation of Reform and Open
Up policy with the goal of introducing foreign investment.

Internally, China started political, ideological and economic reform in
preparation for the new economic and investment development. For example, the 1976
“Gang of Four” was purged and then arrested for trial. New political line “Four
Modernizations” was proposed to develop the national economy. With constant policy
debates and arguments, the reformers concluded that China’s central command
economy lacked flexibility, which deterred productivity and competition. The “Reform
and Open Up” policy was established through the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of CPC, which started China’s experiment with foreign investment
and economic reform.

This chapter focuses on the FDI policy and law between 1978-1991. The main
purpose is to understand the genesis of the FDI regulatory framework during this period
of the time. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part gives a comprehensive

8

The destination of these delegations including: Asian (including places such as Japan,
Singapore and Hong Kong), West Europe (including countries such as France, Belgium, Denmark,
Switzerland, and West Germany), East Europe (including Romania and Yugoslavia) and United
States in North America. “In 1978, Gu Mu, then vice premier of the State Council, led an
economic delegation to visit five Western European countries. It was the first time the Chinese
government had ever officially dispatched representatives to Western countries since the
founding of New China in 1949. See, Zhao linyun, Zhongguo guongchandang jingji gongzuo shi
[CPC Economic Work History 1921-2011] (Beijing, Zhongguo Caijing jingji Press, 2011), 100.
22

overview of the historical events of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Congress of CPC in
the introduction, which led to the promulgation and development of Chinese reform
and Open Up policy. In addition, it outlines the ideological and constitutional framework
to support China’s foreign investment experiment in the next section. It provides a
political and constitutional perspective to explore the third part of this chapter, the legal
framework of FDI regulation during 1978-1991. This part would first identify the basis of
FDI regulatory framework by introducing EJV Law and its implementing regulations.
Then it gives special attention to China’s foreign exchange regulation and labor
regulation to showcase China’s unique FDI regulation under China’s command economy.

The central issue of the FDI policy and law development during the 1978-1991
was the dynamic between the central authority’s traditional command economy setting
and the development of the new foreign investment regime. The study of the
ideological and constitutional framework and foreign investment legal framework
during this time suggests a contentious relationship between the conventional
understanding of socialism and the meaning of modernization, exemplified,
implemented and introduced by foreign investors. The most obvious evidence would be
foreign investors’ expectation for a large domestic consumer market and low labor cost
played against China’s policymakers’ expectation for foreign capital and technology
without an open domestic market. These issues had not been settled until the 14th
Party Congress in 1992, a historical event that will be discussed in the next chapter.

23

1. Introduction
After rehabilitated from the political prosecution during the cultural revolution
and restored to his political power within the Chinese Communist Party , Deng Xiaoping
and his followers gradually re-established a pragmatic political line for the Party : to
improve the living standard of Chinese people under the leadership of the Party through
the program of Four Modernizations, which was originally proposed by the late prime
minister Zhou Enlai, but was suspended due to the interference of the far-left faction
and Zhou’s illness. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with multiple state official visits to
major western countries, and numerous of close collaborations with specialists from
international organizations (such as World Bank), Deng Xiaoping and his followers
gradually formulated a notion that China cannot improve economic performance and
productivity without the world market. Specifically, Deng believed a meaningful and
successful modernization cannot be achieved without foreign capital, technology,
managerial skills, market, and investment. 9Most importantly, modernization cannot
achieve without the law to govern and protect people and society. 10

9

A West German coal mining company produces 50 million tons of coals with two thousand
employees while the same output requires 80 thousands employees. for the same amount of
output, a Switzerland Hydroelectric power plant only require 12 staff while China requires
almost three hundred. see Gu mu, “Guanyu Fangwen Ouzhou Wuguo de Qingkuang Baogao,”
[Report on Visitation of Five Western European States], 1978, July, 22 reprinted in Dangde
Wenxian 1 (2009), http://www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/DANG200901007.pdf. (accessed July 31, 2017)
10
Deng Xiaoping returned to power on a platform that emphasized the "two hands policy" and
the "four modernizations." The two hands policy meant that on the one hand, the economy
must be developed while on the other hand, the legal system must be strengthened. The four
modernizations referred to the need to modernize agriculture, industry, national defense, and
science and technology. See Randall Peerenboom, “Globalization, Path Dependency and the
24

Deng’s visions were crystallized at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central
CPC Congress, when China declared the Reform and Open-Up policy, which symbolized
a new era for China’s relationship with socialism, with world economy, and with foreign
investors. The new economic policy was supported by the revelation of two crucial and
intertwined factors: first, the power of global commerce and foreign investment in
improving the economy performance and living standard of the people, which was
evidenced by the successful transformation of Japan and Singapore in the 1970s11;
second, a more connected and integrated global economic system indicated by
increasingly stabilized international relationship between the West and China, which
was considered as an unprecedented opportunity for China due to its ideological
conflict with the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the 60s. 12

“Reform” in the context of the Reform and Open- Up meant to transform China’s
ideology thinking, and to restructure the institution of the Party and State apparatus.
“Open-Up” meant to reconnect with the West and the rest of world through trade and
foreign investment. From late 1970s to early 1990s, there had been insufficient political,

Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China,”
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 19 (2001): 161-163.
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Gu mu, “Guanyu Fangwen Ouzhou Wuguo de Qingkuang Baogao,” [Report on Visitation of
Five Western European States], 1978, July, 22 reprinted in Dangde Wenxian 1 (2009),
http://www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/DANG200901007.pdf. (accessed July 31, 2017)
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John W. Garver, China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of
China, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) 358-361.
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legal, and social infrastructure to implement the Reform and Open Up policy. But this
did not stop the central authority to give it a try. It was a period of reconstruction
between 1978-1993: political and ideological debates and institutional overhaul
established new political and constitutional principles, which served as the foundation
and guidance for the reform. During this period, massive amount of new legislation and
regulations enabled and facilitated the inflow of foreign investment and trade.

The introduction of foreign investment under the Reform and Open Up policy
has truly liberated the economy. According to the study by Shen jiaming, “since 1979,
more than 2100 joint ventures, cooperative enterprises and business wholly owned by
foreign firms have been established in China.” 13 There was no western business
presence in China before 1978 and the rapid growth was unprecedented. “By the end of
1984, total paid-in foreign investment in these enterprises had grown to $3.7 billion,
almost 60 percent higher than the year-end figure for 1983.”14 The communication
between China and the West also experienced rapidly increased since the
implementation of the Reform and Open Up policy. “By September 1988, there were
already 1,047 foreign representative offices in Beijing... P.R.C.'s exports in 1987 total

13

Shen Jiaming, “Investment in the People’s Republic of China: The Basic Legal Framework,”
U.Pa.J.Int' lBus.L. 10(1988): 409,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume10/issue3/Shen10U.Pa.J.Int'lBus.L.409(
1988).pdf, (accessed July 31, 2017)
14
Ibid.
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34.6 billion dollars, 256% higher than that in 1978. Similarly, its imports in 1987 total
33.4 billion dollars, 210% greater than that in 1978.” 15

A significant amount of foreign investment contracts was signed between 1979
to 1986. According to the study by Garry Dernelle, it was estimated that about “7,500
foreign investment contracts were signed with a value of approximately 19.1 billion U.S.
dollars.”16 Economic data illustrated the initial enthusiasm of the foreign investors.
However, this excitement soon fizzled when foreign investors encounter the reality of
Chinese central planning economy. For example, the CIA reported that FDI rose about
“10 percent to more than $2 billion in 1986, but the level of new foreign investment
pledged fell nearly 50 percent.”17 Western observers noted that “disappointment
toward new FDI regulation” and uncertainty derived from political debate over the
“pace and direction of economic reform” were the causes of the change of the
numbers.18

With the enactment of the Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) Law and Wholly
Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) Law, some foreign investors organized their business
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Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):345. Also see Zhang Lixing, “The Statutory
Framework for Direct Foreign Investment in China,” FLORIDA INT'L LJ. 4 (1989): 289-290.
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https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90T00114R000200110001-4.pdf.
18
Ibid.
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in the form of CJV or WFOE. The CIA report found that “[a]mong 1500 approved SFJV
contracts in 1986, there were 870 EJV and 560 CJV and 18 WFOE.”19 During 1978-1992,
FDI inflows increased steadily and rapidly. However, the distribution was uneven. Most
of the inflows concentrated in coastal China. For example, Guangdong Province. “FDI
has played a major role in Chinese economy, for instance by stimulating trade growth
and promoting productivity improvements in the domestic economy. Hong Kong
remains the largest source of FDI. Measured by the size of its population and other
objective factors, China’s potential for attracting more FDI from OECD countries remains
underexploited.”20

Despite the rapid growth of the FDI, the central authority did not have consensus
as to the extent and the political implication of the foreign investment. The central
authority was divided into two factions: a moderate faction supporting foreign investors
and market reform, and a traditionalist faction supporting central command economy.21

19

Ibid.
See OECD, The Role of FDI In China's Economic Development, OECD Publishing, 2003, accessed
July 31, 2017, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-investment-policyrevie
ws-china-2003/the-role-of-fdi-in-china-s-economic-development_9789264101975-4-en.
21
China’s observers in the 1970s observed and labeled two groups of policies advocators. One
was moderate and another was radicals. The “Moderator view China as a weak, vulnerable,
underdeveloped country which must be transformed as rapidly as possible into a modern
industrial state. They believe, among other things, that modernization requires scientific
exchanges with and imports of technologically advanced investment goods from the West.”
However, the radicals hold a different view, they “believe that large-scale imports of foreign
goods undermine faith of the people in the success of the revolution and makes China
vulnerable to economic ‘blackmail’. The Radicals believe that reliance on foreigners rekindles
the sense of inferiority caused by a century of humiliation at the hands of the West and that
20
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The traditionalists were struggling with the ideological debate on whether to accept
foreign investors and their market economy practice on a longer term and larger scale.
Traditionalist faction envisioned a curated command economy that private sector and
the market alone are not trusted to be sufficient to generate long-term stable economic
growth. 22 The objection of traditionalists for foreign investment was ideological: foreign
investment and relevant reforms represented capitalism economy, which is
incompatible with the socialist economy.

Deng Xiaoping and his followers had a clear vision of the relationship between
Socialism and market economy for the purpose of reform. In Deng Xiaoping’s mind,
foreign investment and export-oriented industries were great policy tools to resolve
China’s modernization problem. The export-oriented and foreign joint venture industry
could serve as a means to pay importation of advanced machinery. In addition, with the
possibility of the joint venture, China can finance the industry upgrade through foreign
investments. Furthermore, foreign invested enterprises would establish examples to
promote modernized corporate governance.23 This approach was supported by other

exposure to capitalists, capitalist-made products, and capitalist business procedures erodes the
revolutionary will of the masses, leading to revisionism.” See, Randall Peerenboom,
“Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of
Law in the People's Republic of China,” BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 19 (2001): 161-163.
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For example:“In early 1979, Chinese arranged commercial credit lines amounting to nearly 10
billion, mostly with Japanese banks. China also made major capital purchases, during mid-1979,
over 17 billion worth of pledges for officially supported export credits from France 7, UK 5, and
Japan 1.8, Canada 1.7 and Italy 1. China’s balance of payments position improved dramatically
over the next year as a result of excellent export growth.”see: Central Intelligence Agency
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senior leaders of the Party. For example, the vice prime minister Li Xiannian proposed
that the state shall reduce the fiscal pressure of direct purchasing foreign technology by
relying on compensatory trade and foreign investments.24In order to convince the party
cadres, Deng Xiaoping’s made public remarks that Mao Zedong supported economic
cooperation with the West in the form of trade and joint ventures, as Deng stated that:
“While Comrade Mao was still living we thought about expanding economic and
technical exchanges with other countries. We wanted to develop economic and
trade relations with certain capitalist countries and even to absorb foreign
capital and undertake joint ventures.”25

However, not everyone believed it. Deng argued that one cannot convince the
masses to follow socialism if the administration failed to maintain sustainable
development. With a sense of relentless pragmatism, he emphatically refuted that a
market economy only lives in capitalism.26 For example, in order to relax the tension
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For example, when Deng Xiaoping talked to Guinea first president Ahmed Sékou Touré, he
argued that “the first thing about socialism is the development of productivity...the right or
wrong of a socialist economic policy shall be determined by its effect on the development of
productivity and people’s income. This is the overriding standard.” See “Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang
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with the far-left in the Party, he skillfully packaged his reform agenda in a Maoist
expression by stating that “modernization is a new Great Revolution.”27 Deng
highlighted the main theme of the reform is to relax centralized planning.28

Although reform and decentralization were inevitable, foreign investment
experiment faced many political obstructions. Traditionalists, such as Chen Yun and his
followers repeatedly emphasized the supremacy of the central planning and
unapologetically pointed out the inherited defects of the market, such as opportunism,
would cause the collapse of those fiscally irresponsible reform policies. As a major
critique of the Reform, Chen opposed the expansion of the Special Economic Zone
experiment and considered these experiments should be contained within the approved
regions. Ironically, this idea was resonant by others after Deng Xiaoping’s retirement in
the early 1990s. Chen Yun theorized his idea as the “bird-cage economy,” in which the

Da Shiji,” [Reform and Open Up Chronical 1977-2008]
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Study Institution of McGill University, Dec. 26, 1979. Ibid.
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For example: State Council, Economic System Reform Working Group issued Preliminary
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economic mechanism shall be the primary means for government administration of the
economy, and state shall expand autonomous operation by the enterprises. Also see, the
MOFERT Report on Reforming Foreign Trade System provided that the main focus of the reform
is to separate government agency and enterprise operation, decentralization of approving
process and make trade company financially independent from the central planning.
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cage represents central planning under Party leadership and the bird represents the
market. “A bird can fly freely in the cage when the size of the cage is appropriate for the
comfort of the bird,” as Chen explained. It is important to point out that Chen Yun did
not principally oppose reform or improvements in productivity. Although many
traditionalists had ideological reasons to object foreign investment, there were also
other concerns. For example, Chen concerned a free market would threaten the
effectiveness of central planning in maintaining economic balance and protect people’s
economic rights.

A central command economy system is a self-proclaimed rule system that
requires all transactions following the central government. The integrity of the central
command economy system depends on the restrictions on the freedom of contract. The
rationale was that the private sector could not achieve optimization of economic
outcome. A centralized authority can produce an optimized outcome through central
planning. One risk for Chinese reform and Open Up was the issue of opportunism and
rent-seeking during the transition from central command economy to a more relaxed
economy system. The condition went worse when there was no effective commercial
law system during the 1980s. The launch of Reform and Open UP since the end of the
1970s entailed unprecedented waves of inflation, smuggling goods, corruption, which in
return gave platforms for the critics from conservative members of the Party and
massive protests by students. Deng realized the rise of official corruption and illegal
activities at an alarming rate, which could jeopardize the central authority’s legitimacy
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and capacity in implementing the reform. For example, state and Party officials had
unchecked access to obtain finance, natural resource, commodity, and information for
business opportunities under the planning system. These officials and their family
members and friends obtained unfair advantages over business transactions.

Many foreign investment laws and regulations during the 1980s reflected the
struggles that the traditionalists experienced. The conflicts between the command
economy and the notion of competition and profit were the main theme of the
contradiction of the reform during the 1980s and early 90s. The contradiction was not
truly settled until the beginning of the 1990s when the Party decided to build the
“socialist market economy.” The terminology “socialist market economy” expressed a
concession of political rhetoric against market and profit, which was extraordinary given
the fact that a decade ago, China was vigorously condemning the market and profit.29

Unfortunately, the Reform and Open Up ended up with a series of setbacks and
conflicts in the late 1980s, politically and economically. China still lacked a basic civil and
commercial legal system at the end of the 80s. Inflation, corruption, an opportunism for
short-term profit by state officials and enterprise managers, and other elements seeded
and fomented a sense of conflicts and discontent between the reformers and
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conservatives. There were also massive protests by students that led to strong reactions
from political conservatives.30 Uncertainty shadowed China’s future at the beginning of
the 1990s with the visible decline of foreign trade, and with foreign investment and
public condemnation from the western societies. In 1991, the public narrative turned to
a harsher tone on the reform with an ideological attack on the supporters of the reform.
For example, an editorial in People’s Daily suggested that China cannot sustain a market
economy. Another editorial openly revived Maoist expression of bourgeois
liberalization, which openly attacked the new reform policies as the host of such rightwing tendency. The Premier openly stated that the development of the economy should
slow down.

However, the story of foreign investment and reforms during the 1980s did not
end this way. Deng Xiaoping was fully aware of the mood and narrative calling for
retreating from further reform. He orchestrated a semi-private trip to the Special
Economic Zone during the Chinese New Year of 1992.31 During the trip, his open
remarks on Chinese administration revealed his frustration and concern for the
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For example, the new year editorial of People’s Daily in 1987 proposed to uphold Four

Cardinal Principle and against Bourgeois liberalization (Zi chan jie ji zi you hua 资产阶级自由化
思潮)
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Between Jan 18 and Feb 21 of 1992, Deng Xiaoping scheduled a southern tour through train to
visit Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai. He made public speech openly criticized the slowdown of
reform process. He called for further liberal market reform. Initially, the southern tour was not
publicized by the official press until later of the year. About the organization and subsequent
implication of the trip, see Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China,
(Cambridge, MA, and London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011): 876.
34

slowdown of the reform. He unapologetically proclaimed that the debate of central
planning and market economy is not a defining element of socialist ideology, which was
a position he repeatedly argued throughout the 1980s.32 To him, a much more
appropriate benchmark or the predominant defining element for socialism would be the
performance of the economy and living standard of the people.33 Deng’s public remark
later resonated with his followers in the Party. The mood of uncertainty disappeared by
the end of 1992. It is interesting, from a retrospective, to reconsider Deng’s reaction and
remarks. It is clear that conservatives’ concern over reform derived from the classic
problem of “opportunism” under market economy system without a strong protection
from the rule of law. Although Deng himself mentioned the administration should
concentrate on reforming and relaxing central planning and regulation on the one hand,
on the other hand, he warned the administration the need to use law and legal system
to punish illegal activities such as corruption and smuggling. The 1992 Deng Xiaoping’s
Southern Tour ended the uncertainty of Chinese reform and entailed a new era of
China’s development of the FDI legislation. In addition, an economy performance
benchmark, such as GDP, GNP and or other economic data had started to be a critical
evaluation standard to determine the policy of the state and career path of state
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Deng Xiaoping told future premier Zhu Rongji during his Shanghai visit in 1991 that it is
impossible to have economic development without open up. In addition, China cannot stop the
reform because there were different opinions in the party. Ibid.
33
For example, “Fundamentally, the reason we cannot step forward on the path of reform
linked to our fear for capitalism and capitalism path. The benchmark for socialism or capitalism
debate should be whether the policy could improve socialist productivity, whether it could
improve national power and the living standard of the people.” Ibid.
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officials.

2. Ideological and Constitutional Framework
a. Ideological Framework

Acceptance is the first step of invitation for foreign investors. Before China
opened the gate for foreign investment, the political rhetoric against market and private
ownership had gradually declined but not disappeared throughout the 1980s. During
the 1970s, the 11th Party Congress asserted that “defend socialist economy, against
attacks from urban and rural capitalism.34” At the end of the 1970s, although the official
position on the privately owned or operated economy was less supportive, it turned a
neutral and less combative tone. It considered such acts as the “supplement and
addition” to a socialist economy. In 1981, the 6th Plenary Session of 11th Central CPC
showed more supports, which affirmed that such economic activity is “necessary
supplement.” The 12th Party Congress further relaxed the taboo by claiming private
owned, or the operated economy is “necessary and beneficial.” The authority approved
three economy forms during the early 1980s: State owned enterprises (SOE), Collective
Ownership and Individual owned or operated economy. The term for individual owned
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or the operating economy in Chinese is “Geti jingji,” literally meaning individual
economy of urban and rural working people, which de-emphasize the issue of
ownership due to political sensitivity. In 1988, the political rhetoric dismissed the
traditional taboo on the market and private ownership; it proposed a new term “Siying
jingji” (private sector of the economy) in Chinese, which means a form of an economy
managed and operated by private sector. This new policy also approved by 1988
Constitution. The 1988 Constitution amendment added a new paragraph to article 11,
which stated that:

“The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within
limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to
the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of
the private sector of the economy and exercises guidance, supervision, and
control over the private sector of the economy.35”

The pre-amendment article provided that:
“The individual economy of urban and rural working people, operating within
limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist public economy. The
State protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy. The
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1988 Const Amendment.
37

State guides assists and supervises the individual economy by administrative
control.36
This section focuses on the ideological and constitutional framework between
1978-1991 that contribute to the development of China’s foreign investment policy and
law. It will provide a brief overview over the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central CPC
and the promulgation of the 1982 Constitution, which offers a necessary historical
context in understanding the FDI legal framework in the next section.

Various events occurred prior to the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central
Committee of CPC in 1978 suggested a gowning consensus that questioning the
legitimacy of the old thinking and structure on what defines as socialism. For example,
left extremists and Mao’s followers’ political line was publicly debated and questioned.
The supports for the reform grown stronger. The idea of rewarding one’s labor based on
performance and contribution was no longer considered as capitalism practice.37 A new
economic system “rural responsibility” was introduced and implemented, to allow
peasants sell any products that exceed their assigned portion.38 The People’s
Procuratorate was restored as a part of Chinese legal system rebuild after the Cultural
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Up 1977-2008 , ( Beijing: Zhongguo caijing Press, 2008)
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Revolution. In multiple occasions, Deng revealed that “fundamental feature showing the
superiority of the socialist system is to be able to have an unprecedented development
of productivity than the old society [pre-1949 Republic of China time], and to be able
gradually to satisfy the growing needs of the people.”39 Two days before the meeting,
on December 16, Beijing and Washington jointly issued Joint Communiqué on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, which was unimaginable when China acquiesced
U.S. as imperialists just a few years ago. 40

On December 22, 1978, Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing.41 Historians and Chinese authorities
later consider this meeting as the beginning of a new era for China: it not only
denounced left extremism political ideology but also opened a small gate to reconsider
the role of central planning, which is essential for the decision for the Reform and Open
Up policy and the policy of accepting foreign investment in China.

On the ideological side, this meeting officially ended the political line of class
struggle as the main goal of the state, which was just affirmed in 1978 Constitution in
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Zhonggong shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui (中共十一届三中全会) [Communique of the Third

Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] adopted at the
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Dec.
22, 1978, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/pekingreview/1978/PR1978-52.pdf.
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less than ten months.42 In assessing the past left extremist political movements, the
meeting linked the connection between Party’s failure of enforcing democratic
centralism and the expansion extremist political view. Thus, it called for restoring the
principle of democratic centralism and collective leadership, and the need for restoring
the rule of law in protecting people’s Constitutional rights-- a move that not only later
successfully attacked Mao’s followers in the Party, but also made it possible to
rehabilitate many Party cadres and intellectuals.43 For example, it emphatically stated
the importance of law in safeguarding people’s democracy and socialism four
modernization.44 Law is needed for building and improving the socialist legal system.45
42

The People's Republic of China is a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by
the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. PRC Constitution. Art.1
43
“The plenary session unanimously endorsed the policy decision put forward by Comrade Hua
Guofeng on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on shifting the emphasis of
our Party's work and the attention of the people of the whole country to socialist
modernization.”
“The session highly evaluated the discussion of whether practice is the sole criterion for testing
truth, noting that this is of far-reaching historic significance in encouraging comrades of the
whole Party and the people of the whole country to emancipate their minds and follow the
correct ideological line.” See, “Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central
Committee,” Beijing Review.com October 10, 2008,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/200810/10/content_156226_5.htm.
44
Since for a period in the past democratic centralism was not carried out in the true sense,
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to lay particular emphasis on democracy at present, and on the dialectical relationship between
democracy and centralism, so as to make the mass line the foundation of the Party's centralized
leadership and the effective direction of the organizations of production. See The Communique.
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on the agenda of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and
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In addition, it announced to shift the focus from politics and ideology to a more
moderate and practical goal: economic development and modernization. The meeting’s
diagnosis on China’s economic performance linked the underperformance of the
economy with China’s over centralized command economy system. It openly criticized
that the entanglement between government agencies and enterprises under the
centralization creating problems for the performance efficiency.46 The cautiously
drafted language suggested the planning may not be compatible with the law of the
economics and function of the value in economic activities.47 Thus, the meeting
proposed for decentralization and liberalization based on its critique of a centralized
command economy. The Communique proposed new policy designed to separate Party,
government, and enterprise through introducing a new “responsibility system,”

judicial organizations must maintain their independence as is appropriate; they must faithfully
abide by the laws, rules and regulations, serve the people's interests, keep to the facts;
guarantee the equality of all people before the people's laws and deny anyone the privilege of
being above the law. See, “Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central
Committee,” Beijing Review.com October 10, 2008,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/200810/10/content_156226_5.htm.
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management in our country is the over-concentration of authority, and it is necessary boldly to
shift it under guidance from the leadership to lower levels so that the local authorities and
industrial and agricultural enterprises will have greater power of decision in management under
the guidance of unified state planning; big efforts should be made to simplify bodies at various
levels charged with economic administration and transfer most of their functions to such
enterprises as specialized companies or complexes. Ibid.
47
“It is necessary to act firmly in line with the law of economics, attach importance to the
function of the value in economics, consciously combine ideological and political work with
economic methods and give full play to the enthusiasm of cadres and workers for production.”
Ibid.
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performance evaluation and promotion system.48 Translate into plain language this was
a half supports to private interest, private profits.

It is important to point out that the 1978 Meeting was not the end of the debate
for the nature of the reform and legitimacy of foreign investment policy under a socialist
system, on the contrary, the meeting cracked an opening on the supreme status of
central planning. In fact, as the FDI policy and legislation expressed, China was not fully
embracing the notion of the market economy during the entire 1980s. Questions and
debates about the legitimacy of the new reform and the definition of socialism
throughout the 1980s. For example, less than three months after the Third Plenary
Session, the head of Plan Commission, Chen Yun published his essay on the issues of
Central Planning and Market. He argued that socialist economy needs two defining
feature: 1, centralized planning, which is the foundation; 2, the market as a supplement
to adjust the central plan.

Although debates about the nature of socialism in the context of introducing
foreign investment never ends during the 1980s, the central authority made the

48

“ It is necessary, under the centralized leadership of the Party, to tackle conscientiously the
failure to make a distinction between the Party, the government and the enterprise and to put a
stop to the substitution of Party for government and the substitution of government for
enterprise administration, to institute a division of responsibilities among different levels, types
of work and individuals, increase the authority and responsibility of administrative bodies and
managerial personnel, reduce the number of meetings and amount of paperwork to raise work
efficiency, and conscientiously adopt the practices of examination, reward and punishment,
promotion and demotion. Ibid.
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decision for the Reform and Open Up. In fact, the decision of reform and open up, using
foreign investment and establishing special economic zone was the result of some
careful policy studies and debates. The information pool for the policymaker came from
two sources. First, a massive wave of state-sponsored economic delegation around the
world to investigate and study economic development in other countries. Second, close
academic cooperation with an international organization, such as World Bank. 49

b. Constitutional Framework
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress of CPC established an
ideological and conceptual framework for the development of China’s socialist
modernization. It fundamentally shifted Authority's focus from politics to economic
development by redefining China’s socialism. After the Third Plenary Session of 11th
Central Committee of CPC, the Party openly denounced the Cultural Revolution and
announced a new political line of focusing modernization and economic development.
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“The World Bank’s first official mission to China to discuss Beijing’s request was led by its
president, Robert McNamara in April 1980. The mission was received by Deng Xiaoping who told
the mission: “We are very poor. We have lost touch with the world. We need the World Bank to
catch up. We can do it without you, but we can do it quicker and better with you.” The change in
China’s representation in the World Bank was arranged with amazing speed; in May1980 the
Board approved Beijing’s request. The first mission was led by “thirty two Bank staff
(economists, agronomists, engineers, health experts, education experts and other sector
specialists) participated at various times, from October through December … The Chinese
organized a counterpart team which included Zhu Rongji (China’s PM from 1998 –
2003)…Mission findings were reflected in a 1,000-page multi-volume report entitled ‘China:
Socialist Economic Development’ which was submitted to the Bank’s Board before the first
project loan was presented for approval in June 1981.” see Pieter Bottelier, “China and the
World Bank: How a Partnership Was Built,” Working Paper No. 277, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/84e3/99cb8a4029d3bba20d34a754ce98da230dd8.pdf.
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Since then, the central authority started the process of drafting constitution
amendment, to restore and rebuild China’s legal infrastructure. According to Peng
Zhen’s report to the National People’s Congress (NPC), the NPC started this process by
establishing a Constitution Amendment Committee to charge the draft in 1980.50 This
Constitution amendment later has become the basis of China’s current constitutional
framework. The report particularly highlighted that:
Our country follows the policy of opening to the outside world while adhering to
the principle of independence and will continue to do so in the days to come.
China will continue to expand economic, technological and cultural exchanges
with other countries on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The draft
stipulates that foreign economic organizations and individuals foreign may invest
in China and enter into economic cooperation with Chinese economic
organizations. Of course, all foreign economic organizations in China must abide
by the laws of the People’s Republic of China, and their lawful rights and
interests will be protected by the law of the People’s Republic of China.51
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Peng zhen, “Report on the Draft of the Revised Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,”
delivered at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on November 26, 1982,
accessed, July 27, 2017 http://www.e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1982/1982e.report.pdf.
51

Zhonggong shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui (中共十一届三中全会) [Communique of the Third

Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] adopted at the
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Dec.
22, 1978, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/pekingreview/1978/PR1978-52.pdf.
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The 1982 Constitution is one landmark legislation that affirmed the principles of
the 3rd plenary session, which established the constitutional basis for Chinese reform
and Open Up. It provides a legal basis for China’s new economic reform and foreign
investment. Although it has limits, it is a necessary tool for the later development. The
Preamble provided that:

“The future of China is closely linked with that of the whole world. China adheres
to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression,
noninterference in each other’s' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and
cultural exchanges with other countries.”52

The article 6 of the Constitution defined China’s economic system; it provided that:

The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is
socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the
whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The system of
socialist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man;
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Preamble, PRC Constitution.
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it applies the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to
his work.53

As later discussion indicated, between 1978-1991, China’s foreign investment legal
framework operated within a centralized planning economy. The government
functioned as the central planner with unchecked power, and China’s legal system was
underdeveloped. Other articles in the Constitution can also highlight this central
planning economy. For example, article 11 defined the relationship between private
sector and public sector:
The individual economy of urban and rural working people, operating within
limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist public economy. The
State protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy. The
State guides assists and supervises the individual economy by administrative
control.54
The statutory language clearly stated the words “control,” which indicated that the
supports to the private sector were minimum. Article 12 further emphasized
that: “Socialist public property is inviolable. The State protects socialist public
property.”55 However, no similar treatment was awarded to “private sector,” which
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PRC. Const art. 6.
PRC. Const art. 11.
55
PRC. Const art.12.
54
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affirmed a clear and differentiated treatment by the Constitution. 56Article 18 stipulated
basic principle of the foreign investment. It provided that:

The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign
economic organizations, and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter
into various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises and other
Chinese economic organizations in accordance with the provisions of the laws of
the People's Republic of China. All foreign enterprises, other foreign economic
organizations as well as Chinese-foreign joint ventures within Chinese territory
shall abide by the laws of the People's Republic of China. Their lawful rights and
interests are protected by the laws of the People's Republic of China. 57

The restrictive tone over China’s private-sector under the Constitution create a shocking
contrast with the article 18. As the discussions in next section suggested, the
development of FDI framework between 1978-1991 displayed a dualist regulation
system. China’s private sector was oppressed by the central planning system. The
foreign investments were treated as tools for creating foreign exchange and technology
for China’s economic development.

56
57

This changed in 2004 Constitution amendment. See next chapter discussion.
PRC. Const art.18.
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3. FDI Legal Framework 1978-1991

On July 1st of 1979, the second session of The Fifth National People’s Congress
adopted Sino- Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (hereinafter EJV Law).58 This was the
first foreign invested enterprise (hereinafter FIE) related legislation since the 3rd Plenary
Session of the 11th National Congress of CPC proclaiming the decision of Reform and
Open Up. The 1979 EJV Law was an “enabling act” for containing only 15 short articles.
Supplementary legislation such as Implementing EJV Regulations was adopted to
provide necessary guidance for the investor and regulator. The 1979 EJV Law and its
implementing rules formed the foundation for China’s foreign investment framework.

The first generation of the foreign investment legal framework demonstrated
various features of the centralized command economy system. For example, (1) the
Sino-foreign joint venture (JVs) adopt the principle of “equal share, equal rights,” which
negated the rights of majority shareholder by requiring a unanimous decision. (2) The
chairman of the board of director in a foreign invested enterprise (FIE) must be served
by a Chinese. (3) FIE must submit detailed production and operation plan to China’s
planning authority for inspection and review before, during and after production. (4)
The FIE cannot sell its products to China’s domestic market without obtaining
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Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated July.
1, 1979 by the Second Session of The Fifth National People’s Congress) [hereinafter EJV Law].
Many studies and publications during the 80s also translated the title of this law as Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.
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administrative permission. Even with permission, the products must be sold to a
government agency that in charge of the distribution because there was no private
distribution network and market. (5) The employee of the FIE must be appointed or
recommended by local labor authority. Any disciplinary punishment or discharge must
be approved by such authority. In addition, due to a shortage of foreign exchange, strict
foreign exchange rule was placed on FIE. (6) Employees can only remit 50% of their
salary outside China. Initial enthusiasm from investment community soon declined due
to market restrictions, the lack of a meaningful and clear legal guidance, and strict rules
on foreign exchange.

The central authority was not unaware of these unpopular restrictions and
regulations. The State Council issued 1986 Encouragement Provision, which designed to
relax some unpopular restrictions. With this new measure, FIE can hire or discipline
employee at their will. The restriction on Chinese chairman was also removed. In 1986
the NPC adopted WFOE Law, in 1990 State Council adopted WFOE Implementing Rules.
These two laws allowed foreign investors to establish a wholly owned business in China.
The Contractual Joint Venture Law (hereinafter CJV Law) was enacted in 1988. The EJV,
WFOE (Wholly foreign owned enterprises), and CJV referred to different forms of
investment structure for foreign investors. The Contractual Joint Venture is a special
form of a business venture based on contract. The venture itself would not be an
independent legal entity. Each investor would be held responsible in accordance with
their shares of contribution. Legally, this form of investment remembered to the
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structure of a partnership. The EJV Law, WFOE Law, and CJV Law and their implementing
rules formed the basis of China’s FDI regulatory framework. Under this foreign
investment legal framework, China later adopted relevant tax regulations, labor
regulations, foreign exchange regulations and contract regulations. In addition, as many
ignored, China adopted special investment measures for investors from Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan with less restrictive rules. Throughout the 1980s, China had signed
series bilateral treaties of investment protection with different countries around the
world to gain MFN status.59 These treaties became the foundation for China’s future
investment regime.
It is important to point out that there was no formal commercial legal
infrastructure during the 1980s. Thus most of the FIE related legislation were fulfilled by
administrative rules and decrees created by State Council or relevant departments. In
addition, foreign investment laws promoted arbitration as dispute resolution when
China’s litigation system was not ready to adjudicate disputes involved foreign investors.
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See Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the BelgianLuxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
accessed July 31, 2017, http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h/au/201001/20100106725192.html.
Art. 3.1: Direct or indirect investment made by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory
of the other Contracting Party shall enjoy equitable treatment.
art. 3.3 The treatment and protection provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not be
less favorable than that enjoyed by investors of a third State.
Art. 11: Investors of one Contracting Party shall enjoy the most favored nation treatment in the
territory in the of the other Contracting Party in respect of all the matters subject to this
Agreement. Or see: Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's
Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments: Neither
Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated with such investments by
the investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that accorded to
the investments and associated activities by the investors of any third State.
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The FDI framework during the 1980s subject to various criticisms from the investment
community. The most prominent one was a lack of coherency and clarity. Corruption
and rent-seeking issues were also quite serious throughout the 1980s. However, as
Deng famously stated: it is better to have some law than not, and we can improve it
later. Massive legislation during the 1990s started China’s judicial system
modernization, which focuses on the quality of the legislation and the professionalism
of judicial system.

This section exclusively focuses on the legal framework of FDI between 19781991. The purpose is to illustrate how the foreign investment policies and laws were
created and developed through analysis of the laws and regulations. This section will
first discuss the EJV Law and supplementing regulations. In this part, it will provide an
article by article analysis of the first EJV Law. Then it will provide a shorter analysis on
WFOE Law and CJV Law because these laws are sharing similar regulations with the EJV
Law. In addition, this section will also discuss the foreign exchange regulations and labor
regulations. The purpose of this section is to provide a comprehensive overview of the
basic framework of foreign investment regulation. At the end of this section, a short
summary will be provided to highlight issues and complaints of China’s FDI framework
between 1978-1991.

a. EJV Law Framework
On July 1st of 1979, the second session of The Fifth National People’s Congress
51

adopted Sino- Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (hereinafter EJV Law).60 This EJV Law
was later amended in 1990 and 2001. The current 2016 EJV Law is based on 2001
version with one minor change. There were only fifteen articles for the 1979 EJV Law. As
one scholar concluded that the law was “too vague and too skeleton.”61 Thus,
supplementary legislation was created during the 1980s to form an EJV regulatory
framework.

The main purpose of the EJV Law, as the article one stated, was to “expanding
international economic cooperation and technological exchange.”62 Interestingly, the
phrase “international economic cooperation and technological exchange,” widely used
in diplomatic context played down the economic implication of foreign investors
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Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated July.

1, 1979 by the Second Session of The Fifth National People’s Congress)中华人民共和国中外合
资经营企业法. Many studies and publications during the 80s also translated the title of this law
as Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment.
61
Barbara Campbell Potter, “China's equity joint venture law: a standing invitation to the West
for foreign investment?” Univ. Penn. J. Int. Law 12, no.1 (1993) :362 Accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume14/issue1/Potter14U.Pa.J.Int%27lBus.L.
1(1993).pdf.
62
Art.1, EJV Law. “With a view to expanding international economic cooperation and
technological exchange, the People's Republic of China shall permit foreign companies,
enterprises, other economic organizations or individuals (hereinafter referred to as "foreign
joint venturers") to establish equity joint ventures together with Chinese companies, enterprises
or other economic organizations (hereinafter referred to as "Chinese joint venturers") within the
territory of the People's Republic of China, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit and
subject to approval by the Chinese Government. ”
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because capitalism was still a sensitive issue. 63 Foe example, one of the issues at the
planning stage of establishing SEZ was how to name the special experiment. The term
“trade zone,” “export zone” or even “industrial park” were refused because they were
considered as the too bourgeoisie.

With only fifteen articles, the signature 1979 EJV Law covered very basic aspect
of foreign investment without any supports from a functioning domestic legal system
due to lack of contract law, civil code or other essential commercial law.64 Thus, the
1979 EJV Law was more of a political statement than a meaningful legal guidance, which
affirmed the will of enforcing the open up policy. As Deng himself admitted “an
imperfect law is better than nothing,” because it could be the first step for later
improvement.65 In addition, the 1979 EJV Law did serve some practice interests. First, as
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The 1978 Constitution and political rhetoric at late 1970s remained hostile to foreign
elements. See 1978 Constitution preamble. See P.R.C. Const. Preamble, “We must persevere in
the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and in the struggle for the socialist road
against the capitalist road. We must oppose revisionism and prevent the restoration and
aggression against our country by social-imperialism and imperialism.” accessed July 31, 2017,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:People%27s_Republic_of_China_1978_Constitu
tion.pdf&page=3/.
64
China do not have any form of contract law until the promulgation of Economic Contract Law
in 1981. The first Civil law in China was 1986 General Principle of Civil Law. China do not have
company law until 1993.
65
“There is a lot of legislative work to do, and we don't have enough trained people. Therefore,
legal provisions will have to be less than perfect to start with, then be gradually improved upon.
Some laws and statutes can be tried out in particular localities and later enacted nationally after
the experience has been evaluated and improvements have been made. Individual legal
provisions can be revised or supplemented one at a time, as necessary; there is no need to wait
for a comprehensive revision of an entire body of law. In short, it is better to have some laws
than none, and better to have them sooner than later. Moreover, we should intensify our study
of international law.” See, Deng Xiaoping, “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, and
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Deng insightfully pointed out, it established a legal foundation for future improvement.
Second, it officially proclaimed China’s commitment to Reform and Open Up through
the expression of legislation by NPC. This announcement not only dismissed the protest
against foreign investment in China’s politics circle but also assured foreign investors
China’s plan for Reform and Open Up.

Article one and two outlined the purpose of FDI and the eligibility of investors.
As previously indicated, the purpose of FDI was to “expand international economic
cooperation and technological exchange.”66 Foreign companies, enterprises, individuals
and other economic organizations are permitted to establish EJV with only Chinese
business entity (excluding Chinese individual).67 It is important to point out that the
“foreigner” presumed anyone outside mainland China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan
even China claiming sovereignty over these regimes at the time). But China would adopt
the term “Overseas Chinese” to categorize this special group.

Article 3 governed the basic principle of establishing FIE, which provided that a

Unite as One in Looking to the Future,” accessed July 31, 2017,
http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1260.html.
66
Art.1, EJV Law.
67
Art. 1, and art. 2 of EJV Law. see “The Chinese Government shall protect, in accordance with
the law, the investment of foreign joint ventures, the profits due them and their other lawful
rights and interests in an equity joint venture, pursuant to the agreement, contract and articles
of association approved by the Chinese Government. All activities of an equity joint venture
shall comply with the provisions of the laws, decrees and pertinent regulations of the People's
Republic of China.”
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FIE applicant must obtain administrative approval from a designated agency prior to the
process of applying for a business registration. This practice did not change until a
recent adjustment in 2016 after the success of Shanghai Free Trade Zone, which allowed
certain investors exempt from foreign investment verification.68 Such agency will
develop a set of rules, directives, and regulations concerning the qualification and
required conditions for the investors and investment project. Article 3 required prior
obtaining a business license through State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC), the signed joint venture agreements, contracts and article of association must be
approved and permitted by PRC Foreign Investment Commission.69

Article four specified the corporate form of the joint venture and minimal
contribution standard. It required foreign investor must contribute no less than 25
percent of its registered capital. The established joint venture would be a limited liability
company that investors would share the profit and risk in accordance with their
contribution.70 Article five concerned the forms of contribution. It specified that foreign
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See last chapter on Shanghai Free Trade Zone.
Art. 3, EJV Law “
“Article 3The equity joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed
by the parties to the venture shall be submitted to the Foreign Investment Commission
of the People's Rpublic of China, which shall then decide to approve or disapprove the
venture within three months. When approved, the equity joint venture shall register
with the General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of
China, acquire a business licence and start operations.”
70
Art.4 EJV Law
“An equity joint venture shall take the form of a limited liability company. The
proportion of the foreign joint venture's investment in an equity joint venture shall be,
in general, not less than 25 percent of its registered capital.
69
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investor could contribute cash, in kind or industrial property. It strongly emphasized that
the foreign investor could subject to compensation request from China when such
contribution was made by outdated technology and equipment. The Foreign investor
must also pay for land use rights when land use rights were not part of the contribution
to the joint venture.71

Perhaps one of the most controversial regulations of the EJV Law was the article
six, which governed the board of the directors. This article required the chairman of the
board of the director must be served by a Chinese person appointed by the Chinese
partner in the JV. Without specifying the decision-making process in EJV board, article
six only vaguely stated that both parties should make a decision under the principle of
equal and mutual benefits.72 Clearly, this meant China negate “majority share control”

The parties to the venture shall share the profits, risks and losses in proportion to their
contributions to the registered capital. If any of the joint venturers wishes to assign its
registered capital, it must obtain the consent of the other parties to the venture.”
71
Art. 5, EJV Law,
“The parties to an equity joint venture may make their investment in cash, in kind or in
industrial property rights, etc. The technology and equipment contributed by a foreign
joint venturer as its investment in kind must be advanced technology and equipment
that really suit China's needs. In case of losses caused by a foreign joint venturer
practicing deception through the intentional provision of outdated technology and
equipment, it shall compensate for the losses.A Chinese joint venturer's investment may
include the right to the use of a site provided for the equity joint venture during the
period of its operation. If the right to the use of the site is not taken as a part of the
Chinese joint venturer's investment, the equity joint venture shall pay the Chinese
Government for its use.The above-mentioned investments shall be specified in the
contract and articles of association of the equity joint venture, and their value
(excluding that of the site) shall be assessed by all parties to the venture.”
72
Art. 6 EJV Law
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in corporate governance. However, the chairman of the board was also vested other
important authorities: such as signature JV contract. This meant foreign managers in JV
might need Chinese chairman’s support to greenlight an important business dealing.

Distribution of profits and taxation was set forth in article seven. Under article
seven, the after-tax profit would be distributed in accordance with the proportion of
their investment in joint venture. This means investors cannot privately determine the
share of profit. Article seven also provided a less clear tax incentive: an equity joint
venture equipped with world advanced technology can enjoy income tax reduction or
exemption for the first two to three profit-making years.73 Clearly, the definition of

An equity joint venture shall have a board of directors, the size and composition of
which shall be stipulated in the contract and articles of association, after consultation
between the parties to the venture; the directors shall be appointed and replaced by
the relevant parties. The board of directors shall have a chairman, whose office shall be
assumed by the Chinese side, one or two vice-chairmen, whose office(s) shall be
assumed by the foreign joint venturer(s). In handling important problems, the board of
directors shall make decisions through consultation by the parties to the venture on the
principle of equality and mutual benefit.
The functions and powers of the board of directors are, as stipulated in the articles of
association of the equity joint venture, to discuss and decide all major issues concerning
the venture, namely, the venture's development plans, proposals for production and
business operations, the budget for revenues and expenditures, the distribution of
profits, the plans concerning manpower and wages, the termination of business, and
the appointment or employment of the general manager, the vice-general manager(s),
the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors, as well as the determination of their
functions, powers and terms of employment, etc.
The offices of general manager and vice-general manager(s) (or factory manager and
deputy manager(s)) shall be assumed by the respective parties to the venture.
The employment and discharge of the workers and staff members of an equity joint
venture shall be stipulated in accordance with the law in the agreement and contract
concluded by the parties to the venture.”
73
See Art. 7 EJV Law
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“world advanced technology” required further explanation by the authority.

There were other restrictions related to capitals. For example, FIEs must deposit
their profit and money at Bank of China [hereinafter BOC] or any other bank approved
by BOC.74 In order to save foreign exchange reserve, EJV Law further specified a
preference of domestic supplier over the foreign supplier for manufacturing purchasing.
75

Because China did not allow FIEs to pay domestic supplier with foreign exchange, FIEs

“The net profit of an equity joint venture shall be distributed among the parties to the
venture in proportion to their respective contributions to the registered capital, after
payment out of its gross profit of the equity joint venture income tax, pursuant to the
provisions of the tax laws of the People's Republic of China, and after deductions from
the gross profit of a reserve fund, a bonus and welfare fund for workers and staff
members and a venture expansion fund, as stipulated in the venture's articles of
association. An equity joint venture equipped with advanced technology by world
standards may apply for a reduction of or exemption from income tax for the first two
to three profit-making years. A foreign joint venturer that reinvests its share of the net
profit within Chinese territory may apply for a partial refund of the income tax already
paid.”
74
Art. 8, EJV Law
“An equity joint venture shall open an account with the Bank of China or a bank
approved by the Bank of China. An equity joint venture shall handle its foreign exchange
transactions in accordance with the regulations on foreign exchange control of the
People's Republic of China. An equity joint venture may, in its business operations,
directly raise funds from foreign banks. The various kinds of insurance coverage of an
equity joint venture shall be furnished by Chinese insurance companies.”
75
Art. 9 EJV Law
“The production and business operating plans of an equity joint venture shall be
submitted to the competent authorities for the record and shall be implemented
through economic contracts. In its purchase of required raw and semi-processed
materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc., an equity joint venture should give first
priority to purchases in China. It may also make such purchases directly on the world
market with foreign exchange raised by itself. An equity joint venture shall be
encouraged to market its products outside China. It may sell its export products on
foreign markets directly or through associated agencies or China's foreign trade
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must sell foreign exchange to BOC to obtain Chinese currency. Moreover, additional
restrictions could be found in Article 10 and 11 specified that profit or wage earned in
China by a foreign investor or an employee could only be remitted abroad through the
Bank of China under a less desired official exchange rate.76

The EJV Law also sent some uncertain signals about China’s commitment to the
future of JV program when it placed a mandatory time limits on the existence of EJV.
Under article 12, the equity joint venture only lasted to a period of time agreed by the
investors, although investors can apply for an extension through the Foreign Investment
Commission.77 There was a strong presumption that supporting a limited and restricted

agencies. Its products may also be sold on the Chinese market. When necessary, an
equity joint venture may set up branches and subbranches outside China.”
76
See art. 10
“The net profit which a foreign joint venture receives as its share after performing its
obligations under the laws, the agreements and the contract, the funds it receives upon
the expiration of the venture's term of operation or its early termination, and its other
funds may be remitted abroad through the Bank of China in accordance with the foreign
exchange regulations and in the currency or currencies specified in the contract
concerning the equity joint venture.
A foreign joint venture shall be encouraged to deposit in the Bank of China the foreign
exchange which it is entitled to remit abroad.”
Art.11
“The wages, salaries or other legitimate income earned by a foreign worker or staff
member of an equity joint venture, after payment of the individual income tax under
the tax laws of the People's Republic of China, may be remitted abroad through the
Bank of China in accordance with foreign exchange regulations.”
77
Art. 12 EJV Law
“The contract period of an equity joint venture may be decided through consultation by
the parties to the venture according to its particular line of business and circumstances.
Upon its expiration, the joint venture contract period may be extended if the parties
have reached an agreement and obtained the approval of the Foreign Investment
Commission of the People's Republic of China. An application for such extension shall be
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foreign presence for the purpose of facilitating domestic companies obtain modern
business operation skills and technology. Article 13 set forth reasons for ending an
equity joint venture, which includes: several losses, fail to perform obligations under
joint venture agreement, force majeure, etc.78 Article 14 concerned dispute resolution,
which provided that investors can settle their disputes through mediation or arbitration
in China or other agency agreed by investors.

The 1979 EJV Law was revolutionary, it directly confronted with value and faith
vested within the 1978 Constitution by permitting the representatives of “bourgeois and
imperialist,” which tested Chinese policy makers and reformers’ understanding of
modernization and beneficiary of the socialism.79 The legislation of EJV Law was led by
Peng Zhen, who started China’s legislative work after rehabilitation from the Cultural
Revolution. The first wave of legislation after Cultural Revolution included Election Law,

made six months before expiration of the contract.”
Art.13 EJV Law
“If, prior to the expiration of the contract period of an equity joint venture, there occur
heavy losses, failure of a party to perform its obligations under the contract and the
articles of association or force majeure, etc., the contract may be terminated before the
expiration date through consultation and agreement by the parties, and subject to
approval by the Foreign Investment Commission of the People's Republic of China and
to registration with the General Administration for Industry and Commerce. In cases of
losses caused by a breach of contract, the financial responsibility shall be borne by the
party that has breached the contract.”
79
See P.R.C. Const. Preamble, “We must persevere in the struggle of the proletariat against the
bourgeoisie and in the struggle for the socialist road against the capitalist road. We must oppose
revisionism and prevent the restoration and aggression against our country by socialimperialism and imperialism.” accessed July 31, 2017,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:People%27s_Republic_of_China_1978_Constitu
tion.pdf&page=3/.
78
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Organization Law for People’s Congress and People’s Government, Organization Law for
People’s Court, Organization Law for People's Procuratorate, PRC Criminal Code, PRC
Criminal Procedural Law, and EJV Law. He proclaimed that “the development of socialist
democracy requires future improve and complete socialist rule by law…”80 During the
draft of the EJV Law, there was an intensive discussion on whether the law should place
a restriction on the percentage of foreign investors’ share. The original draft restricted
foreign investor share shall not exceed 49%, and major business decision required ⅔ of
the investor approval. After consultation with experts and investors, Deng Xiaoping and
Peng Zhen believed such restriction would be detrimental to the foreign investors,
which might not be what policymaker wanted.81 Although China did not adopt any share
restrictions, it negates majority shareholder principle by asserting all major corporate
affairs must be determined unanimously.

Although 1979 EJV Law was considered as an “enabling legislation,” it jumped
started China’s foreign investment policy. Few months after the promulgation of 1979
EJV Law, the first SFJV Beijing Air Catering was established in April 1980.82 On April 1990,
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Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi (中共中央党史研究室) [CPC Party Hisotry Research

Office], “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo da shiji 1949-2009” (中华人民共和国大事记) [Chronical
of People’s Republic of China 1949-2009], accessed July 27, 2017,
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184862.html.
81

Jingrongjie, “Zhongguo shoujia zhongwai hezi qiye” (中国首家中外合资企业：北京航空食品

有限公司) [The First Sino-Foreign Joint Venture: Beijing Airline Food Catering Inc], accessed July
27, 2017, http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2009/09/0414435979906.shtml.
82
For example, see the administrative approval from PRC Foreign Investment Administrative
Committee Notice: On April 4th of 1980, Foreign Investment Administrative Committee
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Seventh National People's Congress adopted a new amendment to the EJV Law.83 This
was the only amendment to EJV Law between 1978-1991, it was later amended again in
2001 and 2016. The 1990 amendment covered about 9 articles, focused on sections
with strong criticisms and complaints from the foreign investment community. 84 For
example. The EJV Law emphatically stated that the state would not nationalize FIE
unless for the purpose of public interest with “proportional compensation.”85 As one
could expect, the vague wording “proportional” could not satisfy investors’ concern. The
1990 amendment further removed one extremely unpopular rule about the board of
director. Under article 6 of the amended EJV Law, the authority no longer required the
chairman of the board to be a Chinese appointed by a Chinese investor. However, the
rule for unanimous voting remained, which meant it continues refusing the interest of
the majority. The amendment rewrote tax incentive part by removing strict conditions

convened meeting to review following documents: the contract between CAAC Civil Aviation
Administration of China (CAAC) Beijing branch and Hong Kong CNAC Air Catering Ltd. for
establishing Beijing Air Catering Ltd., Beijing Air Catering Article of Incorporation, and the
memorandum Certain Issue regarding the Company, we approved all these documents for
implementation.” This administrative notice affirmed the joint venture between CAAC and
Hong Kong investor. Ibid.
83
Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui guanyu xiugai zhonghua renmin gongheguo hezi jingying qiye
fa de jueding(全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》的决定)
[Decision of the National People's Congress Regarding the Revision of the Law of the People's
Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted at the Third Session of the
Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on April 4, 1990,
[hereinafter 1990 amendment].
84
Zhang Yuqing, James S. McLean, “China's Foreign Economic Contract Law: Its Significance and
Analysis ,” Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus 8, no.1 (1987):120-143, accessed July 27, 2017,
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=njil
b.
85
Art.2 1990 EJV Law
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that preserving tax benefits only to FIEs with advanced technology. The amendment
also allowed FIEs open bank account at any institution approved by SAFE. The
amendment took a more flexible attitude toward the term of operation, which allowed
investors to decide if they want to put a time limit on JV contract.

On July 26, 1980, State Council promulgated Measures on Administration of
Sino-Foreign EJV Registration [hereinafter Registration Measure]. 86 The Registration
Measure was a piece of administrative legislation centered on the procedure and
implementing rules regarding equity joint venture’s application for a business license
through SAIC in pursuant to the article 3 of EJV Law. The Registration Measure clearly
defined the time limit, the required files, and items for business license registration.
According to article 2, the registration must occur within 1 months after FIE obtain
permission from Foreign Investment Administration Committee (FIAC).87 Three types of
files must be provided during registration in accordance with article 3:
1. Approval from FIAC,
2. EJV agreement, Contract, Article of Association (both English and Chinese with 3
copies),
3. Copies of business license or other licenses issued by a foreign government.88

86

Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Dengji Guanli Banfa (中外合资经营企业登记管理办法) [State

Council, Measures on Administration of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Registration] (adopted
July. 26, 1980 by State Council) [hereinafter EJV Registration Measure].
87
Art. 2 Registration Measure.
88
Art. 3 Registration Measure.
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Article 4 detailed listed information must be provided for business license registration:
1. Name, location, address, scope of operation and method of operation of the EJV
2. The registered capitals and shares of each investor,
3. Board of directors, and chairman of the board, senior manager, and vice
manager,
4. Number of the employee (Chinese and foreigners),
5. File number of the relevant approval documents.89
As some FIEs later complaint, Chinese authority was restrictive over the items listed on
the registration. For example, the registration demand investors to register their
contract with SAIC. However, it was quite difficult for such investors to amend the
contract without permission from SAIC later.

In addition, the authority followed a strict interpretation of the “scope of
operation,” changes from one category into another proved to be difficult. Article 8
requiring investors to pay the registration fee, which was detailed by 1982 Interim
Measures on EJV Registration Fee. 90

89

Art. 4 Registration Measure.

90

Guanyu Zhongwaihezi jingying qiye jiaona dengjifei biaozhun de guiding（关于中外合资经营

企业交纳登记费标准的暂行规定）[Interim Measures on EJV Registration Fee] adopted by
SAIC February 2 1982. Table 2-1. Registration fee
Registered capital

Registration fee

10 million RMB and below

1%% of registered capitals

Above 10 million RMB

0.5%% of the registered capital
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Four years after the promulgation of the EJV Law in 1979, in response to
criticisms of vagueness and lack of guidance from the business community and western
academics, the State Council promulgated the Regulations for the Implementation of
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture on
September 20 of 1983.91 Based on the 1979 EJV Law, this was a piece of administrative
legislation designed to provide comprehensive guidance on issues concerning the
establishment, operation, and management of a joint venture through sixteen chapters
and one hundred and eighteen articles.92 The title “Implementing Regulation” signified

Chinese overseas, Hong Kong, Marco Investors

50% discount on registration fee

Registration amendment

Registration fee

●
●
●
●
●

Relocate JV
Change production
Increase or transfer registered capital
Change of Board of Director or senior
manager
Extension of JV contract

91

100 RMB

Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on SinoForeign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated Sept. 20, 1983 by the State Council) [hereinafter EJV
Law Implementation Regulations]
This law also referred as “Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,” accessed, July 29,
2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.shtml
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftiotlotprocojvucafi1228/.
92
The EJV Law in 1979 only had 15 articles. There are sixteen chapters of this legislation. To
make a comparison, I list chapters in below:
Chapter 1 General Principle
Chapter 2 Establishment and Registration
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the supplementary nature of the legislation, to compensate the deficiency of the EJV
law. It was an important part of China’s FDI regulatory framework when there was no
domestic legal infrastructure, such as Company Law, Bankruptcy Law, labor laws,
Intellectual Property Laws, and other business-related legislation. Many rules under EJV
Law Implementing Regulation reaffirmed rules or measures adopted by the regulatory
agencies throughout the years since the initial promulgation of 1979 EJV Law. Under EJV
Law Implementing Regulation, MOFERT is the designated agency in charge of the
application and enforcement of the EJV registration related the laws and rule. 93 In
addition, it specifically excluded Special Economic Zone from the application of this
regulation unless NPC or State Council stated otherwise.94

Structurally, the Implementing Regulation provided a better and clearer

Chapter 3 Structure and Registered Capital
Chapter 4 Contribution
Chapter 5 Board of Director and Management
Chapter 6 Importation of Technology
Chapter 7 Land use Rights and Fees
Chapter 8 Sales and Purchases
Chapter 9 Taxation
Chapter 10 Foreign Exchange Control
Chapter 11 Finance and Accounting
Chapter 12 Employee
Chapter 13 Labor Union
Chapter 14 Period of Operation, Dissolution and Liquidation
Chapter 15 Dispute Resolution
Chapter 16 Miscellaneous
EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
93
Art. 117, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
94
Art. 116, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
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guidance for the investors. Chapter one General Principle laid out principles for the
eligibility of a foreign investment project. For example, article 3 and 4 respectively
defined the industry sector allowed for FIE, and basic conditions must meet for such
investment.95 Article 5 provided conditions deny a FIE application.96 The problem with
this article was the ambiguity of the criteria listed in the statutory language. For

95

Art. 3, Joint ventures established within China's territory shall be able to promote the
development of Chinese economy and the raising of scientific and technological levels for the
benefit of socialist modernization. Joint ventures permitted are mainly in the following
industries:
(1) Energy development, the building material, chemical and metallurgical industries;
(2) Machine manufacturing, instrument and meter industries and offshore oil exploitation
equipment manufacturing;
(3) Electronics and computer industries, and communication equipment manufacturing;
(4) Light, textile, foodstuffs, medicine, medical apparatus and packing industries;
(5) Agriculture, animal husbandry and fish breeding;
(6) Tourism and service trades.
Art.4, “ Applicants to establish joint ventures shall lay stress on economic results and shall
comply with one or several of the following requirements:
(1) They shall adopt advanced technical equipment and scientific management which enable the
increase of the variety of products, the raising of quality and output and the saving of energy
and materials;
(2) They shall provide benefits in terms of technical renovation of enterprises and result in less
investment, quicker returns and bigger profits;
(3) They shall enable the expanded production of products for export and result in increasing
income in foreign currency;
(4) They shall enable the training of technical and managerial personnel.” See, Art.4, EJV Law
Implementing Regulation.
96
Article 5, “Applicants to establish joint ventures shall not be granted approval if the project
involves any of the following conditions:
(1) Detriment to China's sovereignty;
(2) Violation of Chinese law;
(3) Nonconformity with the requirements of the development of China's national economy;
(4) Environmental pollution;
(5) Obvious inequity in the agreements, contracts and articles of association signed, impairing
the rights and interests of one party.” See Art. 5. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
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example, the project “incompatible with China’s national economic development” or
the project “violate China’s sovereignty” would not be granted permission.97 These
three articles formed a conceptual framework indicating the conditions for accepting or
denying a FIE application. These rules became the prototype of the Catalogue of
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment developed during the 1990s.98 Read it
together, the EJV Implementing Regulation stated a clear preference for industry
involving high technology, such as energy development, electronics and computer
industries, and communication equipment manufacturing, medical apparatus; and
industry provided fast return on investment, such as textile, food staff, and packing
industries; and industry generate foreign exchange, such as tourism and service
trades.99

It further defined the legal nature of JV as “Fa ren” (Legal person), which
protected by Chinese law under Chinese jurisdiction.100 “Legal person” is a legal concept
originated from German Law as “juristische Person,” it refers to a non-human entity that

97

Article 5, “Applicants to establish joint ventures shall not be granted approval if the project
involves any of the following conditions:
(1) Detriment to China's sovereignty;
(2) Violation of Chinese law;
(3) Nonconformity with the requirements of the development of China's national economy;
(4) Environmental pollution;
(5) Obvious inequity in the agreements, contracts and articles of association signed, impairing
the rights and interests of one party.” See Art. 5. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
98
Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment, see next chapter.
99
Art. 3 Implementing Regulation.
100
Normally it can be an incorporated forprofit organization or not-for-profit organization. Art.
2, EJV Law Implementing Regulation, Ibid.
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recognized by the legal system through legislation or registration. Moreover, in order to
assure the independent operation rights of the investor, article 7 emphasized that joint
venture “has the right to do business independently within the scope of the provisions
of Chinese laws, decrees, and the agreement, contract and articles of association” and
the relevant government agencies shall provide support and assistant.101

Chapter two concerned issues related to the administrative examination and
approval for establishing a FIE project. Article 8 designated MOFERT as the agency in
charge the FIE permission.102 Certain projects can be reviewed and approved by a lower
level authority when certain criteria are met. Article 9 detailed outlined the required
documents for application, which is:
1. application form,
2. project feasibility study jointly conducted by Chinese and foreign
investors,
3. the signed article of association, joint venture agreement and contract,
4. candidate list for Chairman, vice-chairman, and board of directors.
5. Local government and Chinese partner’s supervising authority’s opinion
and recommendations.
Under article 10, the MOFERT or other authority has three months to review and make a
decision. When joint venture project obtained permission from the MOFERT, the

101
102

See Art. 7. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
See Art. 8, and 9(1). EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
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applicant must apply for a business license with the provincial administrative bureau for
industry and commerce within a month since the grant of permission.103 The joint
venture would be officially established since the date of issuing business licenses. The

103

Article 9 The following procedures shall be followed for the establishment of a joint venture:
(1) The Chinese participant in a joint venture shall submit to its department in charge a
project proposal and a preliminary feasibility study report of the joint venture to be established
with foreign participants. The proposal and the preliminary feasibility study report, upon
examination and consent by the department in charge, shall be submitted to the examination
and approval authority for final approval. The parties to the venture shall then conduct work
relevant to the feasibility study, and based on this, negotiate and sign joint venture agreements,
contracts and articles of association.
(2) When applying for the establishment of a joint venture, the Chinese participant is
responsible for the submission of the following documents to the examination and approval
authority;
(a) Application for the establishment of a joint venture;
(b) The feasibility study report jointly prepared by the parties to the venture;
(c) Joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed by
representatives authorized by the parties to the venture;
(d) List of candidates for chairman, vice-chairman and directors appointed by
the parties to the venture;
(e) Written opinions of the department in charge and the people's government
of the province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government
where the joint venture is located with regard to the establishment of the joint venture.
The aforesaid documents shall be written in Chinese. Documents (b), (c) and (d) may be written
simultaneously in a foreign language agreed upon by the parties to the joint venture. Both
versions are equally authentic.
Article 10 Upon receipt of the documents stipulated in Article 9 (2), the examination and
approval authority shall, within three months, decide whether to approve or disapprove them.
Should anything inappropriate be found in any of the aforementioned documents, the
examination and approval authority shall demand an amendment to it within a limited time.
Without such amendment no approval shall be granted.
Article 11 The applicant shall, within one month after receipt of the certificate of approval,
register with the administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the province, autonomous
region or municipality directly under the central government in accordance with the provisions
of the Procedures of the People's Republic of China for the Registration and Administration of
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (hereinafter referred to as registration and administration
office). The date on which it is issued its business license is regarded as the date of formal
establishment of a joint venture.
70

joint venture will continue operating until the expiration of the term listed on the JV
contract. Joint ventures are normally granted for 10-30 years. Certain project can last
more than 30 years with permission from state council. Liquidation and dissolution
started after the expiration of the term.104

Article 13, 14 defined two legal concepts: Joint Venture Agreements [合营企业
协议 Heying Qiye Xieyi] and Joint Venture Contracts [合营企业合同 Heying Qiye
Hetong]. In pursuant to the definition provided by article 13, the “Agreement” would be
something similar to the “letter of intent.105” The distinction seems irrelevant to the
enforceability of the agreement. The need for such distinction may relate to the content
of the agreement. Sometimes, a foreign investor found it was quite difficult to amend a
signed or approved contract even private contract provide conditions for renegotiation.
Thus, the Implementing Regulation allowed investors to sign “agreement” with less

104

Article 102. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
Article 13 The "joint venture agreement" mentioned in this chapter refers to a document
agreed upon by the parties to the joint venture on some main points and principles governing
the establishment of a joint venture.
"Joint venture contract" refers to a document agreed upon and concluded by the parties to the
joint venture on their rights and obligations.
"Article of association" refers to a document agreed upon by the parties to the joint venture
indicating the purpose, organizational principles and method of management of a joint venture
in compliance with the principles of the joint venture contract.
If the joint venture agreement conflicts with the contract, the contract shall prevail.
If the parties to the joint venture agree to sign only a contract and articles of association, the
agreement can be omitted.
105
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detailed terms. Article 14 stipulated items must be included in the contract. 106
Article 15 might be the most controversial one, which excluded the choice of law
for Joint Venture Contract. It stated that “The formation of a joint venture contract, its
validity, interpretation, execution and the settlement of disputes under it shall be
governed by the Chinese law.107” This restriction contradicted to common practice
among many market economies. It was unfair to foreign investors when China’s legal
infrastructure was limited. Article 16 outlined the items must be included in the article

106

Article 14 The joint venture contract shall include the following main items:
(1) The names, the countries of registration, the legal address of parties to the joint
venture, and the names, professions and nationalities of the legal representatives thereof;
(2) Name of the joint venture, its legal address, purpose and the scope and scale of
business;
(3) Total amount of investment and registered capital of the joint venture, investment
contributed by the parties to the joint venture, each party's investment proportion, forms of
investment, the time limit for contributing investment, stipulations concerning incomplete
contributions, and assignment of investment;
(4) The ratio of profit distribution and losses to be borne by each party;
(5) The composition of the board of directors, the distribution of the number of
directors, and the responsibilities, powers and means of employment of the general manager,
deputy general manager and high-ranking management personnel;
(6) The main production equipment and technology to be adopted and their source of
supply;
(7) The ways and means of purchasing raw materials and selling finished products, and
the ratio of products sold within Chinese territory and outside China;
(8) Arrangements for income and expenditure of foreign currency;
(9) Principles governing the handling of finance, accounting and auditing;
(10) Stipulations concerning labor management, wages, welfare, and labor insurance;
(11) The duration of the joint venture, its dissolution and the procedure for liquidation;
(12) The liabilities for breach of contract;
(13) Ways and Procedures for settling disputes between the parties to the joint venture;
(14) The language used for the contract and the conditions for putting the contract into
force.
The annex to the contract of a joint venture shall be equally authentic with the contract itself.
107
Article 15. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
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of association, which provided a clear guidance for establishing joint ventures 108 Article
17 stipulated that joint venture agreement, contract, and article of association only
come to effect after obtaining approval from the regulatory authority.109

Chapter three and chapter four governed the business structure of the joint
venture and contributions. Under article 19, joint ventures could be formed as limited
liability company. Shareholders of the company bore the risk in proportionate to their
contribution, or as the Implementing Regulation referred to as “liable to the joint
venture within the limits of the capital subscribed.110” Although Article 19 adopted the
common practice of limited liability, this might not be a true limited liability as many

108

Article 16 Articles of association shall include the following main items:
(1) The name of the joint venture and its legal address;
(2) The purpose, business scope and duration of the joint venture;
(3) The names, countries of registration and legal addresses of parties to the joint
venture, and the names, professions and nationalities of the legal representatives thereof;
(4) The total amount of investment, registered capital of the joint venture, each party's
investment proportion, stipulations concerning the assignment of investment, the ratio of profit
distribution and losses to be borne by parties to the joint venture;
(5) The composition of the board of directors, its responsibilities, powers and rules of
procedure, the term of office of the directors, and the responsibilities of its chairman and vicechairman;
(6) The setting up of management organizations, rules for handling routine affairs, the
responsibilities of the general manager, deputy general manager and other high-ranking
management personnel, and the method of their appointment and dismissal;
(7) Principles governing finance, accounting and auditing;
(8) Dissolution and liquidation;
(9) Procedures for amendment of the articles of association.
109
Art. 17,EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
110
Article 19: A joint venture is a limited liability company.
Each party to the joint venture is liable to the joint venture within the limit of the capital
subscribed by it.
73

investors soon discovered that majority contribution would not automatically translate
into controlling right in business management. Article 36 of chapter 5 specifically listed
four categories in business management that must be decided through a unanimous
decision by board members. These four areas are:
(1) Amendment of the articles of association of the joint venture;
(2) Termination and dissolution of the joint venture;
(3) Increase or assignment of the registered capital of the joint venture;
(4) The merger of the joint venture with other economic organizations.111

The article 106 also allowed investors to distribute remaining assets of the joint venture
in proportion to their investment or any other ways agreed under joint venture
agreement, contract or article of association in case of liquidation.112 Other restrictions
included the joint venture could not reduce the registered capital during the term of the
joint venture. In addition, one could not transfer his or her shares or increase the
registered capital without approval from regulatory agency first.113 Although EJV Law
Implementing Regulation allowed non-cash contribution, it placed strict requirements.
These restrictions caused many complaints.114 For example, article 27 stipulated that
contribution in the form of machinery equipment and other materials must meet three
conditions:

111

Art. 36, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
Art. 106, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
113
See Article 23, Article 24. EJV Implementing Regulation.
114
Zhang Lixing, “The statutory Framework for Direct Investment in China,” FLA. IT’L.J.
4(1989):289-290.
112
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(1) They are indispensable to the production of the joint venture;
(2) China is unable to manufacture them or manufactures them only at too high
a price, or their technical performance and time of availability cannot meet the
demand;
(3) The price fixed shall not be higher than the current international market price
for similar equipment or materials.115
In effect, this was an extremely narrowed definition for a qualified non-cash
contribution.

Chapter five of the law concerned issues related to the board of director. As the
above analysis pointed out, the limited liability principle was not truly reflected in the
Implementing Rules because majority share will not translate into control of the joint
venture. Article 32 even stipulated that the chairman of the board of director would be
held by a person appointed by a Chinese investor. Under article 37, the chairman would
be the legal representative of the joint venture. A limited liability company is an entity
created by law (as a natural person is created naturally), legal representative. The legal
representative of the legal person represented the affairs of such entity. His or her
signature would have legal effect on any contract or agreement that involve a legal
person.

Chapter six of the Implementing Regulation produced many unpopular

115

Art. 27, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.
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protective measures restricted the rights of intellectual property holder in the business
of joint venture. First, the Implementing Regulation asserted that technology must
be“appropriate, advanced with the great and obvious return on investment and
competitiveness in the global market.” 116Second, the technology transfer agreement
must be reviewed and approved by Chinese authority prior to effective date. The
Foreign investor must provide information about such technology as a reference.117
These requirements remained as a fixture of China’s FIE regulatory framework and thus
subject to strong criticisms by the foreigners. Third, the law outlined other restrictions
as review conditions for the agreement. For example, Article 46 laid out a laundry list of
rules restraining the rights of the intellectual property holders. For example, the
intellectual property right holder “shall not put any restrictions on the quantity, price, or
region of the sale of the products that are to be exported.”118The term of technology
transfer could not exceed ten years, but the licensee could still have the right keep using
the technology.119 In addition, no restriction was allowed on the part of the licensee for
purchasing any parts or raw material needed in the process of utilizing such
technology.120Moreover, there was one catch-all clause that prohibits any restrictive
terms deemed unreasonable by Chinese laws and decrees. This was problematic
because the statute did not provide any guidance on what consider as “unreasonable.”

116

Art. 44. EJV Implementing Regulation.
Art. 45. EJV Implementing Regulation.
118
Art. 46 (2) EJV Implementing Regulation.
119
Art. 46(3),(4) EJV Implementing Regulation.
120
Art. 46 (6) EJV Implementing Regulation.
117
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Chapter 7 and 8 respectively focused on site using rights and purchase and sale
of the FIE. Regulation regarding the purchase and sale was the most representative
feature of China’s command economy. Under a command economy, everything was
allocated in accordance with the central plan, which was why there was no modern
price market. Since the introduction of FIE, the legislator must provide means and
mechanism to accommodate this new reality. Under the EJV framework, FIE was
required to produce an annual plan for operation, production or construction. The FIE
would send their plan to the “department in charge,” an administrative agency in charge
of JV’s Chinese partner.121 This department would coordinate with other government
agencies in charge of the resources, to ensure supply of these resources. Even China’s
command economy system provided undesired domestic material supply. The EJV
Implementing Regulation specifically asked FIE to purchase supplies from domestic
vendors “given the same conditions.”122 In addition, contrary to many investors’
expectation of taking advantage of China’s large consumer market, the EJV Regulation
restricted FIE’s capacity of selling to domestic consumers. Only products “urgently
needed by Chinese market” was allowed to be sold in China under article 61. 123 Even
when one can qualify to sell the product in China, the seller must go through a special
government department. Because the lack of free market, the government would
purchase the goods then redistribute to another buyer in accordance with the central
plan.
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Art. 54, 55, 56 EJV Implementing Regulation.
Art. 57 EJV Implementing Regulation.
123
Art. 61 EJV Implementing Regulation.
122
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Although the 1983 EJV Implementing Regulation provided more detailed rules
related to FIE affairs, the law itself revealed its central planning economy nature
through multiple restrictions. For example, (1) a FIE investment project would not be
granted if the consumption of the resource by FIE would affect the enforcement of the
central or regional plan. (2) Share transfer by a foreign investor was not allowed unless
reviewed by the relevant authority. (3) Although the board of director was the highest
authority of the company, the chairman must be served by a Chinese appointed by the
Chinese investor. (4) In addition, the board voting followed the rule of unanimous,
which excluded majority voting right rule. (5) The intellectual property right holder
could not sign contract exceed certain years, and the law can strike down any restrictive
terms it deemed as “unreasonable.”

The implementing Regulation had been amended twice during the 1980s. the
1986 amendment extended maximum operation time for JV. It allowed state council to
grant 50 years of JV contract for any project with huge investment or involved advanced
technology. The 1987 amendment concerns specific accounting rules, which is not the
focus of this study. The EJV Law and Implementing Regulation established two
important legal concepts for China when there was no developed commercial legal
system. The first important legal concept was “legal person.’’124 Under the central
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1986 Article 41 of General Principle of Civil Law adopt the concept of legal person, it provided
that:“Sino-foreign equity joint venture enterprises, Sino-foreign contractual joint venture
enterprises and wholly foreign owned enterprises established in the territory of the PRC that
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planning, firms were viewed as the apparatus of the administration. Thus, they were not
endowed with a separate legal identity.125 The second important legal principle is the
“alienability of ownership and the associated benefit right from owning the assets.”126
The transferable interest and the adoption of the board of director in corporate
governance were revolutionary considering China’s socialist system. The shareholders’
benefit and alienation rights for the SOE sector were not recognized until the early
1990s. The promulgation of Company Law in 1994 formalized and enshrined the limited
liability reform experiments into the national legislation.127 The legislative recognition of
the decision right came much earlier to FIEs than to SOEs. Probably the most important
control right was the right to appoint managers when FIEs could not hire employee
independently at the beginning of the 1980s. However, The recognition of legal
independence may not automatically translate into a political autonomous. The legal
independence only referred to civil or criminal liability. Politically, the business entity is
considered as an extension of the political program of socialism.

On October 11, 1986, State Council adopted Provisions for Encouragement of

meet the requirements for legal persons acquire the status of Chinese legal persons upon
approval and registration in accordance with law by the administrative agencies for industry and
commerce.”
125
Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 195),300.
126
Ibid.
127
Huang yasheng, “An Institutional and Policy Approach to the Demand for Foreign Direct
Investment in China,” in China Review 2000 (Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 2000): 269.
Also see: Huang Yasheng, “One country, two systems: Foreign-invested enterprises and
domestic firms in China,” China Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2003): 409.
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Foreign Investment (hereinafter Encouragement Provision), also known as Article 22.128
The main purpose of this administrative legislation was to resolve two issues. First, it
provided legislative solutions for many problems and criticisms asked by foreign
investment communities and western academics.129 Second, it provided new tax
incentives to counter the sharp drop in FIEs investment during the preceding years since
the beginning of the 1980s. 130 The main subject of the Encouragement Provision, as it
stated clearly at the very beginning, was to promote two types of FIEs, “Products Export
Enterprises” and “Technologically Advanced Enterprises,” with various specific policies
and incentives related to site using fee, financing, profit remittance, tax, staff and labor
management, government service and support, and etc.131 These policies and incentives
can be deconstructed into following categories:
1. Tax related incentives
2. Government service
3. Foreign exchange
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Guowuyuan guanyu guli waishang touzi de guiding (国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定)

[Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment] [hereinafter
Encouragement Provision] adopted by State Council on October 11, 1986, accessed July 26,
2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053822.html.
129
Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional Economy,” Pac.
Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, accesed July 27, 2017,
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs.
130
FDI rose about “10 percent to more than $2 billion in 1986, but the level of new foreign
investment pledged fell nearly 50 percent. See CIA Office of East Asia Analysis, “Directorate of
Intelligence: Foreign Investment in China in 1986, and Prospects for 1987,” CIA , March 31 1987,
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4. Labor management
There were two main functions of these new policies and incentives. Tax incentive
designed to attract more investors with economic benefits. Government service and
supports designed to improve investment environment with clear and standardized
regulations and rules. In order to attract foreign investment, the Encouragement
Provision outlined additional tax incentives in the form of tax deduction and tax holiday
extension. Article 7, 8 ,9, 10, and 11 concerned tax incentives. Under the new provision,
Product-for-export FIEs and technologically advanced FIEs enjoy zero tax when they
remit abroad the profit.132 Product-for-export FIEs enjoy additional 50% off tax
reduction if FIE export 70% or more of the output value.133 If such FIEs located in SEZ, it
will enjoy 10% income tax rate. Technologically advanced FIEs will enjoy an extended tax
holiday of three more years.134 In pursuant to the article 10, the provision provides tax
return for a portion of profit used for reinvestment by qualified FIEs. 135

The Encouragement Provision clarified and standardized three types of
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art. 7 Encouragement Provision.
art. 8 Encouragement Provision.
134
art. 9 Encouragement Provision.
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“Foreign investors who reinvest their shares of profits from their enterprises in order to
establish or expand product-for-export enterprises or technologically advanced enterprises for a
period of operation of not less than five years, after application to and approval by the tax
authorities, shall be refunded the total amount of enterprise income tax already paid on the
reinvested portion. If the investment is withdrawn before the period of operation reaches five
years, the amount of enterprise income tax refunded shall be repaid.” See Art. 10,
Encouragement Provision.
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administrative practice. Firstly, it lifted mandatory export agent service requirement.136
Secondly, it standardized the site using fee. Thirdly, it placed a maximum time limit on
administrative reviewing process. In addition, it emphasized the principle of respecting
FIEs’ labor management without undue interference by local labor authority. Article 12
and 13 concerned the export and import license. Under this provision, FIEs can apply the
export license to export product without using the service of an agent.137 In addition,
FIEs can apply for such license every 6 months.138 Any semi-products, raw materials
utilized for the manufacturing of the products can be exempt from the requirement of
the importation license unless they are later resold to domestic customers.139 In
response to complaints from investors that local authority or Chinese partners abuse
site using fee to obtain rents from foreign investors, article 4 specifically defined the
standard of the site using fee, as it provided that:
(1) five to twenty RMB yuan per square meter per year in areas where the
development fee and the site use fee are computed and charged together;
(2) not more than three RMB yuan per square meter per year in site areas where
the development fee is computed and charged on a one-time basis or areas
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art. 12 Encouragement Provision. “Enterprises with foreign investment may arrange the
export of their products directly or may also export by consignment to agents in accordance
with state provisions. For products that require an export license, in accordance with an annual
export plan of the enterprises, an application for export licenses shall be made every six
months.”
137
art. 12 Encouragement Provision.
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Ibid.
139
art. 13 Encouragement Provision.
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which are developed by the above-mentioned enterprises themselves.140
It further allowed local government to exempt site using fee on a case by case basis.141
Under the EJV Law and supplementing regulations, FIE could not independently hire an
employee. All hire decision must be made by a local labor authority. The labor authority
would send labors for the job, and the employer could not fire or discipline the
employee without approval from the authority. Foreign investors were frustrated by
these regulations when the local authority could not provide qualified labors. Article 15
specifically asked the local authority to respect FIEs staff management and wage system.
It stipulated that FIEs have rights to freely hire or fire any staff without prior approval by
the labor authority.142 One of the highlights under Encouragement Provision was to
place a maximin 3 months time limit for all FIEs related administrative approving
process. As the article 17 stated:

Article 17 The people's governments at various levels and relevant departments
in charge shall strengthen the coordination of their work, improve efficiency in
handling matters and shall promptly examine and approve matters reported by
enterprises with foreign investment that require a response and resolution. For
the agreements, contracts and articles of association of enterprises with foreign
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art. 4 Encouragement Provision.
“Exemptions for specified periods of time from the fees provided in the foregoing provision
may be granted at the discretion of the local people's governments.” see art. 4 Encouragement
Provision , accessed July 26, 2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053822.html.
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investment to be examined and approved by the departments in charge under
the State Council, the relevant examination and approval authorities must,
within three months from the date of receipt of all documents, decide whether
to approve or not to approve the documents.

Although the Encouragement Provision provided multiple benefits to FIEs, there
were many issues that might deter the function of those benefits. The main issues were
ambiguity and the lack of an effective and meaningful mechanism to prevent local
government authority from interfering with the rights of the foreign investors. Two
most representative examples, one concerning the scope of FIEs receive benefits,
another concerning type of remedies to the injury from arbitrary administrative charges
and fees. Article 2, article 18, and 19 defined the scope of the benefited FIEs, which
were:

Article 2:(1) Production-type enterprises whose products are mainly export,
which have a foreign exchange surplus after deducting from their total annual
foreign exchange revenues the annual foreign expenditures incurred in
production and operation and the foreign exchange needed for the remittance
abroad of the profits earned by foreign investors (hereinafter referred to as"
Products Export Enterprises")
(2) Production-type enterprises possessing advanced technology supplied by
foreign investors which are engaged in developing new products, and upgrading
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and replacing products in order to increase foreign exchange generated by
exports or for import substitution (hereinafter referred to as "Technologically
Advanced Enterprises").143

Production Enterprises (生产型企业) normally refers to business entity involves exportoriented manufacturing or processing and assembling sectors, which would exclude
service sector. Article 2 basically established two types of FIEs with preferred
treatments. One is Products Export Enterprises with products mainly for exportation,
and another is technologically advanced enterprises. Unfortunately, definition under
article 2 was ambiguous and confusing. For example, there is no clear statutory
language to describe what constitutes as “product mainly for export.” One may
conclude 90% product could qualify as “mainly.” What about 60% or 65%? Also, the
statutory language “mainly” failed to specify whether it referred to the value of the
products or the quantity of the products. In addition, under the article 2 (2)
“technologically advanced enterprises” was defined as an entity with three qualifying
conditions: first, FIEs needed to be an entity engage in developing new products,
second, such products had to be a kind that could upgrade and replace any product,
which could increase foreign exchange through exportation or to save foreign exchange
through import substitution. This definition was ambiguous and confusing because it
failed to clarify whether the products needed to be “new” for the domestic market or
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Art.2 Encouragement Provision.
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international market. A Certain type of products or technology can be quite common in
a market economy but fairly new in China, would such products fall into the definition of
the article 2 (2)? In order to further clarify which FIE met these conditions, article 18
delegated the power of evaluation to the local MOFERT authority. As it stated:

Product-for-export enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises
mentioned in these Provisions shall be confirmed by the foreign economic
relations and trade departments where such enterprises are located in
conjunction with the other relevant departments in accordance with the
enterprise contract, and certificates of confirmation shall be accordingly issued.
If the actual results of the annual exports of a product-for-export enterprise are
unable to reach the target of a surplus in the foreign exchange balance as set in
the enterprise contract, the taxes and fees which have already been reduced or
exempted in the previous year shall be paid in the following year.144

Clearly, this arrangement provided great discretionary power to the local
authority, which may increase the risk of rent-seeking. Article 19 further provided that
Products Export Enterprises must pay all deducted taxes in the following year if FIE
failed to meet target foreign exchange surplus.145 This additional restriction created
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Art.18 Encouragement Provision.
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“These Provisions shall be applicable to those enterprises with foreign investment that
obtained approval for establishment prior to the date of these Provisions became effective and
that conform to the preferential terms of these Provisions.” see art. 19 Encouragement
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great uncertainties for foreign investors because the global market could not ensure a
stable product price and provide stable foreign exchange surplus.

Arbitrary administrative charges and fees had been a systematic issue plagued
the development of Chinese foreign investment and domestic economy.146 During the
1980s, due to the lack of fiscal supporters from the central government, effective
intergovernmental regulations and judicial oversight and an adequate tax revenue
system, a local government would finance its operation through various arbitrary, illegal
charges and fees from the FIEs and domestic firms. Although central authority had
repetitively issued multiple directives requiring local officials stop such behavior, those
directives did not propose any sanctions or punishments. Thus, the Encouragement
Provisions provided two statutory solutions.

The first solution was to aske a provincial government to restrain lower
government agencies by making local rules. The second solution was to allow FIEs either
refused the payment demands by the local authority or filed a written complaint to a
local MOFERT authority. For example, article 16 emphasized that a provincial
Government must adopt detailed implementation measures for “State Council

Provision , accessed July 26, 2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053822.html.
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World Bank, The social sectors: population, health, nutrition, and education, (Washington,
D.C.: The World Bank, 1983), 429, accessed July 25, 2017,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/279491468743727018/The-social-sectorspopulation-health-nutrition-and-education.
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Concerning Firmly Curbing the Indiscriminate Levy of Charges on Enterprises.” 147 It was
questionable that these measures could resolve the problem of arbitrary charges. If the
central authority wished to end local authority’s illegal administrative charges, she could
simply announce nationwide sanctions with clear rules. However, the central authority
delegated sanction power to lower provincial governments with self-discipline. In
addition, although FIEs would have a statutory right for refusing payment demands from
the local authority, there was no legal infrastructure to support FIEs claim. The foreign
investors bore great risk for not paying demands from a local authority.

The only recourse seems to be filing a complaint at local MOFERT authority.148
However, there is another problem for FIEs, what consider as “unreasonable fee”? Since
the Encouragement Provision designed local MOFERT to process complaints concerning
“unreasonable fee,” such authority would obtain interpretive power through this article.
Unfortunately, local MOFERT authority’s interpretive power may not be helpful to the
foreign investor in theory and in practice. For example, a local MOFERT is part of the
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See Guo wuyuan guanyu jianjue zhizhi xiang qiye luantanpai de tongzhi(国务院关于坚决制

止向企业乱摊派的通知) [State Council Notice on Prohibiting arbitrary Administrative Charges],
adopted by State Council on April 23, 1986, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-10/20/content_5122298.htm.
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“Article 16, Encouragement Provision “All regions and departments must implement the
Circular of the State Council Concerning Firmly Curbing the Indiscriminate Levy of Charges on
Enterprises. The people's governments at the provincial level shall formulate specific measures
and strengthen supervision and administration in this regard. Enterprises with foreign
investment may refuse to pay indiscriminately apportioned charges if such cases occur, and may
also appeal to the local economic committees up to the State Economic Commission.”
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local people’s government. When a local People’s Congress adopted an ordinance
requiring all FIEs within its jurisdiction to pay construction fee for a local theater, which
may be unreasonable, the local MOFERT would not have the constitutional power to
struck down such ordinance, even on a case by case basis. Thus, the mechanism
provided by this Provision cannot resolve illegal administrative charge issues.

The Encouragement Provision, also known as Article 22, outlined a set of policies
and incentives designed to resolve some of the issues related to the FIEs operation and
application. One of the greatest policies would be the maximum 3 months’ time limit on
MOFERT's reviewing process. Additional tax incentives were provided to attract exportoriented enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises. The problems with the
Provision, as above discussion and analysis indicated, mainly concentrated on the
ambiguity of the statutory language and the lack of a mechanism to interpret, enforce
and remedy injured party.

The EJV Law and its implementing regulations; the registration regulations, and
the Encouragement Provision were the basis of China’s EJV legal framework. in addition,
the implementing regulations for EJV law formed the basis for other foreign investment
regulations, such as WFOE and CJV laws. The EJV Law and its implementing regulations
demonstrated many features of China’s central commanding economy. First, the central
authority refused to give foreign investors controlling rights. China’s EJV structure
negated “majority shareholder rules.” Under the principle, “equal share, equal rights,”

89

major corporate affairs must be determined unanimously. Second, the central authority
transplanted central command system into FIE corporate governance. Any amendment
of JV contract or change of registered capitals required permission from the government
authorities. In addition, foreign investors were not allowed to freely negotiate “choice
of law” clause under the contract because all JV contract must be interpreted by
Chinese law. However, China did not have a functioning commercial legal system and
private legal service market. The EJV Law specifically instruct investors to take
arbitration when a dispute arose.

b. WFOE Law framework
On April 12, 1986, 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China adopted the Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China (WFOE Law).149 This was the first
legislation concerning WFOE, and it was not amended until 2000. The last amendment
was 2016.

Like the EJV law, the 1986 WFOE Law was a short legislation with only 24 articles.
Article 2 defined WFOE as enterprises established exclusively by foreign investors’ own

149

Zhonghua remin gongheguo waizi qiyefa(中华人民共和国外资企业法) [Wholly Foreign-

Owned Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China]promulgated by 6th National People’s
Congress on April 12, 1986.
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capital.150 It excluded branches of a FIE.151Article 3 laid out basic principle for a WFOE,
which required the FIE must be the kind “benefit Chinese economy with advanced
technology and machinery or a majority of the products for exportation.”152 It
designated State Council to implement detailed rules for conditions disqualify a WFOE
project. The establishment of WFOE shared the similar registration process with EJV
except for verification period. Applicant must first obtain permission from MOFERT
before applying for business registration.153 The verification and reviewing period was
90 days, which was longer than EJV.154 In addition, WFOE shared same punishment
(revocation of the license) if the investor failed to invest within a certain period of
time.155 Like EJV Law, WFOE Law also installed statutory language stating a preference
of domestic vendor as the supplier for the FIE.156 Under article 18, FIE must maintain
payment of balance.157
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Art. 2, WFOE Law, “As mentioned in this Law, ‘enterprises with foreign capital’ refers to those
enterprises established in China by foreign investors, exclusively with their own capital, in
accordance with relevant Chinese laws. The term does not include branches set up in China by
foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations.”
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Ibid.
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Art. 3, WFOE Law.
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Art. 6, WFOE Law.
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Art. 6, WFOE Law.
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Art. 9, WFOE Law. “An enterprise with foreign capital shall make investments in China within
the period approved by the authorities in charge of examination and approval. If it fails to do so,
the industry and commerce administration authorities may cancel its business licence. The
industry and commerce administration authorities shall inspect and supervise the investment
situation of an enterprise with foreign capital.”
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Art. 15, WFOE Law.
157
Art. 18, WFOE Law.
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The EJV Law and Implementing Regulation formed the basis for EJV framework.
On December 12, 1990, State Council adopted Implementing Regulation on Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprises [hereinafter WFOE Implementing Rules], which formed the
basis of WFOE regulatory framework.158 The WFOE Implementing Rule formed a similar
structure as the EJV Implementing Rule. The first chapter General Principle defined the
conditions for establishing WFOE, and conditions disqualifying the WFOE project. Under
the Implementing Rule, there were three categories: conditions, restrictive sector,
prohibited sector. Under article 4, the prohibited sectors included:
1. the press, publication, broadcasting, television, and movies;
2. domestic commerce, foreign trade, and insurance;
3. post and telecommunications; and
4. other trades in which the establishment of foreign-capital enterprises is
forbidden by the Chinese government.159

The restrictive sectors included:
1. public utilities;
2. communication and transportation;
3. real estate;
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Waizi qiye fa shishi xize(外资企业法实施细则) [Implementing Rules of the Law of the

People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises] adopted by State Council on
December 12, 1990.
159
Art.4 Implementing Rules of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital
Enterprises
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4. trust investment; and
5. leasing.160
These projects must be verified and approved by MOFERT. Article 3 also laid out general
conditions for a WFOE project, which must be advanced technology or export-oriented.
Unlike the EJV Law had ambiguous statutory language requiring the “majority of the
products” for export. Article 3 clearly stated that WFOE project must meet the general
condition of more than 50% value of the whole production would be exportation.161 The
WFOE Implementing Rule laid out clear registration process: applicant would directly
apply for permission from provincial authority when the total investment below a
threshold setup by the State Council. The local authority would file a record of the
permission to MOFERT within 15 days.162 In order to ensure the supply of water,
electricity or another social service, the WFOE demand investor to file a project plan to
the local authority. The authority must provide a reply within 30 days to the investor.163
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Ibid.
Art. 3, WFOE Implementing Rule. “the annual output value of its exported products accounts
for more than 50% of the annual output value of all products, thereby resulting in a balance
between revenue and expenditure in foreign exchange or a surplus.”
162
Art. 8 WFOE Implementing Rule.
163
Art. 10 WFOE Implementing Rule.
“A foreign investor shall, prior to the filing of an application for the establishment of a
foreign-capital enterprise, submit a report to the local people's government at or above
the county level at the place where the proposed enterprise is to be established. The
report shall include: the aim of the establishment of the proposed enterprise; the scope
and scale of business operation; the products to be produced; the technology and
equipment to be adopted and used; the proportion of the sales of products between
the domestic market and the foreign market; the area of land to be used and the related
requirements: the condition and quantities of water, electricity, coal, coal gas and other
forms of energy resources required; and the public facilities”
161
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WFOE can be organized either as an LLC or other forms under the Implementing Rule,
although it failed to clarify what were the other forms.

164

Unlike the legislation in the

1990s, in 1986, the rule still prohibited FIE to reduce registered capital.165 The Rule laid
out similar regulations regarding contribution in the form of machinery and intellectual
property. For example, article 28 demonstrated that authority dislikes that intellectual
property is valued more than 20% of the registered capital. In addition, detailed
information regarding the intellectual property must be provided to the authority for
verification.

The Implementing Rule also installed sanctions on the promptness of the
contribution. For example, payment of contribution by the foreign investor can be made
in several different times. However, the last payment must be made within 3 years of
obtaining business licenses. Otherwise, the license would be revoked.166

c. CJV Law framework
In order to promote and encourage overseas Chinese investors, especially
investors from Hong Kong and Macau, the State Council adopted Provisions of the State
Council Concerning the Encouragement of Investments by Overseas Chinese and
Compatriots From Hong Kong and Macao[hereinafter Encouragement for overseas
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Art. 19 WFOE Implementing Rule.
Art. 22 WFOE Implementing Rule.
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Art. 30, WFOE Implementing Rule.
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Chinese investor].167 This legislation designed to provide special treatment for investors
from Hong Kong, Macau or Chinese overseas. However, this decree had been
overlooked by many studies. Special treatments under this Provision presented a
shocking contrast with the other FIE related regulations. For example, The EJV
framework placed strong restrictions over the appointment of a board of directors. Such
restrictions were later partially lifted. The Chinese overseas investor provision directly
provided that the investors can freely negotiate the representation of board member
based on their contribution or other agreed conditions.168 In addition, it specified that
overseas Chinese investor could hire their friends or relatives in China as their agent to
process the FIE issue.169 Interestingly, the Chinese overseas investor Provision
established one unified verification process time limit. Normally, the EJV project has to
be verified within 30 days, and WFOE project has to be verified within 90 days, and CJV
project has to be verified within 45 days. Under this provision, disregard form of the
investment project, it will all be verified within 45 days.

d. Foreign exchange control framework
Foreign exchange control was an important aspect that could substantially affect
the rights and interests of the foreign investor. However, China’s foreign exchange
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Guanyu guli huaqiao hexianggang aomen tongbao touzi deguiding(关于鼓励华侨和香港澳

门同胞投资的规定) [Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Encouragement of
Investments by Overseas Chinese and Compatriots From Hong Kong and Macao] adopted by
State Council on August 19, 1990.
168
Art. 14, Encouragement for overseas Chinese investor.
169
Art. 18, Encouragement for overseas Chinese investor.
95

system or control was tied up with China’s currency policy. Between 1973 and 1979,
China adopted a material based currency in order to maintain a stable currency value
for international trade when the western market economy is suffering from the
disruptions after the fall of Bretton Woods system. RMB currency remained as nonconvertible due to such arrangement, during the 1980s, the state implements a dual
exchange rate system. Trade sector following 1:2.8 rate while non-trade sector following
1:1.5 rate. At the very beginning of the Reform and Open Up, the central authority
builds a comprehensive foreign exchange control framework. There were two main
mechanisms of the control: first is foreign exchange coupon. The coupon system was
established to accommodate the need for the transaction without affect China’s nonconvertible RMB system. What the enforcement of the foreign exchange control
requires is not always smooth, especially many FIE facing foreign exchange shortage
under China’s strict rules. 170
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For example, the chart illustrate foreign exchange framework:
PR on Foreign Exchange Control Of the P.R.C
● Detailed Regulations for the Implementation of Exchange Control with Respect to
Foreign Representative Offices and Their Employees
● Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment
Instruments in Convertible Currency into or out of China
● Detailed Rules and Regulations on Exchange Control Relating to Individuals,
○ Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications
by Individuals for Foreign Exchange
● Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises, and ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures
● Implementing Rules on Punishment of Violation of Foreign Exchange Control
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Right after the promulgation of the 1979 EJV Law, the central authority adopted
a comprehensive foreign exchange regulation. China’s RMB was non-convertible. In
order to accommodate the need for the tourism industry and foreign investment
without producing significant impacts on RMB exchange rate, the BOC adopted foreign
exchange coupon system on March 19, 1980.171 Essentially, foreign exchange coupon
was a special intermediary currency designed to accommodate the need for a foreigner
without making RMB available for foreigners.172 The foreign exchange coupon could be
used in certain domestic vendors, which only accepted foreign exchange coupons. The
value of the coupon was the same as RMB, and it could be transferred to other
countries. The foreign exchange coupon system lasted throughout the 1980s until the
foreign exchange rate reform in 1994. As the state enforced two-track foreign exchange
rate (one for international trade, and one for domestic buyers), there were various
illegal transactions took advantage of the different rates. Many foreign invested
companies involved such profit-seeking behavior. For example, a shop only opened to
foreigns should accept foreign exchange coupon. However, the shop might list
discounted price when the buyer paid with foreign exchange, which encouraged the
circulation of the foreign exchange.
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Zhongguo yinhang waihui duihuan zanxing guanli banfa (中国银行外汇兑换券暂行管理办

法) [BOC Interim Regulation on Administration of Foreign Exchange Coupon] [hereinafter BOC
Foreign Exchange Coupon] adopted by BOC on March 19, 1980.
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Art.3 BOC Foreign Exchange Coupon.
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On December 18, 1980, the State Council adopted People’s Republic of China
Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control [hereinafter 1980 Interim
Regulation].173 This was the first administrative legislation concerning the foreign
exchange since the Reform and Open Up and it never been updated until later in 1996,
it was then amended in 1997 and 2008. Between 1978-1992, China’s foreign exchange
regulation framework was compiled by sets of supplementary rules and guidelines
created by SAFE and State Council. Other important agencies were involved in creating
related rules: BOC was responsible for rules related to foreign exchange loans and
transactions, SAFE enforced and interpreted the Interim Regulations. Different
individual and different purpose would result in different regulations. The foreign
exchange regulations were complicated and detailed. Under China’s foreign exchange
framework, Chinese individual subjected to strictest rules. Officials had slightly more
relaxed rules. Foreign investors or individuals enjoyed special treatments than Chinese
business entities. Short-term visitors and government staffs enjoyed more relaxed rules
than business personals.

The main purpose of the Interim Regulation, as the article one under General
Principle, asserted: “increasing China’s foreign exchange reserve and improving
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Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waihui guanli zanxing tiaoli (中华人民共和国外汇管理暂行条

例) [Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China],
adopted by State Council on Dec. 18, 1980, accessed July 25, 2017,
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/irofec454/.
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prudence foreign exchange expenditure.”174 Article 1 paragraph 2 outlined the scope of
the application, which included “inflow and outflow of all foreign exchange revenue and
spending, all kinds of payment instruments in foreign currency, and the carrying of
foreign exchange, precious metals and payment instruments in foreign currency.”175
Foreign exchange under Interim Regulation referred to:176
1. foreign currencies, including banknotes, coins,
2. securities in foreign currency, including government bonds, treasury bills,
corporate bonds and debentures, stocks, and interest coupons,
3. instruments payable in foreign currency, including bills, drafts, checks, bank
deposit certificates, postal savings certificates.177

China’s foreign exchange policy, as it clearly laid out by article 4 “prohibition on
free circulation, use, and mortgage of foreign currency; sale and purchase with
authorizations.”178 It further stipulated that all foreign exchange revenues by any entity
or individual must be sold to BOC unless exempted by laws, decrees other
regulations.179 The Interim Regulation designated State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (hereinafter SAFE) as the agency enforce the law, and BOC is the designated
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bank to process foreign exchange transaction180. The 1980 Interim Regulation had seven
chapters with 34 articles, which established the foundation for China’s foreign exchange
framework.181 Chapter two, three, four, and five respectively dedicated to special
groups of entities or individuals, which were: state and collective ownership entity and
their representatives, a private Chinese citizen, foreign official entities and their
representatives, and Chinese overseas enterprises and EJV and WFOE and their
representatives. In order to fully implement regulations related to the foreign business
entities and Chinese individuals, SAFE adopted following administrative legislation:

1. 1981 Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of
Applications by Individuals for Foreign Exchange,182

180
181
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Art. 3, 1980 Interim Regulations
For example:
Chapter I: General Provisions
Chapter II: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to State Units and Collective Economic
Organizations
Chapter III: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Individuals
Chapter IV: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Foreign Resident Representative
Offices in China and Their Personnel
Chapter V: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese
Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises, and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures and Their
Personnel
Chapter VI: Control Relating to Carrying Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment
Instruments in Foreign Currency into and out of China
Chapter VII: Supplementary Provisions
See: Shenpi geren waihui shenqing shixing xize (审批个人外汇申请施行细则[国家外汇管理

总局)Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications by
Individuals for Foreign Exchange [hereinafter Individual FE Examination], enacted by SAFE on
December 31, 1981. Replaced by Foreign Exchange Control Regulation in 1996. accessed July 31,
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftiofecrti747/.
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2. 1981 Rules for the Implementation Foreign Exchange Control Relating to
Individuals FE Control,183
3. 1983 Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations
Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital
Enterprises, and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] [hereinafter foreign
business FE Control,184
4. 1985 Implementing Rules on Punishment for Violation of Foreign Exchange
Control.185
These regulations formed the basis of China’s foreign exchange control framework.
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Control Regulation in 1996, accessed July 31, 2017,
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Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital,
Foreign-Capital Enterprises and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] [hereinafter foreign
business FE Control]enacted by SAFE on August 1, 1983, replaced by Foreign Exchange Control
Regulation in 1996, accessed July 31,
2017,http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftiofecrrtewoccfeacejv1832. Other regulations
including：Guojia waihui guanliju dui waihui guijingshu he waihui piaozheng deng jinchu guojing
de guanli shixing xize (国家外汇管理局对外汇、贵金属和外汇票证等进出国境的管理施行细
则) [Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment
Instruments in Convertible Currency into or out of China], adopted by SAFE ON August. 10,
1981, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=1058&Db=chl.
185

Weifan waihui guanli chufa shixing xize(违反外汇管理处罚施行细则) [Implementing Rules

on Punishment of Violation of Foreign Exchange Control] [hereinafter FE Control Punishment
adopted by SAFE on April 5, 1985, and replaced by Foreign Exchange Control Regulation in 1996.
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The 1980 Interim Regulation installed a strict foreign exchange control. For
example, all domestic entities’ spending and receiving of foreign exchange subject to
the central plan.186 Such entity could not privately hold foreign exchange or deposit
foreign exchange (including payment instrument) abroad.187 This means such entity
needs permission from SAFE for any foreign exchange transaction. Article 10 further
stipulated Chinese Custom must inspect the payment of balance and trade receipt to
ensure compliance of the foreign exchange control by state trading company.188 At the
beginning of the Reform and Open Up, the central authority placed strict regulations on
domestic firms. At the end of the 1980s, the authority lifted some bans in response to
decriminalize profit-seeking behavior by increase foreign exchange retention quota for
domestic firms.189

The 1980 Interim Regulation and 1981 Individual FE Examination and 1981
Individuals FE Control governed foreign exchange transactions conducted by Chinese

186

Art. 5, 1980 Interim Regulations.
Art. 6, 1980 Interim Regulations. “Unless approved by the SAFEC or its branch offices,
organizations within the territory shall not possess foreign exchange, deposit foreign exchange
abroad, offset foreign exchange expenditure against foreign exchange income, or use the
foreign exchange belonging to State organs stationed abroad or enterprises and institutions
established by the State in foreign countries or in the Hong Kong and Macao regions, by way of
borrowing or acquisition.”
188
Art. 10, 1980 Interim Regulations.
187

189

Art. 1 Zhongwai hezi, hezuo jingying qiye zhongfang touzizhe de waihui guanli guiding (中外

合资、合作经营企业中方投资者的外汇管理规定) [ Admnistration on Chinese investors in
FIE ] adopted by SAFE January 7, 1989.
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individual. These regulations placed a strong bias against a private citizen. For example,
an individual could privately hold foreign exchange revenue if the revenue originated
from his service as a state representative or state-sponsored students.190 However, if a
private citizen obtains foreign exchange through other venues, such as publishing or
rewards, he or she cannot retain the money without permission from the authority.191 In
addition, a private citizen is not allowed to retain any foreign exchange received from
overseas privately. If one receives money more than 3000 RMB, then he or she can only
retain 10%, the rest of the money must be sold to BOC.192 These regulations
demonstrated a strong position that against a private individual possess any economic
capacity independent from the central authority.

190

Art.5 and art. 6 1981 Individuals FE Control. Art. 5 “When personnel are sent by the State to
work in foreign countries or in Hong Kong Macao or other regions return home upon completion
of their missions/assignments, they must promptly remit or bring back to China the
remaining/balance foreign exchange from wages, allowances, etc. that belongs to them, and
such remaining/balance shall not be kept abroad. They shall be permitted to retain the foreign
exchange based on the certification issued by the Chinese organization stationed abroad.” Art. 6
“Students, trainees, postgraduate students, scholars, teachers, coaches and other personnel
who are sent by the State to study in foreign countries or in Hong Kong, Macao or other regions
must, upon their return, promptly remit or bring back to China the remaining amount of the
foreign exchange that they have received during their stay abroad, and it shall not be kept
abroad; they shall be permitted to retain the foreign exchange that they are entitled to receive,
based on the certification issued by Chinese organization stationed abroad.”
191
Art. 7, 1981 Individuals FE Control. “The foreign exchange from fees for publication, copyright
royalties, awards, stipend, author's remuneration, etc. earned by individuals for publications of
their inventions, writings and the like abroad, for speeches and lectures made in their own
names outside China, for their contributions to foreign newspapers, magazines and specialized
journals, etc., must promptly be repatriated and shall not be kept abroad; individuals shall be
permitted to retain the foreign exchange that they are entitled to receive according to the
relevant provisions approved by the State Council or the ministries or commissions concerned,
or with the approval of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control.”
192
Art. 2, 1981 Individuals FE Control.
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There were also various restrictions over the foreign business. For example, all
foreign exchange revenue and spending must be processed through bank account from
the BOC. SAFE would conduct periodical inspection over the company book to ensure
the compliance in pursuant to article 2 of the Foreign Business foreign exchange
control.193 The most controversial restrictions perhaps related to the article 24 and
article 25 of the 1980 Interim Regulation, which allows the business entity, such as EJV,
CJV or WFOE to remit all profit overseas but discriminate against a foreign employee,
which stated only 50% of the post-tax salary could be remitted outside China.194 With
strong criticism and complaints from the foreign investment community, article 25 of
the 1983 foreign business FE Control stipulated that employee’s salary can be remitted

193

Article 2 provided that “In Chapter V of the Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control
of the People's Republic of China, the term "enterprises with overseas Chinese capital" refers to
corporations, enterprises or other economic entities registered in China with overseas Chinese
capital or capital of compatriots from the Hong Kong and Macao regions, and managed
independently or jointly with Chinese enterprises; the term "foreign-capital enterprises" refers
to corporations, enterprises or other economic entities registered in China with foreign capital,
and managed independently or jointly with Chinese enterprises; the term "Chinese-foreign
equity joint ventures" refers to enterprises jointly established, owned and run in China by
corporations, enterprises, other economic entities or individuals with overseas Chinese capital,
capital from compatriots in the Hong Kong and Macao regions or foreign capital and Chinese
corporations, enterprises or other economic entities.” see, article 2 Foreign Exchange Regulation
on FIEs.
194
Art. 25 Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control. “An amount not exceeding 50% of
their after-tax legitimate net earnings from wages, etc. may be remitted or taken out of China in
foreign currency by staff members and workers of foreign nationality and those from the Hong
Kong and Macao regions employed by enterprises with overseas Chinese capital, foreign-capital
enterprises and Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures.”
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outside China with SAFE permission, provided such portion of foreign exchange would
be taken out from foreign business entity’s bank account. 195

Table 1. Foreign Exchange Control during the early 1980s.
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Individual Chinese

Foreign
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Foreign investors
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Partially, amount

deposit in

exceed the quota

Bank of China

must sell to Bank

Free

No, must deposit
in Bank of China

of China
Free to spend

No, unless

No, must sell to

195

Free

N/A

Art. 15 Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises and Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures. “Staff members and workers of foreign nationality and those from the
Hong Kong and Macao regions employed by enterprises with overseas Chinese capital, foreigncapital enterprises and Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures may remit abroad their wages and
other justified earnings, after taxation according to law, and if the remittance exceeds 50% of
their wages and other earnings, they may apply to the SAFEC or its branch offices. The amounts
remitted shall all be debited to the foreign exchange deposit accounts of the enterprises
concerned.”
Also see, Zhang Lixing, “The Statutory Framework for Direct Foreign Investment in China,”
FLORIDA INT'L LJ. 4 (1989): 289-290.
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account

approves

*see relevant articles from Provisional for Foreign Exchange Control and supplementary
legislation.

On April 5, 1985, SAFE adopted Detailed Rules on Violation of Foreign Exchange
Control [hereinafter FEC Punishment].196 This was the first comprehensive
administrative regulation concerning how to punish acts violate foreign exchange
control until it was replaced by 1996 Foreign Exchange Control Regulation. This rule
defined three types of illegal conducts:
1. Unlawful procurement of foreign exchange
2. Evasion of foreign exchange control
3. Disruption of financial stability
Under this rule, depends on the nature of the conduct, there were three different
agencies to enforce the rule and sanction. For example, for cases involving smuggling of
goods, it would be handled by Custom. For cases involving payment instrument, it
would be handled by SAIC.197 Multiple transactions were provided by the rule, normally,
depends on the consequence of the conduct, the sanction could range from oral

196

Weifun waihui guanli chufa shixing xize (违反外汇管理处罚施行细则 )[Detailed Rules on

Violation of Foreign Exchange Control] adopted by SAFE April 5 1985, accessed July 25, 2017,
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/3/3-2-10.html
197
Art. 13 FEC Punishment.
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warning and self-criticism to large monetary penalty. The penalty could be either
confiscation or additional penalty fees.198

Chinese foreign exchange control prohibits the Chinese partner in JV obtains
large disposable foreign exchange without control from the central authority. On
September 24, 1985, SAFE issued General Reply on Certain issues concerning FIE Foreign
Exchanges, which specified that FIE couldn't accept foreign exchange coupon without
permission from SAFE. In addition, Chinese partners in JV cannot provide RMB for the
foreign investor when a foreign partner has RMB shortage for any domestic business.199

In accordance with the central authority's foreign exchange control, local
government would adopt detailed implementing rules to enforce foreign exchange
control. For example, on July 1, 1988, Beijing government adopted Provisional
Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control [hereinafter Beijing FIE FE Control].200
The main purpose of such regulation was to provide detailed guidance to any FIE
registered with Beijing municipality or located within the jurisdiction of Beijing

198

Art. 5 Punishment.

199

Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu sanzi qiye waihui guanli ruogan wenti de zonghe dafu (国家外

汇管理局关于“三资”企业外汇管理若干问题的综合答复) [General Reply on Certain issues
concerning FIE Foreign Exchanges] [hereinafter 1985 SAFE Reply] issued by SAFE on September
24, 1985.
200

Beijing shi waishang touzi qiiye waihui guanli zanxing banfa (北京市外商投资企业外汇管理

暂行办法) [Provisional Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control] adopted by People’s
Government of Beijing on July 1, 1988.
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municipality. One of the highlights for this regulation was to list some exceptions for FIE
domestic, foreign exchange transaction. Under Beijing FIE rule, FIE could pay the
domestic vendor with foreign exchange under certain exceptions.201 Such as FIE
purchased service to produce domestic shortage product or purchase products from the
export trading company. Other situations required written permission from the SAFE
branch office. For example, for the business involved with advanced technology or
import substitute products, written permission from SAFE was required. FIE could open
a foreign bank account after obtaining permission from SAFE.202 However, such practice
was not absolute. According to the Regulations on FIE Overseas Bank Account, the
overseas bank account is only permitted under certain conditions.203 Besides these
conditions, FIE must submit board of director resolution on the overseas bank account
and accountant opinion on whether FIE fully paid subscribed investment.

The Interim Foreign Exchange Regulations, Individual Foreign Exchange Controls,
Individual Foreign Exchange Purchase Application Regulations, Regulations on WFOE,
EJVs and CJVs, and Punishments for Violations of Foreign Exchange Controls formed the
basis of China’s foreign exchange regulatory framework during the 1980s. Foreign

201
202
203

Art. 10 Provisional Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control
Art. 4 Provisional Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control.
Guanyu waishang touzi qiye zai jingwai kaili zhanghu de guanli guiding (关于外商投资企业在

境外开立帐户的管理规定) [Regulations on FIE Overseas Bank Account] adopted by SAFE on
January 7, 1989. For example, FIE would have frequent foreign exchange income and such
income would later transfer to China. Or FIE would have frequent foreign exchange spending.
Other special needs.
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investors were frustrated by China’s currency issues. The central authority designated
this framework for two purposes: 1) to maintain a balance of payments by limit the
outflow of foreign exchanges. 2) to maintain a stable foreign exchange rate to protect
RMB. These two purposes concerning the stability of the foreign exchange rate because
the central authority was struggled from a lot of foreign debts resulted from
“unplanned” purchases made by previous political leaders. China’s strict foreign
exchange rules were biased against Chinese individual and foreign employees. The state
trading company enjoy special exchange rate while Chinese individual must sell the
majority of the foreign exchange to BOC at an undesired rate. A foreign employee could
only remit 50% of the salary oversea. Permissions from SAFE was required for
remittance beyond 50%. These restrictions prevent foreign investors from future
investment. In addition, they promoted rent-seeking behavior for foreign exchange
control evasion.

e. Labor regulation framework
During the 1980s, State Council and Ministry of Labor and Personnel adopted
series administrative legislation and directives, which formed the FIE labor regulatory
framework. Under this framework, Provisions on Labour Management in ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures [Hereinafter EJV Labor Provision] and Implementing
Measures of the EJV Labor Provisions were the basis of the framework.204 The local

204

Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding (中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定)

[Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures ]adopted by State
110

authority would make their implementing rules, for example, Beijing Municipality
Supplementary Rule on Implementing Provisions on Labour Management in ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures [Hereinafter Beijing labor rule].205According to the MOL
Reply concerning whether accept labor dispute arbitration for FIE employee under three
conditions, labor dispute would be governed by arbitration provided under Interim
Regulation on SOE Labor Dispute. 206

Labor management had always been an issue for FIEs during the 1980s. The main
conflicts concerned the policy of China’s labor welfare, particularly job security, and
FIE’s autonomous rights of profit incentive-based labor management. According to the
EJV Law article 6, the employment, the discharge will be governed by JV agreement and
contract.207 This rule only provided a basic principle for the labor issue. Because all JV
agreements and contracts must be verified and approved by the relevant authority, FIE’s
freedom of contract was much limited, which means local authority could interfere FIE’s

Council on July 26, 1980. Also see Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding shishi
banfa (中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定实施办法) [Implementing Measures for the Provisions
on Labor Management in Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted by Ministry of Labor on
January 19, 1984.
205

Beijing shi shishi zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli de guiding (北京市实施中外合资

经营企业劳动管理规定)的补充规定 Beijing Municipality Supplementary Rule on Implementing
Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] [Hereinafter
Beijing labor rule] adopted by Beijing People’s Government on March 20, 1986.
206

See Guoying qiye laodong zhengyi chuli zanxing guiding (国营企业劳动争议处理暂行规

定)[Interim Regulation on SOE Labor Dispute] adopted by State Council on July 31, 1987.
207

Art. 6 EJV Law.
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labor management through the verification process. On July 26, 1980, State Council
adopted EJV Labor Provision.208 Later, the MOL adopted Implementing Rule in 1984.209
These two laws formed the basis of FIE labor management during the 1980s until they
were replaced by PRC Labor Law in 1994.210 The 1980 EJV Labor Provision demonstrated
China’s socialist command economy labor management system, which disregarded free
labor market and incentive-based labor management. Under 1980 EJV Labor Provision,
the FIE could not independently hire an employee without permission from local labor
authority.211 Otherwise, labor authority would provide the employee in accordance with
the regional labor plan.212 Instead of signing contract with each individual, FIE had to
sign a contract with the labor representative, which subject to labor Authority's
approval prior to the date of the contract. 213The power of punishing and discharging
labor was limited under article 5. The FIE cannot independently punish or discharge an

208

Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding (中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定 )

[Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures ]adopted by State
Council on July 26, 1980.
209

Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding shishi banfa (中外合资经营企业劳动管

理规定实施办法) [Implementing Measures for the Provisions on Labor Management in SinoForeign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted by Ministry of Labor on January 19, 1984.
210
See 1994 PRC Labor Law
211
Art. 3 EJV Labor Provision. “The workers and staff members of a joint venture who have been
either recommended by the authorities of the locality in charge of the joint venture or the labor
management department, or recruited by the joint venture itself with the consent of the labor
management department, shall all be selected by the joint venture through careful
examinations. Joint ventures may run workers' schools and training courses to train managerial
personnel and skilled workers.”
212
Ibid.
213
Ibid.
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employee without approval from the local labor authority.

214

The EJV Labor Provision

outlined dispute resolution mechanism. Because China did not have modern HR system
under command economy during the 1980s, the employee could first resolve the
dispute internally with the board of director.215 If the board of director cannot settle,
then both party can try arbitration. However, such arbitration was not final because any
party disagrees with the outcome can file litigation to people’s court.216

The 1980 EJV Labor Provision demonstrated a biased policy against FIE’s freedom
of contract and autonomous rights of labor management, which caused many
complaints from the investors. However, such policy may result from China’s command
economy labor system. China’s command economy provided job security and various
labor welfares. Under this system, each individual would be allocated to a specific
position after the graduation. The central authority would manage and determine the
benefits of the labor in accordance with the central plan. Thus, when the employee was
hired by a FIE, the central authority wished to maintain a form of labor policy coherency
at the cost of the FIE. In order to balance the conflict between the policy of labor
welfare and FIE internal operation, MOL adopted Implementing Measures for EJV Labor
Provision in 1984.217 The Implementing Measures took a compromise that FIE could

214

Art. 5 EJV Labor Provision.
Art.6 EJV Labor Provision.
216
Art. 14 EJV Labor Provision.
215

217

Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding shishi banfa (中外合资经营企业劳动管

理规定实施办法) [Implementing Measures for the Provisions on Labor Management in SinoForeign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted by Ministry of Labor on January 19, 1984.
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stipulate a trial session for labors recommended by the local authority. If such person
failed his or her duty or failed to pass the employment exam, then FIE could dismiss
such person.218 One of the progress for the new Measures was to remove the
requirement of obtaining permission from labor authority prior to punish or discharge
an employee.219 The punishment or discharge decision must be made by either
manager or vice-manager. In addition, such decision must be filed with local labor
authority for the record.220 The 1984 Implementing Measures also allow FIE to decide
the standard of salary and benefit without reference or on par with local SOE.221 Last
but not the least, FIE can negotiate labor insurance and benefits standard with local
labor authority if such FIE disagreed with the general standard.222

To further promote FIE’s right of internal labor management, State Council
adopted Further Implementation of the Policy of Granting Decision-Making Power to
Enterprises with Foreign Investment for the Employment of Working Personnel
[Hereinafter State Council FIE Employment Policy] in 1988.223 This policy further relaxed

218

Art. 3 EJV Labor Provision.
Art. 10 EJV Labor Provision.
220
Art. 10 EJV Labor Provision.
221
Art. 12 EJV Labor Provision.
222
Art. 14 EJV Labor Provision.
223
Guowuyuan Ban gongting zhuanfa laodongbu, renshibu, guanyu jinyibu luoshi waishang touzi
219

qiye yongren zizhongquan de yijian (国务院办公厅转发劳动部、人事部关于进一步落实外商
投资企业用人自主权意见的通知) [Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the
Approval and Transmission of the Proposals Submitted by the Ministry of Labour and the
Ministry of Personnel Concerning Further Implementation of the Policy of Granting DecisionMaking Power to Enterprises with Foreign Investment for the Employment of Working
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restrictions on FIE’s freedom of contract on labor management. For example, article 1
and article 2 supported FIE to fire anyone they need from the community without
permission from local labor authority.224 The chart illustrates the labor management
framework during the 1980s:

Table 2. Labor regulations during the 1980s.

Free to hire labor

Free to discharge or punish
labor

1980 EJV Labor Provision

NO, need labor authority

No, need labor authority

permission

permission

1984 Implementing Measures Can install trial session and

Yes, but need to file a record

on EJV Labor Provision

to local authority

examination, dismiss
unqualified applicant prior
former employment

1988 Hereinafter State

Yes, local authority must

Yes, local authority must

Council FIE Employment

provide assistant

provide assistant

Policy

Personnel] adopted by State Council May 5, 1988. [Hereinafter State Council Notice on Ensuring
FIE Autonomous Labor Management]
224
Art.2 State Council FIE Labor Opinion.
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*1980 EJV Labor Provision and 1984 Implementing Measures on EJV Labor
Provision were replaced by the 1994 PRC Labor Law

One of the recurring themes of Chinese FDI policy and law between the 1980s
and early 1990s was the flexibility of the law enforcement. The need for decentralized
reform is incoherent with the goal for strict law enforcement. Early FDI laws were vague
and ambiguous, which relied greatly on administrative interpretation. The central
authority normally issued different internal directives in order to accommodate the
need for the political object and further reform. For a state proclaimed the superiority
of the central planning, the flexible law enforcement seemed to be arbitrary and lack of
consensus over the extent and area of the reform. As Edward Duff pointed out, this is
not an indication of “absence of law, but rather a pragmatic reaction to China’s highly
political environment.225”

Based on previous discussions on the FDI legal framework, there were problems
concerning the substance and operation of the FDI framework during the 1978-1991 as
well as China’s management style. There were four major problems presented within
the substance of the FDI regulations. First, a lack of domestic legal infrastructure. For
example, the concept of LLC under EJV Law was hard to define due to the lack of
company Law. The concept of limited liability was hard to enforce when there was no

225

Edmund C. Duffy, “Business Law in China: Evolutionary Revolution,” Journal of International
Affairs 49, no. 2 (1996): 557-571, accessed July 29, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357571.
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mortgage law in China, which means loan might have to be guaranteed by the parent
company of the foreign investors. This effectively eliminated the benefits of limited
liability.226 Thus, the limited liability company under EJV Law was merely a title without
substance.227 Second, limited guidance from the EJV Law created vagueness and
confusions. For example, in the process of registration, the authority rarely explained
the basis for their decision, which made it harder for the investor to reduce the risk by
studying the policy. Third, rigid rules concerning the choice of law. For example, Foreign
Economic Contract Law did not provide statutory tools for an investor to apply the
choice of law in the JV contract. On the contrary, all contract performed within the
territory of the People's Republic of China were subject to the law of the People's
Republic.

Other restrictions related to China’s investment policy. For example, the EJV Law
established a narrow and strict definition of advanced equipment, which limited the
non-cash contribution by the foreign investors. The article 27 of the EJV Law provided
that:
such equipment or material must be indispensable to the operation of the joint
venture, must be unable to be produced in China or the production cost is too high.
The price for such contribution must not higher than the international market price

226

Crawford Brickley, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's republic of China: the Promised
Land is not yet in Sight For foreign investors,” U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 10 no. 2 (1988): 261, accessed July
31, 2017, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=jil.
227
Ibid.
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for same or similar items. In addition, such industrial property must use to produce
products urgently need in China or suitable for export.228

In addition, there were some labor issues, such as the problem of independently hire or
discharge labors. The lack of autonomous right in the hiring process and the difficulty in
discharging employee became one of the problems for the effective operation of the JV.
For example, any dismissal must be reported to the local labor bureau for approval, and
labor union can file an objection to dismiss.229

Another type of issues related to the operation of the FDI regulation. First, the
socialist system created a conflict of interests between regulators and the business,
which triggered risks of corruption. For example, there was no private legal service
provider; legal service providers are also employed by the state regulatory agency,
which results in a conflict of interest for many western investors230. Many complaints by
the foreign investors concerned the valuation of noncash contribution. For example,
valuation of contribution by building or land-use rights is controlled by the Chinese
government. These arrangements provided the basis for potential abuse of power

228

Art. 27, 28 EJV Law.
Art. 4 Labor Provisions.
230
For example, the Great Wall Law Office, which is often retained by foreign investors to
prepare joint venture documentation, is staffed by lawyers from MOFERT, which is responsible
for joint venture authorization. See Crawford Brickley, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's
republic of China: the Promised Land is not yet in Sight For foreign investors,” U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 10
no. 2 (1988): 261, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=jil.
229
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because there was no third-party independent valuation service or an effective judicial
system to control government behavior.

Second, the FDI verification and approval process was complicated and full of
bureaucracy. For example, investors and their Chinese counterpart must obtain
permission prior to applying for a business license. Investors were burdened by the
requirements for “project proposal” and “feasibility study.” Proposed terms under
project proposal were hard to change once it approved by the authority.231 There were
confusions as to who bore the cost of these preparations, and there were confusions
regarding the appropriate level of approving authority. 232

There were also problems with the corporate governance under EJV Law. China’s
approach to corporate governance under EJV Law was incompatible with international
customs. Shares in equity/ ownership are not necessarily proportional to its power,
although the liability is proportional to the contribution. For example, Majority
shareholder would not automatically translate into majority voting rights under the
“equal share equal rights principles.”233 A number of directors appointed by each party
determined by consultation between the parties with reference to their equity shares.
The chairman must be a Chinese national. In addition, a major decision by the company
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Crawford Brickley, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's republic of China: the Promised
Land is not yet in Sight For foreign investors,” U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 10 no. 2 (1988): 261, accessed July
31, 2017, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=jil.
232
Ibid.
233
Art. 34, Implementing Regulation,
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must be made through consultation under equal and mutual benefit principle.234 In
practice, the governments interfered with the operation of the joint venture. For
example, the Chinese government would make final decisions on product pricing and
raw materials and energy resources allocation, in order to satisfy the enforcement of
central planning.235

Conclusion
Between 1978-1991, the Chinese central authority established the conceptual
framework for the foreign investment through ideological and constitutional reform.
However, the debates over the legitimacy of the foreign investment program, the
notion of the market, and profit within a conventional central planning economy
continued throughout the 1980s. The EJV Law, CJV Law, and WFOE Law and
supplemental regulations formed the basis of Chinese FDI regulatory framework. The
foreign exchange and labor regulations were important elements affected core interests
of the investors as well as the development of China’s investment environment.

The FDI regulatory framework during the 1980s demonstrated the nature of
China’s centralized command economy: (1) a multiple leveled administrative structure
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Art. 6 EJV Law.
For example, the Chinese government makes final decisions on product pricing and raw
materials and energy resources allocation to permit conformity with the national economic
plan.
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was placed on foreign investment regulation, (2) a restrictive market without a
functioning commercial judicial system. (3) Transactions were regulated and managed
through the central plan and regional plan by the government entities, which naturally
caused rent-seeking and corruptions. The problem of corruption became even worse
when the line between legal and illegal was blurred by China’s constantly changing
policies and rules during the reform era. (4) There was no free domestic market and free
labor market. Foreign investors initially could not hire or discipline labors without local
labor authorities’ permission. (5) Foreign investors’ capacity of profiting from the
domestic market or intellectual property had been limited by the FDI regulatory
framework under the centralized planning economy. Foreign investors were encouraged
to sell products overseas. Permissions were required for any domestic sale. (6) Foreign
investors could not appoint a foreigner to serve the chairman of the board of the
directors. All major corporate decisions must be determined by uanimous votes.

Essentially, the FDI regulatory framework had expressed the conflicts of interest
between the authority and the foreign investors. With all these restrictions, the central
authority failed to create policy and regulations to attract multinational corporations.
The central authority essentially created policy and regulations to promote a particular
form of foreign investment: an investment with a singular investor that invested in
export-oriented sectors. The economic data affirmed such conclusion. A singular
investor from South Asia or Hongkong regions with investment in export-oriented
industry was the major form of FDI during the 80s. The labor management restrictions,
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the board of director nationality restrictions, and foreign exchange restrictions could not
attract modern corporate management teams in China. In fact, such framework
translated FDI into a form of bridge loans or compensation trade: a foreign investor
contributed financial, technological means into a production of goods later could be sold
in the international market. The FDI regulatory framework in the 1980s facilitated an
environment of protection: first, it protected the core interests of the central planning
and political structure associated with the central planning, and second, it used FDI as
the foreign exchange generator to provide financial means and technological means in
preserving China’s central planning economy. The effect of such FDI regulatory
framework fitted with the reality: the majority of FDI inflow concentrated in textile, toy
and other export-oriented labor-intensive sectors.

To some, such FDI regulatory framework was not enough to support Chinese
modernization, because the benefits of export-oriented labor-intensive sectors were
marginal to a sustainable and modernized industrial powerhouse. Modernization could
not center on a conventional central planning system without a modernized private
market and judicial system. As the next chapter illustrated, the new Party Congress and
Constitution amendments changed the “conventional vision,” and redefined the
relationship between central planning and market. This ended the debates over
socialism and the market, which affirmed Deng Xiaoping’s vision of China’s future.
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Chapter 3 THE FDI POLICY AND LAW BETWEEN 1992-2005
1. Introduction
Since Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “southern tour,” China speeded up the pace of the
Reform and Open Up.236 The term “socialist market economy” was officially endorsed
and adopted to normalize any pro-market reform measures and laws. “Socialist market
economy” established the foundation for China’s modernized legaland economic
system. The establishment of the “socialist market economy” was beneficial to China’s
foreign investment. FIEs transformed Chinese economy and society. The penetration of
the global market with “Made in China” indicated a story about China’s industrail and
modernization reform far beyond the common narrative of developing “export-oriented
or labour-intensive sectors.” 237 The 14th National Congress of CPC officially ended the
ideological debate on the market and socialism by proclaiming the main path to
modernization is the “Socialist Market Economy.”238 By concluding the “old system
(centralized command economy)” can no longer serve the needs of the new reality, it
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In 1992, after Deng step down from the Party post, Deng Xiaoping orchestrated a semiprivate winter tour of China’s southern provinces and Special Economic Zone. The “southern
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and Open Up and foreign investment. He would not accept any polices or laws reverse Reform
and Open Up. See last chapter on Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.”
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Affairs 49, no. 2 (1996): 557-571, accessed July 29,
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officially removed the ideological obstacles of the new reform measures.239 The 1999
and 2004 constitutional amendments textualized these new policies by stating the state
will “encourage, support and protect private sector,” and it added that the “state
protect human rights.”240 The 15th and 16th National Congress of CPC established the
principle of “rule the state in accordance with the law,” and it proclaimed that the
legitimate interests of the private sector, as well as public sector, are “inviolable.”241 In
addition, the 16th Party Congress adopted a pro-market and pro-competition ideological
doctrine commonly known as Jinag Zeming’s “Three-Represents,” which asked the Party
to reconsider its relationship with the market because the Party must “represent
advanced social productive forces.”242 Interestingly, the Party line, the “scientific
outlook on development,” proposed in 2003, highlighted the need for a “scientific”
development, which implied the central authority’s role in monitoring and managing the
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“The old economic structure has its historical origins and has played an important and
positive role. With changing conditions, however, it has come to correspond less and less to the
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and consolidate and develop the political situation characterized by democracy, solidarity,
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market to ensure a “scientific development.” These new political and constitutional
principles established the conceptual basis for crafting a better foreign investment law
and policy framework.

Two decades of outstanding economic performance since the launch of the
Reform and Open Up policy in the late 1980s drew great attention from researchers
around the globe. Many prominent studies linked China’s economic growth with the
following factors: (1) domestic infrastructure investment, (2) the institutional reform
and restructuring to promote investment-friendly regulations and cross-border
economic and technological exchanges.243 From the 1990s and early 2000s, China
gradually established the basis of the modernized commercial legal system by massive
waves of legislation (such as Company Law, Contract Law, General Principle of Civil
Code, and Security Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, and many others). Academics predicted
FDI could further benefit from these reforms in the sectors of banking, finance, and
equity market.244

Although these reforms displayed a strong pattern of pro-SOE and procentralized planning, visible progress was made: freedom of contract and private will
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Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu wanshan shehuizhuyi shichangjingji tizhi

ruoganwentidejuedng (中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [Decision
on Improve Socialist Market Economy System] adopted by 16th National Congress of the 16th
CPC on December 14, 2003, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65411/4429165.html.
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were promoted and respected during 1992-2005.245 Openness, transparency,
accountability, and accessibility were no longer ideologically taboo, but treated with
pragmatism as commonly accepted principles for the development of a mature and
healthy investment environment. The development of the Foreign Investment Guiding
Catalogue and the amendments of the equity joint venture (EJV) Law, contractual joint
venture (CJV) Law, and wholly foreign owned (WFOE) Law demonstrated great
improvements of transparency and stability of the FDI regulatory regime. The
development of the Company Law provided a necessary basis for modernizing China’s
corporate governance.

However, problems and challenges remained. Foreign investment suffered from
the clashes between the political vision and the market reality. Foreign investment laws
and regulations extended these conflicts. The policymakers displayed a tendency of
interpreting market realities as inconvenience and problems for their political vision.
The market behavior was commonly understood as “disruptions” to the “order” of the
economy developed and guarded by the authority.246 In this context, “order” was an
expression of political visions of the economy. However, the “order” could not provide
necessary guidance to the investors because it was unpredictable and unreliable. As
some researchers identified, the most complained issues by foreign investors were the
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central authority’s unfair preference of the SOE in a variety of issues. Such preference
created unpredictable regulations for FDI.247 As a result, these regulations created less
competitive SOE sector on the one hand and further alienated private sectors on the
other hand.248 As the next chapter discusses, the alienated private sectors found their
ways of obtaining financial means and investment tools outside the orbit of the central
authority due to the development of globalization.249 Also, the SOE sector was
victimized by such self-fulfilling paradox: more preferential policy, poorer performance;
more protective measures against foreign competition, the weaker position for the SOE
and the central government.

As many foreign investors complained, special policies and incentives for SOE
sector, in the form of loans, administrative approval, and resource allocation,
discriminated against both foreign investors and private sectors in China. It created not
only fiscal problems for the Chinese government but also created legal risks for violating
WTO commitments.250 In addition, the political preference of SOE, created a risk of
corruption. Corruption and ideological prejudice became the greatest threats to foreign
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investors’ interests in the area of market access and resource distribution.251 China’s
intrusive administrative, regulatory regime had effectively undermined Chinese foreign
investment market. Foreign investment turned into a form of bridge loan or non-voting
right equity due to various discriminatory regulations and laws.252 Despite challenges,
there were many opportunities for business to grow during the 1990s, FDI data
presented a bright future for Chinese market during that period.

This chapter mainly focuses on the FDI regime between 1992-2005. The purpose
is to show the development of FDI regulatory regime in the context of the Chinese
ideological and Constitutional framework, as well as its legal framework. The first
section of this chapter gives an overview of the economic status and characteristics of
the foreign investment during the period between 1992-2005. It acknowledges that
foreign investment’s contribution to China’s industrial and trade development is
undeniable. It concludes that even falling short by the market economy standard,
China’s legal system demonstrated great development over the years. In addition,
China’s accession to WTO created a new reality that the central authority’s regulatory
power was limited by the scrutiny of international law.
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The second section exclusively discusses the ideological framework and
constitutional framework during 1992-2005. The purpose of this section is to provide a
necessary ideological and constitutional basis that assists readers in understanding the
principles and contexts, within which the FDI legal framework operated. The main
theme during this time was the end of the debate over the definition of socialism in
relation to the market and profit. The “socialist market economy” was officially
recognized by the Party and the state constitutions. “Protecting and developing state
and private-sectors interests” was considered as an important obligation of the
Vanguard Party.253 This new development, on the one hand, promotes “freedom of
contract,” for both Chinese and foreign investors, while on the other hand, presented a
dilemma for the policymakers in the context of maintaining socialist economic order.

The third section exclusively discusses the legal framework of the FDI regime
during 1992-2005. The purpose is to illustrate the new progress of China’s foreign
investment policy and law through the example of EJV Law, CJV Law, WFOE Law, and the
Catalogue for Guiding foreign investment. In addition, this section would also focus on
one feature of China’s commercial system (dualist legal system) in the context of PRC
Company Law. It concludes that although far from western market economy standard,
there was liberation and progress in the area of promoting “freedom of contract,” and
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“transparency and clarity.” It also notes that the dualist legal system, one system
designed for domestic firms (particularly private firms) and another system for foreigninvested firms, was a natural product of China’s conflicting positions on the market and
socialism. It may be self-defeating in creating undesired consequences for both SOEs
and the private sector in the long run, as the next chapter illustrates.

The background
The FDI development during the 1990s and early 2000s displayed some
interesting features and data. First, the impact of China’s economic development was
reflected in China’s export sector. For example, exportation of natural resources had
been gradually replaced by industrial products, especially textile and apparel. IMF
reported that “By 2002 processed exports reached $180 billion and accounted for 55
percent of China's total exports.”254 Similar sitations China’s textile exportation almost
doubled, “from 4.6 percent in 1980 to 8.5 percent in 1998.”255 China’s share of global
exports for apparel “more than quadrupled, from 4.0 percent to 16.7 percent over the
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For example, “the share of primary product exports fell by almost “four-fifths, from an
average of 45 percent of total exports in the first half of the 1980s to only 10 percent by 1999.”
Labor intensive manufacturing sectors, such as “textiles, apparel, footwear, and toys are China’s
fastest growing exports during the 191990s.” Study reported that export for these items “rose
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same period. Faster yet was the expansion of the world market share for toys--from 2.3
percent in 1980 to 17.9 percent in 1998.”256 The similar situations occurred in the
footwear sector. “China's share of the world market for footwear rose the fastest of all,
soaring from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 20.7 percent in 1998.”257

Table 3. China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2001) billion USD.258
approved
projects

approved
Contract
value

Actual utilized
contract value

Total

20549

56.727

388.21

FDI

20549

52.201

372.53

EJV

7033

13.773

117.45

CJV

1267

6.702

47.51

WFOE

12237

3.4369

198.80

Share Holding
Investment

8

0.324

4.42

Cooperation
exploration

3

0.019

4.2

others

1

0.013

0.15

International leasing
Processing and
assembling

1.02
1.521
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Secondly, a globalized economy benefited China’s economic development. China
doubled its exportation in auto parts in just one year. China’s massive industrialization
and domestic investment made China become the consumer of “40 percent of the
world's cement in 2003.”259 Observers and researchers noted China’s excellent
development in foreign trade and investment.260 As the 1997 World Bank report
suggested, the transition from command to market “in one or two generation for what
rich industrial economies took centuries to help Chinese out of absolute poverty.” 261The
Chinese economy expanded dramatically in the past decades. Between “1978 and 1995
real GDP per capita grew at the blistering rate of 8 percent a year and lifted 200
million.”262 “Three indicators suggest that increased competition is having a
transforming influence on China's domestic economy. First, the decline in employment
in the state sector; second, the dramatic shrinkage in the rate of inventory
accumulation; third, the upturn in profitability of China's state-owned manufacturing
firms.” 263
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It is estimated that China "will absorb $57.6 billion worth of direct foreign
investment in five years, which will control 6.5% of the global economy. This estimate is
an increase from the intake of FDI in 2001 equaling an astonishing record $46.8
billion.”264 Studies emphasized the significance of FDI in Chinese economy . For example,
FDI provided a significant contribution to the growth of Chinese economy during the
1990s.265 It is impossible to ignore the needs of the foreign investors in order to harness
the benefits from the FDI to develop China's modernization and reform further.266 By
the end of the 1990s, China has “one-third of the emerging markets’ total stock of
FDI.”267The links between China’s growth and FDI is undeniable. During the 1990s, China
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became the world's second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) after the
United States. In addition, reform created many benefits for China’s FDI and domestic
forms. For example, China’s trade company increased rapidly since the reform. “Trade
company and joint ventures enjoyed direct trading rights without restrictions licensing
for products and inputs.”268 “Joint venture in 1994 accounted for a third of China’s
imports, and almost 20 percent of exports” WFOE accounted for 12 percent of imports
and 9 percent of exports.” 269

Since China’s accession to WTO, FDI development maintained a steady growth.
“By the end of April 2003, 436,394 foreign investment enterprises obtained approvals
from the Chinese competent administrative authority. Meanwhile, the total amounts of
foreign investment on contracts were USD 858.588 billion and the amounts of foreign
investment actually used were USD 465.789 billion.”270 From Jan to Nov 2005, “China
approved and set up 39,679 foreign invested enterprises, up by 1.17% than the previous
year; the contractual value of the foreign fund was US$167,212millon, up by 23.99%;
actual utilized foreign fund value was US$53,127millon, decreased by 1.90% year-on-

high FDI.” see World Bank, China 2020: China Engaged (Washington: IMF, 1997) accessed July
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year.” 271 South Asian countries and regions ranked high in regions and countries
investing China. The top regions and countries were: “(according to actual invest value)
were Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Japan, Korea, US, Singapore, Taiwan, Cayman
Islands, Germany, and Samoa. The actual investment value of the top 10 countries and
regions constituted 84.37% of China’s actual utilized foreign fund value.”272

Third, researchers acknowledged that although China became the largest FDI
recipient in 2002, high-quality FDI investment from OECD countries was still
inadequately represented.273 Investors and academics agreed that China’s FDI
framework needed to pay attention to factors that promote and facilitate a high-quality
and sustainable development. Most frequently mentioned factors included “a
transparent and predictable legal system, streamlined investment approval procedures,
good corporate governance, pro-competition policies, and a competent and practical

271

MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2005/1-11),” accessed July 31, 2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/200607/20060702700699.sht
ml.
272
Ibid.
273
For example, although China became the world’s largest recipient of FDI in 2002, the country
continues to rank below OECD economies and several major developing countries in terms of
FDI inflows per capita. Also, while OECD countries provide over 90% of FDI globally, their share
of FDI in China is much smaller. Accordingly, China has now a goal of attracting long-term,
relatively capital-intensive and high-tech projects from multinational enterprises in OECD
countries. Improvements in the business environment that will help achieve this goal will also
have the broader effect of increasing domestic investment. OECD, “OECD Investment Policy
Review of China 2003,” accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/oecd-investment-policy-reviewof-china-2003.htm.
135

financial system.” 274 Since the 2000s, China started to adopt new policies to develop
structures that were more compatible with the WTO commitment and sustainable
development. This change also mirrored the fact that more and more high-quality FDI
replaced labor-intensive and export-oriented small size FDI. 275

With the development of China’s legal infrastructure and economic system,
more and more foreign investors choose WFOE as the form of their business
investment. For example, “Since 1997, WFOEs have begun to outnumber JVs. Factors
such as Chinese partners’ competence, joint-venture (JV) management control, and
frustration from JV failure examples, have been cited as reasons why a strict adoption of
WFOE for conducting business in China might be preferable.276” Some researchers
highlighted the fact that China adopted different strategies in approaching FDI. FDI
incentives were tailored to fit local advantage.277
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Fourth, joining WTO transformed China’s implementing policy and law on
international trade and FDI regime. With the signature with the U.S. and EU for the
bilateral agreement on China’s accession to WTO in 1999 and 2000, China broke ground
for its path to WTO admission.278
Table 4. China’s Path to WTO.
1984

● China obtained observer status in GATT

1986

● China notified GAT of intent to renegotiate terms of membership

1987

● GATT established Working party on China membership

1995

● China applied for accession to WTO

1997

● China agreed to Nondiscrimination and Judicial Review under WTO, signed
bilateral agreements with New Zealand, Korea

1999

● The United States and China signed bilateral agreement on China's
accession

2000

● U.S. Congress passed legislation, EU and China signed bilateral agreement
on China's accession

2001

● China's accession to WTO became effective

•

The average statutory tariff, which stood at the relatively high level of 56 percent
in 1982, was reduced to 15 percent by 2001. The share of all imports subject to

favorable tax and administrative treatment to foreign firms (more favorable treatment than to
domestic Chinese firms!)”
278
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J. Int'l L. 12 no.1 (1987):1-35, accessed July 31, 2017,
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licensing requirements fell from a peak of 46 percent in the late 1980s to fewer
than 4 percent of all commodities by the time China entered the WTO. 279

Lee Branstetter and Nicholas Lardy emphasized that “China’s aggressive liberalization of
trade and investment in advance of deadlines built into the agreements surrounding
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).”280 China’s growth
demonstrated a pattern of development that was coherent with the basic experience of
Japan and Korea.281 More importantly, WTO served as an external discipline over
China’s administrative interference of the economy through principles and guidelines

279

Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its Role in Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper
presented at International Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied Economic Research
Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 1-10,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf.
280
For example, “Starting in the mid-1990s, the SOE reforms reflected the state’s desire to seek
effective management and make this suit the needs of a market economy through innovative
operations and mechanisms. Thus far, the government still aims to reform the SOEs in the hope
that the latter can stand on their own feet... Areas like corporate governance, entrepreneurship
and internationalization receive more and more attention. To counteract the problem of surplus
labour in SOEs, the state resorts to the survival of the fittest, resulting in downsizing in SOEs”
see Daniel Yan and Malcolm Warner, “Research Papers in Management Studies Sino-Foreign
Joint Ventures’ Versus ‘Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises’ in The People’s Republic Of China,”
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/workingpapers/wp0111.pdf. Also
see, Loren Brandt, Thomas G. Rawski, Lin Gang, “Inside Chinese economy : Retrospect And
Prospect,” Asia Program Special Report (2005):1,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/AsiaReport_129.pdf (accessed September 04,
2017).
281
For example: From the perspective of earlier Asian growth spurts in Japan and Korea, China
has opened its economic doors to imports and overseas capital to an unprecedented degree, a
strategy that seems likely to create future industrial structures that differ widely from what we
see in Japan and Korea today. Lee Branstetter, Nicholas Lardy, “China’s Embrace of
Globalization,” (Cambridge: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2006) accessed July
31, 2017, http://www.nber.org/papers/w12373.
http://sandraponcet.weebly.com/uploads/8/1/9/0/81902660/chinas_economy_retrospect_and
_prospect.pdf.
138

embedded in a matrix of multinational, bilateral treaties. Thus, WTO formed an external
framework that checked China’s administrative power. 282These external rules, to some
extent, forced the Chinese government to take actions that were more compatible with
the global standard, particularly in the area of market access, subsidies, and
transparency.283

Fifth, China established a dualist legal system between 1992-2005 under China’s
socialist economy. Between 1992-2005, China started massive commercial lawmaking.
These laws formed the basis of China’s dual legal system or two-track legal system: one
for foreign investors and one for domestic firms. This system intended to provide a set
of policies and regulations for foreign investment, which could be more compatible with
the international practice and norms. Another set of regulations for domestic firms were
created to accommodate the experience of the “socialist market economy.” However,
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as one scholar noticed, such system might create confusion and conflicts. 284 For
example, EJV Law, CJV Law, and WFOE Law were created for FIEs. The Company Law
was tailored for the domestic firm, which had many rules incompatible with the foreign
investment legal framework.285 It was acknowledged that “Chinese law treats Chinese
and foreigners unequally, or more accurately, treats Chinese nationals and legal
persons, including those established by foreign investors, less favorably in terms of the
establishment of enterprises and income tax than foreign investors coming directly from
abroad.”286 The design of such dualist structure, as Huang asserted, was “to insulate
SOEs from the reform while using FIE to reform the ‘socialist market economy.'”287 The
PRC Company Law and SOE Law illustrated this issue. For example:
“The Company Law, in theory, is supposed to be a unified legislation governing
firms of all ownership types, but in fact, separate laws designed for firms of
different ownership types have remained in force. Indeed, the Company Law has
specifically stipulated the continuation of the separate legal regime for FIEs.
Thus, for the FIE sector, the three landmark laws, the PRC Law on Sino-Foreign
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Equity Joint Ventures (1979), the PRC Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
(1986), and the PRC Law on Sino Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures (1988)
remained in effect. For most of the SOEs, a critical prerequisite for SOEs to come
under the jurisdiction of the Company Law has not been met—that they are
reorganized into either ‘‘companies limited by shares’’ or ‘‘limited liability
companies.’’ Thus, for the SOEs, the relevant piece of legislation continues to be
the PRC Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned Wholly by the People promulgated
in 1988 (hereafter SOE Law)288
This dualist nature of the legal system attracted academic interest, some entertaining
the thought that such design perfectly fits in the structure of “socialism conservation,”
to preserve SOE rather than eliminate it.289 Interestingly, some researchers pointed out
that with China’s accession to WTO and decades of FDI development, Chinese
leadership experimented with a new tactic, such as M&A, to restructure SOE in the hope
of creating world-class enterprises through soft government planning. 290

288

Yuan Anyuan, “Foreign direct investments in China--practical problems of complying with
China's company law and laws for foreign-invested enterprises,” in Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 3 (2000): 484.
289
Ibid.
290
For example, “In particular, beginning with the creation of the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, China’s new leaders deemphasized their predecessors’ move toward a greater reliance on market forces and a lesser
reliance on Chinese government economic planners and state-owned enterprises. Instead, the
new leaders set out to bolster the state sector by seeking to improve the operational efficiency
of state-owned enterprises and by orchestrating mergers and consolidations in order to make
these enterprises stronger. These actions soon led to institutionalized preferences for stateowned enterprises and the creation of national champions in many sectors.” United States
Trade Representative, 2016 Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance, January 2017,
accessed July 2017, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-China-Report-to-Congress.pdf.
141

Last, since the 1990s and China’s massive business law legislation, the rule of
law started to be a frequent topic among western academics. 291One of the frequent
themes were whether China could maintain the current pace of development in the
1990s without meaningful development in China’s legal infrastructure. One of the
common comments from Western academics was “China’s story defies western
assumptions about the relationship between capitalism and the rule of law.292”As one
scholar observed, obstacles created under China’s FDI policy and law linked to these
issues, “the regulation either rigid without flexibility or flexible but lack transparency,
there is no consensus on to what extent foreign capital is allowed in China’s socialist
economy reform,” except, perhaps, a decision from leadership after long and closed
internal debates. 293

2. Ideological and Constitutional Framework
As the second chapter discussed, during the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping proposed the
“two hands theory,” which referred to the authority would one hand focusing on
economic development while the other hand is focusing on the regulations and laws in
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response to complaints about legal system by foreign investors.294 During the 1990s, a
massive wave of commercial, civil, administrative, criminal laws designed to build
China’s legal system. Legislation benefited FDI tremendously. These laws and
regulations were the extensions of China’s foreign investment policies and underlying
ideological and constitutional framework. Thus, it is important to exam the ideological
and constitutional context of China’s judicial modernization. These discussions provide a
necessary context to understand the extent and forms of China’s commercial system
reform, which would be helpful in understanding the conflicts between the goal of
preserving a revolutionary socialist agenda and the goal of promoting freedom of
contract and foreign investments under a market system.

The first part of this section outlined the progress in China’s ideological reform,
which identified that the authority relaxed the ideological prejudice against market and
profit. This progress provided an excellent basis for China’s further relaxation on FDI
regime, as the next section FDI legal framework demonstrated. The second part of this
section focused on the constitutional development of the China’s economic system,
which suggested that the consistency between the ideological reform and constitutional
reform. It further provided a textual analysis considering the issue of a socialist
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economic order under the Constitution, which illustrated the dilemma between the
political agenda of the authority and the economic interests of the foreign investors for
securing freedom of contract.

a. Ideological Framework
In 1997, the 15th National Congress of CPC report proposed “rule the state in
accordance with the law.”295 It highlighted the implication of this new agenda, as it
pointed out “Rule the state in accordance with the law is the basic strategy, the
necessity of developing the ‘socialist market economy’ and important sign of civic
progress, and an important guarantee for the long-term stability and security of the
state.” In 1990, Administrative Law and Litigation Procedure Law clarified the scope of
administrative litigation, the responsibility of the government agency under different
conditions.296 This legislation gave investors and private citizens a chance to ask court
review government action. In 1994, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted State
Compensation Law, which stipulated the scope of compensation, standard, procedure,
and applicability. This legislation offered a legal framework for investors and private
citizens to settle their disputes with the government agency in the courthouse. Although
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these laws were far from perfect in theory and in practice, the significance was
undeniable. In addition, Administrative Reconsideration Law was promulgated in 1999,
which provided statutory oversight on the government action.297 These measures
improved the accountability of the government. On a side note, since China restored the
judicial system, China started to rebuild people’s court, people’s procuratorate,
arbitration system and lawyer system. Until 2006, there are about 190,000 judges,
140,000 prosecutors, and 130,000 lawyers.298 These new professionals formed the basis
of China’s rule of law system.

The most important ideological reform between 1992-2005 focused on the
relationship between socialism and the role of the market. The reform involved with
three stages. The first stage normalized the notion of the market economy by
establishing the new party line the “socialist market economy with Chinese
characteristics” in 1993.299 The goal is to desensitize the negative connotation of the
market and profit. The second stage further opened the market by removing practices
of a centralized command economy, creating free price market, restructuring SOE
management, and developing the commercial legal system. These measures
substantially transformed China’s command economy. It also introduced a new notion
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of replacing government command with market and court. The third stage was to
decriminalize bourgeoisie by allowing them to join the communist party. These new
developments expressed a historical coherence after Deng Xiaoping’s legacy policy of
the Reform and Open Up, which were all embedded and reflected in the Constitutional
amendments. These reforms officially ended the debates of socialism and capitalism
throughout the 1980s and concluded that the old system existed for historical reasons,
and now it is time to move forward to the “socialist market economy,” which is more
appropriate to serve the socialist modernization.300 FDI policy and law during this period
benefited tremendously from these new reform measures because first, a free domestic
market started to emerge in China when government gradually stepped back from their
intrusive role in the economic transaction. Second, the expansion of market reform
created a domestic market with practices compatible with the global common standard.
China gradually adopted Company Law, Contract Law, Security Law, Antitrust Law,
Insurance Law and many others to build a modernized legal system and professional,
and competent legal service industry.

On the part of political development, the 14th National Congress of CPC
redefined China’s economic system by concluding China would move away from the
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“old system.” 301 It concluded that previous economic system “existed for historical
reasons” with “certain great contributions.”302 However, it was time to move forward
because such system had been increasingly inadequate to serve the “development of
modernization.” 303 The 14th National Congress of CPC proposed a new party line of
developing the “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”304

On the part of the economic reform. The Third Plenary Session of the 14th
National Congress of CPC adopted Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of the
Socialist Market Economy [hereinafter the Resolution on the Socialist Market
Economy].305 The 1993 Resolution on the Socialist Market Economy ended ideological
debates and reaffirmed the necessity of further Open up. It declared that the socialist
market economy is embedded with a socialist system.306 The nature of the “socialist
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market economy” was to let market allocate the resources with state macroeconomic
regulation and control. The resolution outlined area of reform, which included tax, bank,
SOE corporate governance, and legal system.307

The Resolution first explained that the “socialist market economy” system
embedded with China’s socialist system. The main purpose of the socialist system was
to let the “market played a vital role in the allocation of the resource under the state
macroeconomic regulation and control.”308 In addition, the Resolution redefined the
role of the central planning. According to the Resolution, central planning “study and
create a strategic plan based on the market.” 309This new policy substantially
transformed the conventional role of the intrusive central planning under the command
economy system.310 The 1993 Resolution continued the export-oriented FDI policy,
which focused on creating a desirable investment environment to attack exportoriented or technologically advanced foreign investment.311 One of the highlights under
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the Resolution was the fact that the political rhetoric relaxed the tone on the market, it
further emphasized that the important role of the market and law in balancing the
economic development. As the Resolution pointed out: “The main measure is economy
and law, and the administrative interference is supplementary.”312

In response to the Resolution on the Socialist Market Economy, State Council
adopted series implementing directives on economic reform, which further relaxed the
market access and transparency for the foreign investors. On June 8, 1994, State Council
issued Key points in Implementing Economic System Reform.313 This program provided a
detailed explanation on areas of the reform. Which can be categorized by the
following314:
1. Financial System Reform,315
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2. Tax Division Reform, 316
3. Foreign Exchange Reform,317
4. Economic System Restructuring,318
5. Foreign Trade System Reform,319
6. Investment System Reform,320
7. Government Law and Order.321
With the developments of the ideological reforms, the 16th National Congress of the
CPC adopted the Decision on Improve the “Socialist Market Economy” System, which
established a new theoretical framework for China’s modernization. It proclaimed to
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establish “a unified, open modernized market system that is competitive with the
order.” In addition, it called for a sustainable socio-economic development system.322

The 16th National Congress also ratified Jiang Zemin’s “Three Representatives”
theory, a theory essential to further decriminalize and normalize bourgeois. Jiang
Zemin's "three represents" campaign, which emphasized the CCP's role in representing
the interests of people, including capitalists and workers and peasants.”323 In the second
chapter, the Party vocally questioning the role of the bourgeoisie in Chinese economy .
The foreign investment policies and laws extended the central authority’s limited
supports to the market economy and private sectors. The new “three representatives”
implied Party’s relaxation on the market and central control. The CCP had opened its
party membership to entrepreneurs.324 The “three” refers as:
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● “Represents advanced social productive forces" stands for economic production
● "Represents the progressive course of China's advanced culture" stands for
cultural development
● "Represents the fundamental interests of the majority" stands for political
consensus.325
The above reform further removed cultural and political obstacles against market and
profit, which were unprecedented for foreign investment in the 1980s. Under this new
agenda, China’s private sector no longer needed to hide behind the veil, which
established a foundation for the development of Chinese market system by promoting
an open and inclusive investment environment.

b. The Constitutional Framework
The ideological reform that benefited China’s investment environment had been
affirmed by the Constitution Amendments. Few months prior to 14th Central CPC
Congress, the NPC adopted the 1993 Constitution Amendment. This landmark
amendment involved certain paragraphs in the Preamble and the General Principle
section, which laid out a new foundation to assure China’s economic modernization. The
main theme of the amendment was the “socialist market economy,” which removed
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ideological taboo of private ownership by constitutionally supporting private sector and
replacing central planning economy with the less intrusive economy management
system. The amended paragraph of the Preamble established a theoretical basis for the
“socialist market economy” and foreign investments, as it provided that:
“China is at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is to
concentrate its effort on socialist modernization in line with the theory of
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.326”
To implement modernization, the Preamble asked that:
“Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all
nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and
the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, steadily
improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy.”327
The 1993 Constitution Amendment adopt new economic system the “socialist
market economy” under article 15, and redefined the state economy and its relationship
with socialism, as it provided that:
“The State practices “socialist market economy.”The State strengthens economic
legislation, improves macro-regulation and control." "The State prohibits in
accordance with law any organization or individual from disturbing the socioeconomic order.”328
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The 1993 Amendment signified a major transition of the narrative over the
nature of the private sector. On many levels, it ended the vacuum of silence and
uncertainty around the Reform and Open up after the Tiananmen Protest with full
confident on the further economy and institutional reform. New national economic
policy and ideology reform had been contextualized by the 1993 Constitution
amendment. The Amendment provided that “China is at the primary stage of socialism.
The State practices socialist market economy.” 329 The Constitution amendment
specified the new expression of state economy as the “socialist market economy.” The
second part of the article 15 seems provided additional information to explain the part
of “socialism” as it pointed out "The State strengthens economic legislation, improves
macro-regulation and control." "The State prohibits in accordance with law any
organization or individual from disturbing the socio-economic order."330

The socioeconomic order was a common term under command economy
system, which normally referred to the central command or central plan. Clearly, this
new amendment was troublesome for its lack of precision and clarity under the legal
text. As the previous chapter illustrated, many government’s intrusive plans created
more problems than it solved for foreign investors. The 14th National Congress of CPC
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proposed a new line, which moved away from the central command by redefining the
relationship between market, central plan, and law. The new political line established a
basis of interpretive principle with better and clearer guidance.

Although the Constitution did not further specify the precise meaning of this
term, it did not stop the central authority to emphasize the importance of the
socioeconomic order. For example, China’s 1997 Criminal code dedicated one chapter
with the title “Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the Socialist Market Economy.” 331
Based on the relevant articles under Criminal Law, crimes categorized as “Disrupting the
Order” were common white collar crime, such as tax evasion, smuggling, piracy, fraud,
insider trading. In addition, this SPC’s internal directive might also shed some lights and
help you understand the different dimension of the Social-economic order. Based on the
internal directive, there were both legal aspect and political aspect of the socioeconomic order. The legal aspect could be found in criminal law, and other commercial
laws, such as bankruptcy. The political aspect of the “socio-economic order” was a little
complicated. The internal directive judged the political aspect based on the
consequence of the law enforcement or the impact of the law enforcement on a
community. For example, in bankruptcy cases, SPC had issued directives ask local court
pay attention to political implication of the case or to maintain socioeconomic order by
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See Chapter III Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the “socialist market economy”, Criminal
Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter Criminal Law], revised at the Fifth Session of
the Eighth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 14, 1997, is
hereby promulgated and shall enter into force as of October 1,1997, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.
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asking a local court to coordinate with the local authority in cases with potential impacts
on the local community in large:
After debtors enter into the bankruptcy procedure, as it involves the interests of
many parties including creditors, debtors, investors and employees, the
contradictions among them are particularly prominent, improperly handling such
contradictions would lead to mass incidents or unexpected events and sabotage
social stability. Therefore, in the trial of enterprise bankruptcy cases, the
people's courts shall adhere to the leadership of the local Party committees and
give full play to the role of the risk warning mechanism, the cooperation
mechanism, the capital guarantee mechanism and other coordination
mechanisms established by the local governments so as to provide assistance for
the governments to maintain stability in handling enterprise bankruptcy cases.332

The above quotation demonstrated a unique feature of Chinese constitutional
system concerning the relationship between the party and the state in the context of
commercial law, which was also a contentious issue for many interested academics and
investment community. This internal directive provided reasons justified foreign
investors concerns over the independence and fairness of China’s judicial system. The
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最高人民法院关于正确审理企业破产案件为维护市场经济秩序提供司法保障若干问题的

意见 [Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Correctly Trying
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases to Provide Judicial Protection for Maintaining the Order of Market
Economy] issued by SPC on June 12, 2009, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7757&CGid=.
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internal directive asked the court to “coordinate” with local political and government
entities raised many questions. Although, a textual analysis of the Constitution would
found a constitutional basis to support government’s interest in maintaining social
orders, for example, in bankruptcy cases, the forms and manners of carrying out this
duty by the court suggested by the internal directive raised many questions. 333 It is
undeniable that there is a legitimate government interest in ensuring social order and
basic rights of the victims under bankruptcy cases. However, the above internal
directive presented a more troubling message: a lower court is not trusted by
governments and people to reach professional opinion in measuring and judging
different interests.

Although there have been problems with the enforcement of Rule of Law, the
Constitution did pledge to support a better legal system for private sectors. The 2004
Constitution Amendment clearly stated to “encourage support and guide non-public
sectors in accordance with the law,” and it protects “human rights.”334 Article 16 of the
Constitution, which reads, "State enterprises have decision-making power with regard
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China’s Constitution provided conceptual framework and legal basis for Party’s leadership in
forming guiding principles for social governance. The problem with such directive, was the
manner of implementation. For example, see PRC. Const. Art.1.
334
"The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy
such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and
guides the development of the non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law,
exercises supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy." PRC. Const. Art.
11. For example: Art. 33. "The State respects and preserves human rights." The original third
paragraph is changed to be the fourth.
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to operation and management within limits prescribed by law, on condition that they
submit to unified leadership by the State and fulfill all their obligations under the State
plan. State enterprises practice democratic management through congresses of workers
and staff and in other ways in accordance with law", was revised to read, "State-owned
enterprises have decision-making power with regard to their operation within limits
prescribed by law. State-owned enterprises practice democratic management through
congresses of workers and staff and in other ways in accordance with law."335 This
amendment further removed the central planning system from Chinese economy ,
which promoted the modernized economy system for both private and foreign
investors.

3. FDI Legal Framework 1992-2005
EVJ Law was the first comprehensive legislation concerning foreign investment in
mainland China. This short fifteen articles legislation was later supplemented by EVJ
Implementing Rule in 1983, and other various administrative laws concerning tax,
labors, land use, foreign exchange, and business legislation. 336The CJV Law and WFOE
Law were created in 1986, but the Implementing rule for CJV Law was not promulgated
until 1995. With the ideological, political and constitutional reform throughout the
1980s, China further relaxed regulations in investment and market access. On the one
hand, new amendments removed multiple restrictions plagued the investment

336

See EJV Law, previous chapter discussions.
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communities in the 1980s, such as restrictions on labor management, restrictions on
market access, or exportation. On the other hand, new policies opened new industries
for foreign investors, especially after WTO accession. The development of the security
and insurance market since 1993 also opened new opportunities for the foreign
investors. However, structural issues remained: the lack of transparency and
predictability of the FDI legal system not only created an unfair treatment for investors
but also created risks of corruptions. This happened when the central authority
produced policies and regulations without proper consideration of the market reality.
One common example would be foreign investors use Chinese firms as the straw man to
invest or control a restricted industry. 337

This section mainly focused on new developments between 1992-2005: first, the
emerging of the new FIE registration process and regulatory agency restructure. It will
outline the basic FIE registration process and regulatory framework. Second, the
development of the EJV, CJV, and WFOE regulatory framework. It will pay special
attention to the differences between the regulations in the 1980s and 1990s to
showcase the relaxation of the investment regulations. In addition, it highlights the
special legislation that protects Taiwanese investors. Next, it will focus on the
publication of Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment. Fourth,
it will discuss the promulgation of People’s Republic of China Company Law and its
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Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360.
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implication to China’s FDI regulatory framework. Last, it will briefly discuss the issue of
the rule of law during this period with special attention to Chinese business culture that
interpreted by western writers. The main purpose of this section is to show: first, the
progress of FDI regime under the “socialist market economy”; second, the effects of
China’s FDI regime expressed conflicted agenda between the revolutionary principle of
supporting central planning under socialism and the principle of socialist modernization
in supporting freedom of contract.

a. Development of the framework
Before examining the new developments in EJV, CJV, WFOE framework, it is
necessary to have an overview of the regulatory agency and the general registration
process that evolved between 1992- 2005. To better serve China’s “socialist market
economy,” legal and institutional reforms started simultaneously between 1992-2005.
MOFERT, the department used to charge the verification and approval of the FIE
project, had been restructured as Ministry of Commerce (MOC).338 Under the new
administrative system, MOC’s duties had been separated into three areas:
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Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu shangwubu lvxing xianxing xingzhengfagui,

guowuyuanwenjianzhong xiangying zhize de tongzhi(国务院办公厅关于商务部履行现行行政
法规、国务院文件中相应职责的通知)[General Office of State Council Notice on MOC Carrying
Out certain Duties prescribed by Current Administrative Law and State Council Directives],
issued by State Council General Office on October 20, 2003. For example, this document
outlined the jurisdiction of MOC:
1. Any duties involved with MOFERT or MOFEC under laws and decrees will be carried out
by MOC.
2. Recording of the cases processed by local authorities.
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1. FDI Policy study and draft,
2. Verification for special FDI project involving investment above statutory
threshold,
3. Supervising and coordinating local authority’s work. 339
A multi-level approval process for FIE registration developed between 19922005. Under this process, FIE started from the step of submitting a letter of intent
describing the proposed JV to the MOC branch office. The branch office would send the
proposal to a corresponded industrial supervisory department. This department would
review the business proposal. State Planning Commission would involve in this process if
the proposed project exceeded the amount of investment, which required a further
review to ensure such project would not disrupt the state annual economic plan. 340 At

3. Verification and recording of the FIE contract, agreement, feasibility study involving oil,
natural gas exploitation
4. Exportation license involving exportation of goods subject to quota regulation;
5. Verification and approval cases involving FIE establish oversea branches
339
See: General Office of State Council Notice on MOC Carrying Out Certain Duties prescribed by
Current Administrative Law and State Council Directives. A list of MOC duties can be found on
the State Council Notice:
1. policy studying and policy drafting (study and analysis nationwide FDI status, routine
report to State Council, policy draft, and legislation),
2. verification and approval for a certain project (verification, approval for JV contract,
article of association for the project above a threshold or restricted industry sector, or
involved quota) or verification and approval for an amendment of JV contract or article
of association; increase or reduce registered capital; transfer of shares, and M&A,
3. supervision JV contract and article of association,
4. comprehensive coordination, internal department management for policy enforcement,
5. statistic,
NDRC and MOC jointly produce and issue the Catalogue.
340
Edmund C. Duffy, “Business Law in China: Evolutionary Revolution,” Journal of International
Affairs 49, no. 2 (1996): 557-571, accessed July 29, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357571.
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the meantime, a joint feasibility study must be conducted by both Chinese and foreign
parties as the part of the application. If the project is below the $30 million thresholds,
then this application can be processed by agencies at municipality or provincial level. 341
Logistically, it was easier for foreign investors to have a local authority process their
applications.
Figure 1. FIE establishment process evolved during 1992-2005.

Permission
from MOC or
branch office

Business
license
registration

special permit
from SAFE/
Custom

1. Permission from MOC,
2. Business license, Enterprise with Foreign Investment or an investment from
Hong Kong or Macao Investment (FIE) shall apply business license or amendment
of license from SAIC within 30 days of receiving Certificate of Approval for
Establishment of Enterprise with Foreign Investment in People’s Republic of
China or Certificate of Approval for Establishment of Enterprises with Investment
of Hong Kong, Macau, and Chinese Oversea in People’s Republic of China (FIE
certification).
3. Other registration, for example, applicable SAFE or Custom registration.

This multiple leveled registration was not without problems. One of the
problems was the delay. To avoid the complex and time-consuming approval process,
some investors would, even under recommendations of certain local officials, to
intentionally separate an intended investment project into several smaller projects. For
example, the provincial authority could verify and approve a project below 30 million
dollars. In order to attract more investors, local authorities might recommend foreign

341

Provincial government examination and approval (project below 30 million dollars)
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investors to register a smaller investment project with the local authority. An investor
could either set up numbers of smaller projects and later merge them together or later
increase the investment of the initial small project. Such practice was prohibited by the
central authority. 342 The Central authority issued multiple directives to prohibit local
authority or investor explore such mechanism to bypass the investment threshold.343
For example, Kumho Tire and Nanjing Tire formed an EJV in 1994, the total investment
was 119 million dollars, which would trig approval process from the central authority.
However, Nanjing authority and Kumho Tire conspired together with an investment
project under the provincial authority threshold. The investor later increased
investment and shares in four separate times, which discovered by the State Council.
The central authority revoked all beneficial tax policy for Kumho Tire and issued Tax
charges. Although Kumho received monetary punishments, an official at Nanjing
government only received a warning from the government.344 It was true that such
sanctions were unfair to the investor because it only sanctioned foreign investors (such
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Ding limin, “Taiwan touzi dalu, qieji huazheng wei ling,” (台商投资大陆，切忌“化整为零”

) [Taiwan investors shall avoid applying “separation of investment project” scheme to bypass
administration approving process] avialable at http://www.humanelawyer.com/model8.htm.
343
For example: 1991 State Council issued 国务院办公厅关于当前审批外商投资企业有关问
题的紧急通知 [State Council Notice on Strengthening Examination and Approval Procedures
for Large-Scale Foreign Investment Enterprises].
344
Guowuyuan bangongting guan yu nanjing shi youguan bumen yuequan shenpi zhonghan hezi
nanjing jinghu luntai youxian gongsi xiangmu de tongbao(
国务院办公厅关于南京市有关部门越权审批中韩合资南京锦湖轮胎有限公司项目的通报)
[General Office of State Council Issue Anouncmenet concerning Nanjing authorities exceeding
authority in approving Nanjing Sino-Korea Kumho Tire Project ] accessed July 31, 2017,
http://chinabaike.com/law/zy/xz/bgt/1336313.html.
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as revoke the permission for FIE project) without imposed strong punishments against
officials violate these rules. 345

The 1979 EJV Law, later amended in 1990 established the basis of China’s FIE
regulatory framework throughout the 1980s.346 During the 1990s, China started a
massive wave of commercial legal system construction with legislation such as Company
Law, Contract Law, Labor Law, etc. Many laws adopted during the 1990s was later then
amended after China’s accession to WTO. On March 15, 2001, The Ninth National
People’s Congress adopted EJV Law amendment, which focused on the following area:
1. Labor
2. Domestic Purchase
3. Dispute resolution

345

See: Guowuyuan bangong ting guanyu dangqian shenpi waishang touzi qiye youguan wenti

de jingjitongzhi (国务院办公厅关于当前审批外商投资企业有关问题的紧急通知) [State
Council General Office Urgent Notice on Certain Issues Concerning Verification and Approval of
FIE Project]
See: Guowuyuan guanyu yanhai diqu fazhan waixiangxing jingji de ruogan buchong guiding(国务
院关于沿海地区发展外向型经济的若干补充规定) [State Council Supplementary Regulation
on Developing Export Oriented Economy in Coast Regions]adopted by State Council on March
23, 1988.
346
中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法. Law of the People’s Republic of China on SinoForeign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated July. 1, 1979, amended 1990, amended 2001)
[hereinafter 2001 EJV Law].
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Article 6 of the amended EJV Law requiring all employees of FIE must sign a contract.347
In addition, in pursuant to article 7, FIE must provide necessary assistance to the
operation of a labor union.348 The amended EJV Law no longer requiring FIE purchase
insurance from Chinese insurance company. As a compliance to WTO, FIE can purchase
any insurance plan from an insurance company located in mainland China.349 Moreover,
FIE could freely purchase supplies from any vendor or supplier. The article 10 of the
amended EJV Law removed the preference of domestic vendor. It provided that FIE can
purchase material and goods from the domestic or international market on the basis of
“fair and reasonable.”350 Last but not the least, the amended EJV Law now specified that
JV could litigate their dispute in court when no arbitration clause was provided by the JV
contract or both parties failed to agree for arbitration.351
The 2001 EJV Law Implementing Regulation Amendment was the first
amendment since the end of the 1980s. China’s commercial environment and the
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Art. 6 2001 EJV Law.
“The matters of an employee of a joint venture, such as employment, dismissal,
remuneration, welfare, labor protection, and labor insurance shall be specified by
concluding a contract in accordance with the law.”
348
Art. 7 2001 EJV Law.
“An EJV shall provide, to the labor union of its own, the necessary conditions for
carrying out activities.”
349
Art. 9 2001 EJV Law. “All insurances of an EJV shall be covered by insurance companies within
China.”
350
Art. 10 2001 EJV Law. “The raw materials, fuel, and other materials as needed by an EJV
within the approved business scope may be purchased on the domestic or international market
based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness.”
351
Art. 15 2001 EJV Law. “Where each Party thereto has neither provided an arbitration clause
in the contract nor subsequently reached a written arbitration agreement, an action may be
filed with a people's court.”
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economic system changed dramatically since the 1980s. With the massive price, tax and
SOE reforms since the 14th National Congress of CPC, China established an economic
system with a mix of market economy and small central planning elements. The 2001
amendment largely removed sections concerning the central planning system. For
example, all sections concerning the “department in charge” had been removed.352
“Department in charge”was part of the central planning system: each enterprise or
business entity would be assigned to one corresponded government entity. This
government body would monitor, enforce and coordinate business operation with the
central planning. During the 1980s, even FIE had to work with a “department in charge.”
In addition, the EJV Implementing Regulation ended the policy of asking FIE to purchase
supplies from domestic vendors. Another important development was the publication of
State's Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment and Industry Catalog.
The catalog provided a comprehensive guidance on which industry enjoy relaxed
regulations and which industry require a special approval process.353 During the 1990s,
the central authority started SOE reform. As one of the reform measures, foreign
investors were allowed to purchase shares or even engage in SOE operations from
certain industry sectors. Other new measures include: first, FIE could reduce registered
capital with permission from the authority.354 Second, the EJV Law amendment
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The title of chapter 8 changed into purchase and sale without mention of planning.
Art. 4, 2001 EJV Law.
354
Art. 19, 2001 EJV Law Implementing Rules. “An EJV shall not decrease its registered capital
within the duration of operation thereof. If the decrease is truly necessary due to change of the
total investment, production and operation scale, etc., the approval of the relevant Examination
and Approval Authority shall be obtained.”
353
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removed all restrictions placed on non-cash contributions. The authority no longer
required contribution in the form of the machinery need to the kind of machinery that
would be unavailable to produce domestically.355 However, intellectual transfer
agreement still requires the investor to transfer information to the authority.356 Last,
the amendment removed payment of balance rule for FIE. The new amendment no
longer requires FIE to maintain a balance of payment for foreign exchange.

The CJV Law, the Implementing Regulation, and MOFERT CJV Implementing
Regulation Explanation formed the basis of the Sino-foreign Cooperative Enterprises
regulations. The CJV Law offered basic framework and principle. The Implementing
Regulation provided details regarding a certain aspect of the CJV enterprises.357 It
specified the conditions of a permitted project and approval process. The Explanation
provided necessary interpretation for the enforcement of the regulation. As the
previous chapter discussed, the CJV Law adopted very similar regulatory framework
with the EJV Law.
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Art. 24, 2001 EJV Law Implementing Rules. “he machinery and equipment or other supplies
contributed to the capital of an EJV by the foreign party thereto shall be necessarily required by
the production of the EJV. The valuated price of the machinery and equipment or other supplies
shall be no higher than the then-current prevailing price on the global market for the same type
of machinery and equipment or other supplies.”
356
Art. 26, 2001 EJV Law Implementing Rules. “he machinery and equipment or other supplies
contributed to the capital of an EJV by the foreign party thereto shall be necessarily required by
the production of the EJV. The valuated price of the machinery and equipment or other supplies
shall be no higher than the then-current prevailing price on the global market for the same type
of machinery and equipment or other supplies.”
357

Zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye fa shishi xize (中外合作经营企业法实施细则) [CJV Law

Implementing Rule] adopted by MOFERT on Septermber 4, 1994.
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The 2000 CJV Law amendment removed the preference of asking FIE to purchase
from a domestic supplier. In addition, it removed the general article describing the tax
benefits for the CJV company. The CJV Implementing Regulation was the first
supplementary regulation for the CJV Law.358 The CJV Implementation regulation
provided more details regarding the nature and conditions of CJV enterprises. 359 Based
on the reading of CJV Law and CJV Implementing Regulation, the CJV enterprise is a
form of a business entity without legal person status. It cannot independently be held
liable for outsiders. The CJV contract can specify the liability of each investor.
Interestingly, unlike the EJV Law require unanimous board decision, the CJV
Implementing Regulation adopted majority vote rule for operation issues: “Each
resolution adopted at a meeting of the board of directors or joint management
committee shall be approved by a majority of the directors or members present at the
meeting.”360 For important matters, the CJV Implementing Regulation still followed
unanimous decision rule, but it allowed the investors to specify other additional
scenarios require unanimous votes in the CJV contract.361
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Zhonghua remin gongheguo zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye fa(中华人民共和国中外合作经营

企业法) [Law of People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture]
promulgated by National People’s Congress on April 13, 1988.
359
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongwai hezuo jingying qiyefa shishi xize (中华人民共和国中
外合作经营企业法实施细则) [PRC Contractual Cooperative Joint Venture Detailed
Implementing Regulation] [Hereinafter Implementing Regulation], adopted by MOFERT on
September 4, 1995.
360
Art. 28 CJV Implementing Regulation.
361
See article 29 CJV Implementing Regulation:
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WFOE law had been amended by Standing Committee of NPC in 2000. The
Implementing Rule was amended in 2001. These amendments represented China’s
relaxation of WFOE regulation. For example, the central authority no longer required a
WFOE project must be a kind that involving advanced technology.362 FIE was no longer
required to purchase from a domestic supplier.363 The 2001 WFOE Implementing
Regulation removed the exportation and domestic sale quota restriction. It further
allowed WFOE to sell their product in the domestic market independently or through an
agent.364

Table 5. A brief comparison between the EJV, CJV, and WFOE regulations in the 1980s
and 1990s.

Contribution must be

The 1980s regulation

1990s regulation

YES

NO NEED

advanced technology

(1) Amendment to the articles of association of the Cooperative Joint Venture;
(2) Increase or decrease of the registered capital of the Cooperative Joint Venture;
(3) Dissolution of the Cooperative Joint Venture;
(4) Mortgage of assets of the Cooperative Joint Venture;
(5) Merger, division or change of organizational form of the Cooperative Joint Venture; or
(6) Other matters that need to be unanimously approved by the directors or members present
at the meeting of the board of directors or joint management committee as agreed upon by the
parties to the Cooperative Joint Venture.
362
Art. 3, 2000 WFOE Law.
363
Art. 15, 2000 WFOE Law.
364
See Decision of the State Council on Amending the Rules for the Implementation of the Law
of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-capital Enterprises.
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Reduce Registered Capital

NO

YES

Domestic supplier

YES, PREFERRED

NO NEED

Balance of Payment

YES

NO NEED

Domestic sale quota or

YES

NO NEED

restrictions
*since the 14th National Congress of CPC on Reforming investment system, China further
relaxed its FDI regulatory framework by removing many central planning restrictions.

Unlike the 1980s, the central authority did not provide clear guidance on which
industry was restricted to the foreign investors. The central authority created to new
guidelines to help foreign investors understand the investment policy. Some industry
sectors were restrictive to foreign investors. There were multiple ways to deter an
investment. Normally these restrictions ranging from qualification of the investor, the
registration process, and operation restriction, profit restrictions. Take the example of
commercial enterprise sector. The retail sector was one of many protected industries in
China during the 1990s, the 1999 Measures on the Pilot Project for Foreign-invested
Commercial Enterprises (hereinafter 1999 Commercial Investment Measure) provided
an excellent example illustrating these restrictions.365 For example, under 1999
Commercial Investment Measure, the registered capital for JV in retail must exceed 50
million RMB. wholesale business must exceed 80 billion RMB. A qualified foreign

365

(外商投资商业企业试点办法) [Measures on the Pilot Project for Foreign-invested

Commercial Enterprises] adopted by SETC and MOFERT on June 25, 1999.
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investor only limited to an investor whose annual sales exceeded 20 billion dollars in
three consecutive years prior the application. 366 In addition, the foreign investor’s asset
must exceed 200 million dollars in the preceding year prior to application.367 In order to
limit investment in retail sectors, the measurement created a laborious application
process. The feasibility study must be submitted and approved by local economic and
trade commission. The local authority would file the report to state economic and trade
committee before this committee would consult with MOFERT for making the final
decision.368Even the authority approved JV; there were various restrictions on the
structure of the JV. For example, Chinese investor shares must exceed 51% in such JV if
the retail business expanded for more than 3 branches. In the wholesale business, the
Chinese investor’s shares must exceed 51%. 369Moreover, such JV could only operate
within a limited year. JV operation could not exceed 30 years unless the business was in
the western rural regions.370 In retail JV, the authority limited the foreign investors’
capacity to profit from trademark and importation by requiring that trademark royalty
could not exceed 0.3% of the annual profit of the JV. 371 Importation of products could
not exceed annual sales value for 30%. 372

366

art.5 (1) 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
Art. 6 (2)1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
368
Art. 8, 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
369
Art. 6 (4) 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
370
Art. 6 (6) 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
371
art. 7, 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
372
Art. 15, 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.
367
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Table 6. Restrictions on foreign investors in the retail industry (in comparison with the
2004 regulation.
Foreign-invested Commercial

1999

2004 (repealed in 2016)

Must be verified and

Local MOC preliminary

Enterprises
Verification process

approved by local and central examination, MOC final
economic and trade

decision.

committee before
consultation and

Local MOC authority

determination with MOFERT

preliminary review, Central
MOC authority makes
decision

Registered capital

50 million RMB for regular

Same as domestic firm

commercial enterprises
80 million RMB for wholesale
Restrictions on years of JV

30 years (rural middle west

30 years (rural middle west

operation

region 40 years)

region 40 years)

Shares in JV

Chinese investor must exceed Except for agricultural and
51% shares

related products, no
restrictions by 2016.

172

Trademark restriction

Trademark royalty cannot

No

exceed 0.3% of the annual
profit of the JV.
Importation restriction

Importation of products

No

cannot exceed annual sales
value for 30%.

*The regulations on foreign-invested retail or commercial sectors had been through a
long history. The first regulation was adopted by MOFERT on April 4, 1995.
Supplementary regulations were created in 1996 and 2001. The Interim regulation was
then amended in 2004 and again amended in 2006 and 2015 until it was officially
appealed in 2016. 373

One of the highlights of the FDI regime development was the regulations
concerning Taiwanese investors. On March 5, 1994, the Standing Committee of the NPC
adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of
Taiwan Compatriots [hereinafter Protection of Taiwan Investors]. 374 Due to Taiwan’s
special condition, investors from Taiwan were not protected by any bilateral treaties
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Guanyu waishang touzi juban touzixing gongsi zanxing guiding (关于外商投资举办投资性公

司的暂行规定) [Interim Regulation Regulation on Foreign invested Investment Companies]
adopted by MOFERT on April 4 1995, also see the Supplementary Regulation, adopted on
August 24, 1999. Supplementing Regulation 2 adopted on May 31, 2001.
374

Zhonghua remin gongheguo Taiwan tongbao touzi baohufa(中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资

保护法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan
Compatriots] adopted by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on March 5,
1994.
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protecting foreign investors. In addition, Taiwanese are not technically considered as
“foreign investors.” In addition, there was no formal judicial channel or cooperation
between Taiwan and China during the early 1990s. Thus, the NPC adopted new laws,
which designed to protect the interests of the Taiwanese investors. In general, the
conceptual framework established by Protection of Taiwan investor was consistent with
China’s foreign investment policy. The only noticeable difference was the time limits for
authority reviewing and verifying the project. Under Protection of Taiwan Investor, all
investment projects, whether it was a JV or WFOE or CJV, the project must be reviewed
within forty-five days by the authority. 375 In 1999, in order to specify terms and
conditions for enforcing Protection of Taiwan Investor, the State Council adopted
Implementing Regulations.376 Interestingly, the article 8 of the Implementing Regulation
listed permittable forms of the investment including stock holding, purchasing of real
estate and even purchase small and medium-size SOE.377 It was noticed that the EJV

375
376

Art. 8 Protection of Taiwan Investor.
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo taiwan tongbao touzi baohu fa shishi xize(中华人民共和国台

湾同胞投资保护法实施细则) [Implementing Regulations on Law of the People's Republic of
China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots] adopted by State Council on
December 5, 1999.
377
See art.8 of the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots:
Investment of Taiwan compatriots may take any of the following forms of investment in
accordance with the law:
(1) to establish equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures or enterprises with all
capital invested by investors who are Taiwan compatriots (hereinafter generalized as
enterprises with investment of Taiwan compatriots);
(2) to cooperate in the exploration and exploitation of natural resources;
(3) to engage in compensatory trade, processing and assembling or cooperative
production;
(4) to purchase stocks or bonds of enterprises;
(5) to purchase house property;
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framework did not specify whether a foreign investor could engage in these activities,
although local ordinance permit investor to purchase stocks or real estate.378 Thus,
under this rule, Taiwanese investors enjoy an extra privilege that supported by statutory
language: to invest China’s small and medium-sized SOEs. In order to further facilitate
investors from Taiwan, the central authority Taiwan AffairOoffice established
coordinator networks, which provide communication service between the Taiwanese
investors and China’s regulatory agencies. Some local government, such as Beijing
established Taiwanese investor service center to accept complaints from the investors.
Fujian People’s Court established special Taiwanese tribunal exclusively handling
commercial disputes involved Taiwanese investors.379 These mechanisms were
developed to mitigate the lack of bilateral investment treaties between Taiwan and
China.

b. The Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the EJV Law, WFOE Law and CJV Law and
implementing regulations established the basis of FDI regulatory framework, which
defined the conditions of the qualified and disqualified FIE projects. One of the most

(6) to acquire a land use right for development and operation;
(7) to purchase a small State-owned enterprise or collective or private enterprise; or
(8) other forms as permitted by laws or administrative regulations.
378
For example, the Si Chun Provincial Ordinance on Encourage Foreign Investment allow
foreign investor to purchase property or invest in stock market. See Sichuan sheng
guliwaishangtouzi tiaoli(四川省鼓励外商投资条例) [Si Chun Provincial Ordinance on Encourage
Foreign Investment] adopted by Sichuang PC on December 24, 1996.
379
National People’s Congress Report on the Enforcement of Taiwanese investor protection law
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significant legislation about China’s foreign investment was the Interim Provisions on
Guiding Foreign Direct Investment [hereinafter the Investment Guideline] adopted by
State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
and the State Economic and Trade Commission on June 20, 1995. It provided a
comprehensive and detailed guidance for investors, which largely improved the
transparency, accessibility, and predictability for the FIE regulation. The main purpose of
this regulation was to design a new investment guideline system. Under this new
regulation, a foreign investor can refer to Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for
Foreign Investment for relevant administrative verification and review information.380
This catalog had been amended several times (1997, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2015). The
current version is 2017 Catalogue. Under this new system, all investment projects are
categorized into four categories:
1. encouraged,
2. permitted,
3. restricted,
4. prohibited

The catalog only listed three types of industry: encouraged, restricted and prohibited.
Any industry outside the catalog would consider as permitted. The catalog signified

380

Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (外商投资产业指导目录) [Catalogue for the Guidance

of Industries for Foreign Investment], Decree No. 7 of the State Planning Commission, the State
Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation,
December 31, 1997.
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China’s new approach with the FDI. On the one hand, it offered a clear and easy
guidance on the conditions and benefits for foreign investors. On the other hand, it
borrowed some elements from China’s planned economy: the authority can manipulate
the development of the economy. The publication of the catalog improved
transparency, efficiency, and reliability for the investor community: the investor could
investigate the relevant policy through the publication before starting project
planning.381 Under the Interim FDI Guidance, the restricted industries normally were
subject to the following restrictions:
•

the JV contract must state terms of JV operation. 382

•

Fixed asset investment by Chinese investor must be funded by funds belong to
the Chinese investor or owned by a Chinese investor.383

•

The verification and approval must be conducted by the central authority (state
council relevant industrial department) 384

381

Zhidao waishang touzi fangxiang zanxing guiding (指导外商投资方向暂行规定) [Interim

Provisions Guiding Foreign Investment] adopted by State Planning Commission; State Economic
and Trade Commission; Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on June 20, 1995.
It was later amended in 2002
382
Art. 9 Interim FDI Guidance. “Restricted foreign investment projects must comply with the
relevant laws and administrative regulations of the State, as well as the following provisions:
(1) Chinese-foreign joint venture projects coming under the restricted category must have an
agreed term of operation; and (2) In restricted foreign investment projects (A), the fixed assets
invested by the Chinese party shall be the funds owned by the Chinese party itself or the assets
owned by it.”
383
Ibid.
384
Ibid.
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•

Restricted industry project can turn into permitted if 70% of products are for
exportation 385

In addition, the interim FDI guidance laid out sanctions for project violating these
conditions: the project permission would be revoked within 30 days of discovery. In
addition, the contract, article of association, would be voided.

One of the issues for the above regulation was the part restrict the asset
ownership for Chinese investor in a restricted industry. The intent of the regulator was
to avoid foreign investor investing in a restricted project. Particularly, it tries to prevent
foreign investor using Chinese investor as a straw man to circumvent these regulations.
However, the statutory language was poorly drafted, which cannot fully meet the
expectation of the policy maker. For example, the term “asset belongs to Chinese
investor” was quite ambiguous.386 In practice, some foreign investors would agree to
transfer funds to a Chinese investor in exchange for managerial rights or equity rights in
the enterprise under a private “shareholding agreement.” The term “belong to” could
not precisely identify this problem. It is important to note that, China’s public disclosure
system was not fully developed during this period. New approaches and globalized

385

Art. 11 Interim FDI Guidance. “Restricted foreign investment projects (A) within the scope
specified in subparagraph (1) of Article 6, if their export sales of products account for over 70
percent of the total sales of products, with due approval, may be deemed as permitted foreign
investment projects, and shall not be subject to the restriction of Article 9 of these Provisions.
Restrictions may be appropriately eased to the above mentioned foreign investment projects
that can really make full use of the superiority in resources in the mid-west regions, and
conform to the industrial policies of the State.”
386
Art. 9 Interim FDI Guidance.
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public disclosure system have been advanced for the past few years, which would be
discussed in the next chapter.

Figure 2. How to bypass China’s investment restrictions.

Foreign
investor

Chinese
Investor
(Strawman)

Enterprise in
restricted
industry

1. Chinese investor with funds sponsored by foreign investor
2. Chinese investor agrees to transfer all managerial rights or any rights and benefits of
equity to foreign investor
3. Chinese investor register business entity with the funds provided by foreign investor
4. The Foreign investor uses Chinese investor structure as a straw man to invest restricted
industry.

The interim FDI guidance was later amended in 2004. The 2004 amendment
demonstrated a liberalized view on FDI. Take the example of the general principle laid
out by the FDI guidance on the definition of the restricted industry:
Table 7. Restrictive investment industry (1995 and 2004).
1995 Interim FDI Guidance

2004 FDI Guidance

(1) Projects involving technology that has

(1) Lagging behind on a technological

been developed in or has been

level;

introduced into the country, and the
production capacity can already meet the
demands of the domestic market;
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(2) Projects in industries designated by

(2) Detrimental to saving resources and

the State as pilot industries to absorb

improving the ecological environment;

foreign investment or as industries
wherein monopoly of sales is practiced;
(3) Projects for exploring or mining rare

(3) Exploring or exploiting the specific

or precious mineral resources;

types of minerals that are under
protective exploitation as specified by the
State;

(4) Projects involving industries that call

(4) Falling within the industries to be

for the State's overall planning; or

gradually deregulated by the State; or

(5) Other projects that are restricted by

(5) Other circumstances specified in laws

laws and administrative regulations of

and administrative regulations.

the State.

The above comparison displayed the central authority’s relaxed view on FDI. Compared
with 2004 Guidance, the 1995 Guidance was more protective. For example, the 2004
Guidance would deny an investment project if it involved outdated technology. 1995
Guidance would deny a project when the market is balanced. Another great
improvement under the 2004 Guidance was to remove the sanction that a JV contract
and article of association would be voided if they violate Guidance. As an administrative
guidance, the 1995 Interim FDI Guidance lacked the legitimate constitutional authority
to void an agreement between two private parties. Such regulation itself might violate
China’s constitution. In fact, whether the contract is void or not would be a legal
question determined by the court. State Council could not announce the validity of a
contract without a specific delegation by the Constitution. Thus, it was a good
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development when the 2004 FDI Guidance removed such sanction. In addition, the
Supreme People’s Court even stated that “although FDI project may violate state law,
certain relevant contract clause can still be effective and enforceable under the principle
of separation.”387

c. PRC company law and corporate governance
The promulgation of 1993 PRC Company Law was an important development in
China’s commercial legal system and FDI regulatory regime.388 Another great legislation
was the General Principle of the Civil Code.389 On the one hand, these landmark laws
fulfilled the gap of China’s modern corporate governance system. On the other hand,
these laws created a dualist legal system that potentially conflicts and confuse foreign
investors. The intention of the dualist system was clear: one legal framework specially
dedicated to foreign investors and another one regulate domestic firms. However, the
conflict between the PRC Company Law and China’s FIE regulation framework was
inevitable. First of all, the PRC Company Law did not specifically exclude the application
of the Company Law to FIEs. For example, the article 18 only established a very vague
principle for the applicability of the law:

387

See Art. 57, P.R.C Contract Law. “If a contract becomes invalid, or is rescinded or terminated,
the validity of the independent clauses therein that pertain to dispute resolution methods shall
not be affected.”
388
The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated Dec. 29, 1993 by the Fifth
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China) [hereinafter PRC Company Law][zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa 中
华人民共和国公司法]
389

See discussions about legal person from pervious chapters.
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“The present Law shall apply to limited liability companies with foreign
investment. Where laws concerning Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures,
Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures, and foreign-funded enterprises
provides otherwise, such provisions shall prevail.”
For example, the application of the PRC Company Law article 36 and article 53
concerned the procedure of establishing a board of supervisor. 390 These rules might
conflict with the corporate governance under article 36 of the EJV Law Implementing
Regulation.391The EJV Law was modeled on American corporate law, which established
the board of directors as the highest authority in the corporation. The PRC Company
Law article 36 stipulated shareholder meeting as the governing body exercising powers.

390

Yuan Anyuan, “Foreign direct investments in China--practical problems of complying with
China's company law and laws for foreign-invested enterprises,” in Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 3 (2000): 484. Also see art. 36, P.R.C. Company Law, “The
shareholders' meeting of a limited liability company shall be composed of all shareholders. The
shareholders' meeting is the company's governing body, and shall exercise its powers in
accordance with this Law.” art. 53 P.R.C. Company Law “The board of supervisors or, in the
absence thereof in a company, the supervisors shall exercise the following powers: (1)
Conducting inspection of the financial issues of the company; (2) Supervising the performance of
duties by the directors and senior management personnel, and submitting a proposal on the
removal of any director or senior management person who violates laws or administrative
regulations, the company's articles of association, or any resolution of the shareholders'
meeting; (3) Requiring the directors or senior management personnel to correct their conducts
that prejudice the interests of the company; (4) Proposing to convene interim shareholders'
meetings, and convening and presiding over shareholders' meetings when the board of directors
fails to perform the duties of convening and presiding over shareholders' meetings as specified
in this Law; (5) Putting forward proposals to the shareholders' meeting;”
391
Art. 36 EJV Law Implementing Regulation. “he general manager executes the various
resolutions of the board meetings, and organizes and leads the daily operation and
management of the EJV. Within the scope of authority granted by the board, the general
manager externally represents the EJV and internally appoints and dismisses the personnel
under his/her management as well as exercises other authorities granted by the board.”
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In addition, PRC Company Law stipulated that the board of the director is responsible
for the budget and profit distribution. 392 Additional observations under Chinese
company law including:

1. The Chinese company law did not recognize the fiduciary duty and derivative
proceeding. This might be an issue for minority shareholders.
2. During the early 90s, the administration would enforce strict rules on “scope of
the business,” the investors could not easily amend the business registration. For
example,
The business of manufacturing chocolate could not suddenly engage in soft drink
production because the government agency would follow a strict interpretation
on the business registration.

The differences between 1993 PRC Company Law and western corporate
practice reflected China’s unique economic system. The law stipulated that the
shareholder meeting is the highest authority of the company, a different approach
compared with other western market countries. China adopted an approach of
shareholder activism, which gives more emphasizes on the. The 1993 Company Law

392

See Art. 45 Company Law, Art. 37 EJV Implementation rule regarding legal representative
creates some corporate governance issues when the legal representative, who has statutory
authorization to bind entity for transaction and contract, appointed by the shareholder
meetings as the president of the board of directors or executive director in smaller LLC, may
disagree with a transaction approved by the board by refusing to sign on the contract. The
available solution for this was a time consuming bureaucratic application process.
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gave liberty to investors to let them decide if it is necessary to have a formal board of
director or supervisory board.393 Considering the limited development of China’s
commercial market and legal system, the idea of establishing a supervisory board
seemed to be an appropriate policy.394 In the United States, shareholders are the owner

393

See art. 37 P.R.C. Company Law. “The shareholders' meeting of a company shall exercise the
following powers:
(1) Making decisions on the company's operation guidelines and investment plans;
(2) Electing and replacing the directors and supervisors who are not the representatives of the
staff members, and making decisions on the matters concerning the remunerations of the
directors and supervisors;
(3) Approving the reports of the board of directors through deliberation;
(4) Approving the reports of the board of supervisors or those of the supervisors through
deliberation;
(5) Approving the annual financial budget plans and final accounts of the company through
deliberation;
(6) Approving the profit distribution plans and loss recovery plans of the company through
deliberation;
(7) Making resolutions on the increase or decrease of the company's registered capital;
(8) Making resolutions on the issuance of corporate bonds;
(9) Making resolutions on the merger, division, dissolution or liquidation of the company or on
the conversion of the corporate form;
(10) Modifying the company's articles of association; and
(11) Exercising other powers specified in the articles of association.
Where all the shareholders have reached a written consensus on a matter listed in the
preceding Paragraph, a decision may be directly made without convening a shareholders'
meeting, provided that all the shareholders shall affix their signatures and seals to the decision
document.”
394
See Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional Economy,”
Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, 1995, accesed July 27, 2017,
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs.
“China currently lacks any meaningful securities regulation to ensure that the market reflects
the value of the stock and to prevent manipulation of the market by individuals or government
entities. Although China issued Provisional Regulations on the administration of the Issuing and
Trading of Stocks on April 23, 1993 ("Provisional Regulations") and Interim Procedures for
Prohibiting Securities Fraud ("Interim Procedures"), aimed at trading on inside information and
fraud such as use of material information to affect the market, these measures do not provide
clear definitions or remedies to stockholders who are harmed by these activities.” Ibid.
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of the company, which enjoy the fruits of their investment from the success of the
corporation managed and controlled by the management, such as the board of the
directors. This regulatory model largely relied on the development of an advanced
security market, competent public disclosure system, and highly sophisticated legal
system. During the early 90s, it might not be realistic to have China directly transport
the western corporate regulatory framework. However, as the next chapter indicated,
with the development of Chinese economy , China gradually adopted regulatory
frameworks that are compatible with the common practice of the West market
economy. PRC Company Law limited the distribution of dividends, transferability of the
shares. PRC Company Law adopted supervisory board instead of relying on security
market and security commission.395In other words, China’s Company Law focused more
on small size LLC that resembling American limited partnership. 396For example, the
numbers of shareholder were limited to 50 peoples. 397

395

There were quite a lot discussions by western academics questioning Chinese supervisory
board scheme. For example, “To monitor corporate activities, China could adopt mechanisms
currently used in other markets. For example, stock markets and securities commissions can
regulate such behavior as insider trading and stock manipulations by management. Outside
creditors can also monitor the decisions of the management for profit maximization. Boards of
directors can monitor management and respond to inefficiency by firing and hiring. The
existence of a supervising board with broad powers will frustrate the desired market efficiency if
the supervisors are not familiar with the company's business and have no incentive to see the
company profit.” Ibid.
396
Interestingly, the distribution of profits in a limited liability company is almost like a limited
partnership in the United States. The distribution of profits is according to the percentages of
contributed capital by the shareholders, not according to their shareholdings… For companies
limited by shares, distribution is in accordance with the shareholders' shares.' See Art. 45
Company Law, Art. 37 EJV Implementation Rule.
397
See art. 24 PRC Company LAW “The establishment of a limited liability company shall be
subject to the capital contribution by not more than 50 shareholders.”
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d. The rule of law
At the beginning of the new millennium, China’s legal and investment
environment still rated poorly by the westerns. For example: “The Wall Street Journal
and Heritage Foundation rated China in 2002 as a ‘‘mostly unfree economy (given a
bright yellow color to join the likes of India, Cambodia, Romania, and Bulgaria)” even
after more than 20 years of remarkable economic reforms. According to the cited study,
‘‘China’s legal and regulatory structure remains so riddled with contradictory internal
(neibu) unpublished guidelines and exceptions that foreign businesses say progress in
the rule of law has actually slowed in recent years.”398

Complaints about China’s FDI law concentrated on the substance of the law and
operation of the law. The law was obscure, ambiguous, and lack of transparency,
conflict of rules between different levels of bureaucracy, inconsistent interpretation of
the law, and regulation incompatible to global practice. 399 With China’s painful process
of massive business law legislation and reform, foreign investors and academics
acknowledged the problems of the rule of law in China. On the one hand, it was
important and necessary to have a modern legal infrastructure with transparent and

398

The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal (2002).2002 index of economic
freedom. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation. See Huang Yasheng, “One country, two
systems: Foreign-invested enterprises and domestic firms in China,” China Economic Review 14,
no. 4 (2003): 407.
399
Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional Economy,” Pac.
Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, 1995, accesed July 27, 2017,
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs.
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predictable legal guidance for business transactions, on the other hand, they were
frustrated by China’s painful process of cultivating and building a modern legal system.
As one concluded that “law is equated with a numbing bureaucratic process, entangling
sound business projects in an endless review, overlapping government ministries with
no evident purpose and endless opportunities for corruption and gratuities.” 400

Regulatory obstacles for business entities during the 1990s concentrated in three
areas, which related to China’s industrial policy of protecting SOEs and inherited issues
of China’s transition from a central planning economy to a market economy. The first
area concerned on the role of industrial association and self-regulation. 401 During the
1990s, to further promote self-regulation, many government agencies had been
restructured as industrial associations. These associations tended to create a
preferential treatment to SOEs or promote measures protect the industry at the cost of
the consumer and the competition.402 The second area concerned regional bias by the

400

“Western academics noticed the discrepancy between the law in practice and law in book.
This became problematic for foreign investors when Chinese legal system or administrative
procedure law did not provide an adequate mechanism to prevent, punish and correct
government's behavior of not following EJV Law or PRC Company Law. The analysis also pointed
out the core of the conflicts lies on the superiority of Communist Party in China’s constitutional
framework.” Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the
People’s Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360.
401
Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng, “Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive
Compatibility,” J. Comp. L. & Econ 1 (2005): 130,123-148.
402
For example, see: In those key industries, the dominant firms remain mostly state owned. As
a result, the government plays a double role; it is both the owner of the major players and the
referee, i.e. the regulator. Second, in the sectors where the government has retained its
regulatory presence, many of the government ministries or regulatory agencies have 'affiliate
companies' and give preferential treatment to them. This problem is particularly serious at the
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government agencies. 403For example, local authorities would produce laws and rules
protect local business with discriminatory ordinances. The third area related to the
government function. Certain government entities with approval authority might
require business purchase service from certain business as a condition for
administrative approval. 404

Unstable legal and regulatory framework” was one of many problems and
challenges deterred foreign investors.405 The uncertainty was a great threat to China’s
foreign investment regime. The lack of predictability and coherence was one critical

local levels. A good example of this phenomenon is that some local civil affair agencies in
charge of issuing marriage licenses require applicants to take pictures only at designated photo
shops, which are 'affiliates' of the agencies. Third, the governments at provincial and local
levels are well known for creating and maintaining barriers to competition from other localities.
For example, many local governments force dealers of beer, fertilizer, and medicines to only sell
goods that are produced within their own jurisdictions.” Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign
Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6
(1993):331-360.
403
Ibid.
404
For example, “Administrative monopolies have been subject to extensive criticisms by China's
policy-makers and intellectuals. There is a national consensus that more competition needs to
be introduced into the industries that are dominated by the state, and some concrete measures
have already been taken to achieve that goal. The restructuring of China's telecommunication
industry provides an example of China's commitment to promoting competition in statedominated industries.” David L. Weller, “The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for
Foreign Investors to Challenge,” 98, no. 5 Columbia Law Review (1998): 1238-1282, accessed
July 31, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123382.
405
Ibid. David Weller, in his paper, detailed documented the excruciating administrative
examining and approving process for the establishment of a FIE. he analyzed the regulatory
framework and identified the decline of FDI with China’s overreaching and abusive regulatory
regime.405
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issue for a foreign investor. 406Foreign investors normally relied on the published rules
and regulations to make business plans, the sudden disruptions of the policy would
create an undue burden for the investors. 407 One of the most striking examples would
be the pilot program of investing commerce industry in China during the early 1990s.
The State Council failed to predict the market, which later suspended the investment
approval for a period of time until the central authority developed new regulatory
schemes. Many approved projects were restricted for any expansion because of the
State Council ban. Another quite controversial example was China’s telecommunication
industry. Foreign investors fell into a similar predicament when the central authority
suddenly revoked approvals from lower government authority. 408 When the central
authority believed massive inflow of FDI projects in telecommunication created
regulatory difficulties, the central authority just issued blank ban in all
telecommunication sector by forcing foreign investor selling their investment to the
state.409

406

For example, See “The China Syndrome,” Economist, June 9th, 2012, difficulties of doing
business in China, local competition, and "some unfriendly political decisions"including a
"sudden and arbitrary tax on imported capital Goods.
407
“Foreign investors often try to minimize such risk through contractual stabilization clauses,
which aim to grandfather the foreign- investment vehicle in the event of certain changes in the
law. PRC law and practice has permitted such clauses in certain limited.” See David L. Weller,
“The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for Foreign Investors to Challenge,” 98, no.
5 Columbia Law Review (1998): 1238-1282, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123382. Also see Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments
in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 615, 625 (1994).
408
Leontine D. Chuang, “Investing in China 's Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the
Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China,” Nw. J. Int'l L. & Busno 20 no.3. (2000): 510.
409
“The China Syndrome,” Economist, June 9th, 2012, accessed by July 31, 2017,
http://www.economist.com/node/21556587. “These instances run the gamut, including: a Sino189

These problems encountered by foreign investors illustrated the lack of internal
coordination between China’s complex bureaucratic bodies. A bureaucratic agency
might approve one FIE project, but a different agency might take a different position or
change its position without proper coordination or notification to stakeholders. This
became worse when there was no adequate legal system provided any meaningful
remedies to foreign investors. 410 The problem with the central planning also reflected
by Chinese authority’s ignorance to EJV property rights. For example, the local
government would revoke pre-approved land using rights when the government later
decided to have a public transportation project build on the same land that previously
allocated for EJV without any compensation.411

These problems also perfectly illustrated the underdevelopment of the rule of
law: the central authority cannot establish a credible and accountable system that
serving national and political interests in the desired manner. One may conclude that
Chinese authority’s reaction to the market demonstrates a difficulty in managing a

Japanese joint venture being directed to stop selling television sets outside the local province
because it was "taking advantage of disparate regional pricing," apparently making the joint
venture guilty of "profiteering"; a joint venture's general manager being removed by the
company's department-in-charge; and reluctance of foreign exchange and bank officials to
release hard currency earned from international sales by JV.”
410
For example: see Tianjin Otis EJV dispute with the Tianjin Transportation Department
regarding the land using rights. See Timothy A. Steinert, “Note, If the BIT Fits: The Proposed
Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and the People's Republic of China,” J.
Chinese L. 2(1988):405, 446-450.
411
Ibid.
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modern regulatory framework with a variety of interests. A lack of experience in
managing conflicted interest can be mitigated by more reforms and more practice.
However, what truly troubling was a notion that “the rule of law” would be
inconvenient in building China’s socialist market. Similar narratives can be found both in
China and the West within the context of developing a better investment environment.
One may argue China’s economic data tended to gloss over the quality of the
development with the quantity.

In fact, the issue with China’s FDI regime expressed the conflicts between
coherence, reliability, and predictability of the law and the changing nature of the FDI
reform progress.412 FDI framework in the 1980s included a strong element of centralized
planning. The FDI regime in the 1990s presented a more relaxed tendency. However,
the extent and pace of the change have always been in debates. Although the
centralized authority created general or abstract expressions about Chinese reform
agenda through the Party Congress and Five-Year Plan, these vehicles lacked the level of
certainty that a reasonable investor would normally require in formulating an
investment project. With this reality in mind, it was not hard to explain most FDI
projects during the 1990s were large JVs associated with the government for large

412

See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1997). Indicating that one of the elements generally identified
as necessary to the rule of law is "the supremacy of legal authority" and that "law should rule
officials.
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infrastructure constructions or smaller FDI projects associated with export-oriented
labor-intensive industry sectors.

In summary, there are two forms of deviations from rule of law in the context of
foreign investment regulatory framework. First, weaponizing laws to serve Beijing’s
political interest. This type of deviation disregards the reliability and internal coherence
of the law for political interest. Such interests are normally justified by the recognition
or understanding or misunderstanding of a social-economic theory or ideological
preference. The telecommunication sector is one good example explaining this issue.
Second, commodifying judicial or administrative authority to serve personal interest.
This type of deviation disregarded the integrity and honesty of the governance power,
which is a form of corruption. Both forms of deviation share similar mechanism by
taking advantages of an ambiguous law. However, while the second form of deviation is
illegal and common around the world, the first form of deviation compromises the
authority of the law because it suggests that administrators are either unable to utilize
the law for the public good or unable to devise a reliable and coherent mechanism to
serve complex political objectives. The Party possesses the supremacy of authority
under China’s party-state system, the disciplinary framework of CPC established a
foundation to explore a meaningful mechanism to check on officials in connection with
the state government and legal system. 413 In fact, the rule of law recognize that law

413

Larry Catá Backer,Wang Keren, “The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with
Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Constitutional Order,” Rim L. &
Pol'y J 23 no.2, (2014): 20. Also see, Alice Tay & Coniasc Leung, “Introduction: The Relation
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could be a tool for social governance. The core of the rule of law requires that people
aware and understand the law. This means the rule must be communicated to the
audience in a fashion that the audience can understand and then take it as a guide for
their behavior. However, the development of China’s foreign investment regime
demonstrated a troubled pattern: the authority would disregard the reliability of the
law when it considers investors could outsmart the regualtors. In fact, this was the
dilemma in China: well-defined rules could not be used to achieve complex governing
goals by the authority.

During the 1990s, Chinese business culture had been intensively discussed by
many western writers. From a retrospective, these views depicted a pattern of the
business transaction during the 1990s, which provided us more insights over China’s
foreign investment development. Two of the most iconic views about Chinese business
culture during the 1990s could be identified: first, Chinese businessmen or negotiators,
unlike their western counterparts, tend to ignore the details of the contract during the
business transaction. Second, Chinese partners prefer mediation or arbitration over
litigation. This study concluded that Chinese culture is not the cause or the reason to
explain such business behavior. On the contrary, this study considers Chinese culture

Between Culture, Commerce and Ethics,” in Greater China: Law, Society and Trade (A. Tay & C.
Leung eds. 1995): 170.
“The Chinese official and the Chinese citizen are part of a political structure in which the Party's
will and policies have been the most effective law .... Laws and regulations have to be
understood in this wider context of a society in which the formal legal position is only one
consideration and still often not the most important.
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plays an insignificant role in shaping Chinese business behavior. The legal system and
rules helped to form China’s business culture.

First, it is true that Chinese investors tend to act in a more sensitive manner
when personal authority or reputation is perceived to be threatened. However, avoiding
contact details or litigations may not be the result of Chinese investors’ psychological
tendency or Chinese culture. During the 1990s, most Chinese partners that a western
investor worked with were linked to government or semi-government entities. SOE
managers are de-facto government officials. Thus, in the contract negotiation settings,
“being diplomatic” is one feature of government official language. For example, many
investors and academics asserted that Chinese partners prefer abstract principle instead
of detailed facts through a nonbinding letter of intent during the joint venture
negotiations. Many explanations or theories for Chinese investors behavior linked to
Chinese Confucian Cultural and psychological factors such as for avoiding public
humiliation or confrontation to protect one’s personal authority or reputation. 414

414

“ Foreigners at the Gate: Sweeping Revolutionary Changes on the Central Kingdom's
Landscape-Foreign Direct Investment Regulations & Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the
People's Republic of China,” Rich. J. Global L. & Bus 3 (2003): 128-129. For example, “Generally
speaking, contract negotiations in China are broadly based, where the Chinese "seek general
principles," rather than detailed rules explicitly built into to contract… Chinese step back from an
actual agreement and begin negotiations by presenting a letter of understanding that
outlines general principles. US managers are often put off because they want to get to details.
They're not averse to the rhetoric of the preambles, but they want to build a relationship on
facts. For their part, the Chinese stress friendly introductions as a way of establishing their
relationship. Therefore, the Chinese do not place priority on contractual specificities, but on
"other social precepts such as mutual benefit, social harmony and long-term objectives as their
guiding principles in observing the spirit of the transaction.” Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade
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Unlike small and middle-sized export-oriented FIE in the southern province
operated by Hong Kong or Taiwan investors, western FIE project normally involved large
investments with Chinese SOE partners. Thus, it was quite normal that these projects
were negotiated and managed by Chinese SOE managers or officials tended to treat the
project as one political task rather than a business task. With the development of
China’s private sector and reforms, new generations of contract negotiators or business
cultural speak the similar language with their western counterpart.

Western academics and investors accurately pointed out that Chinese prefer
non-litigation forms of dispute resolution. Many westerns attributed such preference
for Chinese Confucian cultural, the reality was far more complex. Although traditionally
Asians preferred non-confrontational mechanism to resolve a personal dispute, it was
important to note that the underdeveloped legal system would be the main reason
shaped China’s business practice. There was no meaningful judicial system could handle
most commercial litigations during the 1980s and early 1990s. China did not have a
modern legal service market at the beginning of the 1990s. The most commercial laws
were developed throughout the 1990s. The litigation system and litigation market were
not fully developed until the late 1990s. Litigation was formal and transparent, which

Liberalization and Its Role in Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper presented at International
Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied Economic Research Conference, New Delhi,
November 14-16 2003), 1-10,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf.
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was standard practice for a multinational corporation in resolving commercial disputes.
However, China’s undeveloped legal system did not create sufficient litigation
experience for Chinese business community. The first generation of the EJV Law
framework acknowledged this reality and asked disputed parties to resolve disputes
through arbitration; litigation was an option. Thus, the lack of meaningful litigation
system would be the true reason for these transaction behaviors.415

Conclusion
Since the launch of the Reform and Open Up in 1978, Chinese foreign investment
inflow expanded rapidly. The foreign investment inflow between 1992-2005 maintained
the momentum of the domestic and foreign investment, which fueled economic growth.
The central authority’s investment policy suggested two important transitions. First, the
central authority recognized the importance of market and private interest by claiming
to establish the “socialist market economy.” The Constitution further proclaimed that
“private interest is protected and guided as part of the socialist market economy.”416
Secondly, China needed to attract high-quality foreign investment through promoting
the rule of law. This period signified China’s massive waves of commercial rulemaking.
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For example, one scholar observed that “Most foreign investors generally consult with
lawyers before and during the process of FDI negotiations. However, it is normal for the Chinese
to not consult with lawyers because this would infer that they did not trust the parties involved
in the negotiations. Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its Role in Chinese Economic
Growth,” (paper presented at International Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied
Economic Research Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 1-10,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf.
416
PRC Constitution Preamble.
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China gradually established a “dualist” regulatory framework with one system
concerning China’s domestic firms, and another concerning foreign firms. This chapter
concluded that although the dualist legal system accommodated China’s economic
reality, it promoted discriminatory treatment among SOEs, private sectors, and foreign
sectors. As next chapter points out, such arrangement became problematic and
counterproductive in promoting a fair, transparent and open market under
globalization. In addition, this chapter considered that the underdevelopment of China’s
legal system shaped China’s business behavior of avoiding litigation during the dispute
resolution and avoiding the contract details during the business negotiation. The study
concluded that Chinese culture played an insignificant role in creating such behavior.
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Chapter 4 THE FDI POLICY AND LAW BETWEEN 2006-2016
1. Introduction

The increasing demands for the relaxation of commerce and investment
regulations and the goal of maintaining balanced and steady economic growth
presented an acute tension to China’s policymakers since the emergence of new
conditions and issues between 2006-2016. China needed new channels to ensure future
economic growth because the traditional pattern of that development reached its limits.
First, the economic benefit of the export-oriented manufacturing industry with cheap
labor reached its limits due to the labor cost increases, global consumer market
saturation and environmental and labor rights concerns.417 Second, the economic
benefits of domestic infrastructure investment led by local government reached its
limits due to market saturation and the risk of nonperforming government loans. A
relaxed and investment-friendly environment might largely restrain the central
authority’s capacity of enforcing regulations and rules designed to reduce market risk
and fluctuation of the national economy in a more effective manner.418 In essence, the
reformers and policymakers were facing a quagmire from which it could not escape, as
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Heriberto Araújo and Juan Pablo Cardenal, “China’s Economic Empire,” June 1, 2013, The
New York Times, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/chinas-economicempire.html?mcubz=3.
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Latham & Watkins Mergers & Acquisitions Practice, “China: Deregulation of the Foreign
Direct Investment Regulatory Regime,” accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-China-Deregulation-of-the-Foreign-DirectInvestment-Regulatory-Regime.
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one put beautifully: the low-hanging fruits for reforms were all picked, now we are in a
new situation. 419

Currently, China’s policymakers proposed multiple new policies and regulations
targeting these issues. First, the central authority started Shanghai Free Trade Zone
(SFZ) experiment in 2013, which was designed to streamline the foreign investment
verification system.420 By 2016, many policies implemented in SFZ are now expanded
nationwide and written into new FDI regulations with legislation proposals.421 Second,
the central authority proposed One Belt One Road program, a multinational investment
project designed to find solutions for the Chinese saturated infrastructure investment
market and SOEs, although suspicions for the risk of economic errors by many western
academics have been strong.422 Third, the central authority pushed a series of new
policies and measures to relax restrictions on domestic entrepreneurship. On the part of
private equity (PE) market, the authority had been taking precautionary moves: in order
to avoid the negative effects and risks for the large inflow and outflow of the capital, the
central authority developed a complexed capital control regime with rules and
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Kevin Yao, “In Fixing the Economy, China Aims for Low Hanging Fruit,” July 29, 2013, The New
York Times, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/global/infixing-the-economy-china-aims-for-low-hanging-fruit.html?mcubz=3.
420
“Introduction of Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone,” accessed July 31, 2017, http://en.chinashftz.gov.cn/.
421
“Farewell to the Era of Case-by-Case Foreign Investment Approvals,” accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5ecc03ca-7d14-4bf1-88ed-511e98cd90d3.
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FT View, “One Belt, One Road — and many questions,” Financial Times, accessed July 31,
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/d5c54b8e-37d3-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec.
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regulations covering various economic sectors, such as PE market, finance, insurance
and foreign exchange.423 The prime example for such control includes Qualified
Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors
(QFII) experiments and foreign exchange regulations.424 Essentially, QDII and QFII
regimes and other foreign exchange control measures were expressions of the central
plan system 2.0. Only certain screened large institutional investors were allowed to
engage in investment activities under the supervision of the central authority while
individuals, and smaller investors are blocked out. However, there were exciting
developments in the last few years. The success of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone
experiment resulted in a new foreign investment regulatory framework that provided a
certain level of national treatment for a foreign investor in certain industries. The
policymakers started preferred share experiment, which ended “equal share, equal
rights” corporate law principle by allowing investors to diversify their investment
options and enabling modern corporate governance reform. The exciting new
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Judy Deng, “The Regulatory Landscape for Private Equity Investment in the Secondary Market
in China,” The Journal of Private Equity 16, no. 3 (2013) 41, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43503774.
424
The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program (QFII) is pilot capital investment program
designed to allow qualified foreign institutional investors to invest Chinese stock market under
certain restrictions since 2002. A variation of this program, RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors (RQFII) was established in 2011 to enable permitted institutional (entity/ legal person)
to use oversea RMB funds for security investment in Mainland China. See Article2, Measures on
the Pilot Program of Securities Investment in Mainland China by RMB Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investors.
Ma Guonan, Robert N McCauley, “Do China’s capital controls still bind? Implications for
monetary autonomy and capital liberalization,” BIS Working Papers No 233, accessed July 31,
2017, http://www.bis.org/publ/work233.pdf.
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development of the business structure “Wechat economy,” as the latter section would
discuss, created cashless, government-less, and self-regulating investment and business
model that would revolutionize China’s foreign investment framework in the future. In
the meantime, the central government started to work with the international legal
framework by entering into various international agreements, such as the one targeting
money laundry or tax evasion. Recently, China adopted new CSR (Common Standard
Reporting system) and developing China’s public disclosure framework to promote a
transparent and robust investment market.425

In this chapter, the main focus is the new development of the foreign investment
policy and law from 2006 to 2016 with new opportunities and challenges. A brief
overview of the economic data of the FDI development for the past decades would be
presented in the rest of the introduction as a reference. The data acknowledged that
the impact of China’s foreign investment on the world order is undeniable, and the
relationship between China and the world is reciprocal. In order to illustrate how the
central authority interpreted China’s new foreign investment framework, this chapter
follows the same structure from previous chapters. The ideological and constitutional
frameworks provide a necessary ideological and constitutional basis that assists readers
in understanding the principles and contexts, within which the FDI legal framework
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“Chinese financial institutions have started carrying out due diligence on customer’s tax
residency.” See “Time to comply: China implements OECD's financial info exchange”
International Financial Law Review, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3744696/Time-to-comply-China-implements-OECDs-financial-infoexchange.html.
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operated. The main theme during this time was the recognition of rebalancing the
relationship between market and the government by promoting a unified market access
and market self-regulation. In addition, it has been promoting a transparent, fair and
open market. It called for further reform on the government function in order to
provide convenience for foreign investors.

Before the fourth section summarizes this study, the third section exclusively
discusses the legal framework of the FDI regime during 2006-2016. This section would
cover three issues: first, the new developments of the foreign investment regulatory
framework with the Preferred Stock experiment; second, the new challenges of Chinese
foreign investment framework in maintaining a reasonable government control without
hurting the market activities; third, the new opportunity for Chinese foreign investment
regulatory framework with China’s “wechat economy” and the international legal
framework of public disclosure schemes in managing market behavior for public good. It
concludes that the current policymakers acknowledged the importance of market
freedom and the legitimate interest of protecting the public good. However, more
reforms are necessary to maintain a reasonable, fair and transparent investment
framework. This chapter will start with a brief overview of the foreign investment
performance between 2006-2016. Then it follows the same structure of previous
chapters by discussing the ideological framework and legal framework before the end of
a short conclusion.
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During the past thirty years, China has maintained a rapid rate of economic
growth, “the average annual growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) has been
9.4 percent, and the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita is 8.2
percent.”426 Although China had taken the position for the largest exporting country in
2013, almost half of the exports has come from firms “in which foreign investors have at
least some ownership.427“World Bank data indicate that China's GDP grew by 10.6
percent from 1990 to 2000 and by 9.6% from 2000 to 2010. Some of the reasons for this
tremendous increase have been the increased liberalization, freer markets, freer trade,
higher labor productivity, efficient use of resources, and also the role of foreign direct
investment.”428 With Chinese economic development, export oriented and laborintensive sectors have been facing pressures from the rising labor and production costs
and the strict environmental regulations. As a result, relocation to “Western and Central
China, and other low-cost South East Asian countries such as Vietnam” became
inevitable.429
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Liu Xiangbo, Luo Yu, Qiu Zhigang, and Zhang Ru, “FDI and Economic Development: Evidence
from China’s Regional Growth, “Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 50 (2014): 87-106.
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Kulkarni, Kishore G; Tapas, Poornima; Dangre, Rita R, “FDI Comparatists: China and India,”
SCMS Journal of Indian Management 13, no. 1 (2016) 50.
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For example, “in contrast to the supply chain of the Taiwanese PC industry and the clustering
of the Japanese auto industry, the US food and chemical industries need not organize a wide
spectrum of suppliers producing raw materials or components for their final products…
Moreover, the US FIEs tend to focus on institutional environment in the expansion destinations
and expect high transparency in government procedures and decision-making. Compared with
Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors, the Americans are relatively unfamiliar with Chinese
culture and are reluctant to become involved in the guanxi-based communication.” Xu zhihua,
Yeh Anthony, “Origin Effects, Spatial Dynamics and Redistribution of FDI in Guangdong, China”
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Between 2006-2016, the foreign investment performance was steady. “From
January to October 2016, Newly Approved Foreign-invested Enterprises amounted to
22580, up by 7.4% year on year; and the actual use of foreign investment reached RMB
666.3b（USD 103.91billion, up by 4.2% year on year.” 430 The top ten nations and
regions with investment in China were still concentrated in South and East Asia: “Hong
Kong (USD71.16 billion), Singapore (USD4.89 billion) , Republic of Korea (USD4.12
billion), United States (USD3.49 billion) , Macao (USD3.35 billion) , Taiwan
Province(USD2.98 billion) , Japan (USD2.46 billion) , Germany (USD2.44 billion), U.K.
(USD2 billion) and Luxembourg (USD1.38 billion). Investments from these countries
accounted for 94.6% of the total actual use of foreign investment in the country.”431

Table 8. FDI data 2006-2016.
Newly approved

Actual use contract
value

2016

22580

$103.91billion

2009

18,163

$70.871 billion

2008

27,514

$92.395 billion

2006

41485

$63.21 billion

Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie [Journal of Economic & Social Geography],
104, no. 4, (2013) 439-455.
430
MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2006/1-10),” accessed July 31, 2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/statistic/foreigninvestment/201612/201612021
65831.
431
Ibid.
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*data: MOFCOM China’s absorption of Foreign Investment 432
On the part of the Outbound Direct Investment (ODI), Chinese enterprises made
a nonfinancial direct investment of “US$14.53 billion in 53 countries along Belt and
Road. The investment mainly flew to Singapore, Indonesia, India, Thailand, and
Malaysia.” 433The number of the contracts “signed by the Chinese enterprises in 61
countries along the Belt and Road reached 8,158 in 2016, and the value of the newlysigned contracts amounted to US$126.03 billion, taking up 51.6% of China’s total
contract value of the contracted projects over the same period, The turnover reached
US$ 75.97 billion, taking up 47.7% of the total, up 9.7% year on year.”434
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In January-October 2009, the number of newly approved and established foreign-funded
enterprises in China totaled 18,163, down by 20.11% year-on-year, and the foreign investment
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A new draft of the Foreign Investment Law was released in the spring of 2015 to
reform the governance of foreign investment by granting national treatment to foreign
investors in both admission and operation. However, such draft had not yet been
finalized due to China’s complicated foreign exchange issue, an important obstacle to
China’s foreign investment. 435 Currently, the lawmakers are still working on the draft.
Various new reforms and new legislation were created to promote the FDI regime. For
example, the Shanghai Free Trade Zone was designed to streamline the verification and
approval process for foreign investors. It was designed to provide national treatment for
foreign investors in industries that the central authority considered less important. For
important industry sectors listed on the “negative list,” the investor would be subject to
the traditional investment verification process. This reform designed to simplify the
registration process for foreign investors. Under the new rules, a foreign investor does
not have to prepare feasibility study if the investment project is not named on the
negative list. The amendment of the EJV Law, CJV Law, and WFOE Law later affirmed
these new reform measures. A new National Security Review was also created to
balance the growing interest of the M&A by foreign investors and the need for
protecting national security.

435

See, Bian Yongmin, “A Revisit to China’s Foreign Investment Law: With Special Reference to
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of the P.R.C. Foreign Investment Law], January 19, 2015,
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201501/20150100871010.shtml
206

In addition, in order to maintain a payment of the balance, China imposed strict
foreign exchange control, which strongly affected normal commerce and foreign
investment activities. Due to China’s close connection with the world economy, China’s
mega foreign exchange reserve started to cause concerns from both domestic and
foreign watchers. Theoretically, Yuan’s revaluation would attract foreign investment in
China and lower the cost of imports, but it could also cause financial risk when China’s
bank sector has a large number of bad loans that cannot provide a healthy and
sustainable investment environment. 436The issue with China’s foreign exchange control
demonstrated the difficulty of maintaining a strong central controlling economy and a
market system.437

With China’s rapid FDI development, academics realized that the impact of
global trade and investment is reciprocal: the world is changing China and Chinese
people, vice-versa the West became more and more susceptible to China. 438 “China
represents 23 percent of the world’s population”, put in perspective, China’s impact is
undeniable. More than 10 percent of what China ships to the U.S. ends up on Wal-
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438
Mark A. Scott, “China's influence on the American legal system resulting from China's rise to
power,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 32.1 (2008), accessed July 29, 2017,
http://www.suffolk.edu/law/student-life/16963.php.
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Mart's shelves. 439 The rise of China’s economic power under globalization connects
China and the global market. China’s impact on global trade, investment, transaction
behavior and the legal system is undeniable.440 More importantly, China’s experience
provides an alternative narrative and discourse about the social and legal system, which
will be discussed in this chapter.

When sizable investment and transaction made by corporations in China under
China’s system embedded with Chinese cultural values and ideology, one cannot
venture the idea to what extent the world will be affected by China. China’s growth will
inevitably inject its influence over the pattern and culture of business transactions
globally. Particularly, China’s legal system and legal culture, in the area such as “contract
law, property law, dispute resolution” would cause interest and comparison with the
common practice in other areas of the world. Such comparison would both create more
knowledge of China and more bias toward China. 441 It is important to point out that the
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1979, 523 visas were issued to students and scholars from China. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 19791986: CONSULAR REP. tbl. 5-1 (1987). "In 2002, about 65,000 Chinese students were enrolled in
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meaning of Chinese characteristics is still subject to debates and developments and it is
more of a symbol to signify people who identify and acknowledge a pattern of problem
analysis and solutions under certain abstract and evolving principles and ideology. The
Western paradigm acknowledged the extraordinariness of China’s transformation.
However, China’s story and experience in FDI is extraordinary in a sense that it engaged
in many compromises that would be considered culturally, politically, and
constitutionally unique for a different country. These compromises may have implied
the difficulty of duplicating.

2. Ideological Framework

Since the establishment of the principle of socialist modernization at the 3 rd
plenary session of the 11th National Congress of CPC in 1978, the main theme of China’s
past decades of development was the Reform and Open up.442 Each era gives a new
meaning to this term. As previous chapters discussed, during the 1980s, the main focus
of the authority was to define the role of the market and profit under China’s
centralized planning system.443 the 1980s established the foundation of the FDI
framework. During the 1990s, China reformed the centralized planning system by

universities in America, and Chinese students accounted for the highest percentage of
international students on many American campuses." T.K. Chu, 150 Years of Chinese Students in
America, HARV. CHINA REV. 7, 7 (2004).
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443
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establishing a socialist market economy.444 A dualist commercial law system was
developed to curate Chinese economy with the intent to revitalize China’s SOE sector,
on the one hand, to develop foreign invested economy sectors on the other hand. The
most significant ideological and constitutional progress has been the recognition of the
legitimate interest of China’s private sectors. This progress further affirmed China’s
commitment to the market economy.445

Since 2006, new conditions and issues emerged: the rapid growth of China’s ODI,
return investment and outflow of the capital raised concerns about the sustainability of
China’s FDI policy and investment environment. The emerge of wechat economy under
globalization presented new opportunities to central authority’s understanding of the
role of the government and market participants. The rapid outflow of capital and the
complexity of money laundry scheme presented new challenges to China’s foreign
investment regime.

Thus, the main issue of the foreign investment framework since 2006 has been
the relationship between the market and central authority within the context of
developing the socialist modernization. This means, how to balance the political interest
of the central authority in maintaining goal-oriented prosperity, the interest of the
freedom of contract, and the interest of the rule of law. This section focused on new
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developments in ideological framework between 2006-2016 within the context of
foreign investment by reviewing policies and principles proposed by the 17 th and 18th
Party Congress. The discussion will provide a necessary context for better understanding
the foreign investment legal framework discussed in the next section. It is noted that
there was no constitutional amendment during the selected period of the time.

a. The 17th Party Congress

Between October 15-21, 2007, the 17th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China was held in Beijing.446 This meeting elected new Party cadres and
summarized the past reform and policies. In this meeting, it redefined socialism with
Chinese characteristic and called for reforms to build a “reasonable, efficient and
secure” financial system. It restated the principle of the Reform and Open Up and
pledged to keep developing FDI regime under the globalization, and guided by the
principle of mutual benefit. The 17th National Congress of CPC defined a socialist path
with Chinese characteristic as:
socialism with Chinese characteristics means we will, under the leadership of the
CPC and in light of China's basic conditions, take economic development as the
central task, adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and persevere in reform and
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opening up, release and develop the productive forces, consolidate and improve
the socialist system, develop the socialist market economy, socialist democracy,
an advanced socialist culture and a harmonious socialist society, and make China
a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern
socialist country. The main reason this path is completely correct and can lead
China to development and progress is that we have adhered to the basic tenets
of scientific socialism and in the meantime added to them distinct Chinese
characteristics in light of China's conditions and the features of the times. In
contemporary China, to stay true to socialism means to keep to the path of
socialism with Chinese characteristics.447
The Party Congress’ definition of the socialist path with Chinese characteristic
demonstrated a historical continuity since the establishment of the socialist
modernization and Four Cardinal Principle. This pattern represented China’s policy
commitment to the foreign investment.

The 17th Party Congress restated socialism with Chinese characteristic theory,
which included principles developed by past leaders.448 On the part of financial and
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“Theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics constitute a system of scientific theories
including Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, and the Scientific
Outlook on Development and other major strategic thoughts. This system represents the Party's
adherence to and development of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and embodies
the wisdom and hard work of several generations of Chinese Communists leading the people in
carrying out tireless explorations and practices. It is the latest achievement in adapting Marxism
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investment regime reform, the 17th Party Congress showed supports but with selfrestraint, as it called for building “reasonable structure, complete function, efficient and
secure” modern financial system.449 Perhaps due to the complexity of the foreign
exchange issue, the 17th Party Congress made a more pragmatic promise that calls for
future instead of present RMB reform. As it provided that:
We will improve the RMB exchange rate regime and gradually make the RMB
convertible under capital accounts. We will deepen reform of the investment
system and improve and strictly enforce market access rules. We will improve
the state planning system.450
The Speech also took the same position on the future of market regulation, as it stated:

ideological foundation for the concerted endeavor of the people of all ethnic groups. It is an
open system that keeps developing. Practices since the publication of the Communist Manifesto
nearly 160 years ago have proved that only when Marxism is integrated with the conditions of a
specific country, advances in step with the times and is tied to the destiny of the people can it
demonstrate its strong vitality, creativity and appeal. In contemporary China, to stay true to
Marxism means to adhere to the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
See: Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and Strive
For New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, October 15, 2007,
accessed July31, 2017, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/200711/20/content_86325.htm.
449
Deepen fiscal, taxation and financial restructuring and improve macroeconomic regulation.
We will proceed with financial reforms to develop various types of financial markets and build a
modern financial system that is inclusive of different forms of ownership and different ways of
operation and that features a reasonable structure, complete functions, efficiency and security.
Ibid.
450
See: Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and
Strive For New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, October 15,
2007, accessed July31, 2017, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/200711/20/content_86325.htm.
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We will give play to the guiding role of national development plans, programs,
and industrial policies in macroeconomic regulation and combine the use of
fiscal and monetary policies to improve macroeconomic regulation.451
It is noted the Party Congress acknowledged the issue with the RMB exchange system
but only stated it “will” reform the system. In fact, SAFE issued stricter rules weakening
individual's capacity in purchasing foreign exchange by placed a quota of 50,000 dollars
a year for foreign exchange purchasing. Although Chinese economy improved
drastically, the central authority never increases the quota since 2007.452 As discussions
in the next section suggested, this measure showed a tension between the private
interest and public policy. China’s investors could not freely invest their own property
because the central authority could not predict the fluctuation of the market or
maintain a balanced growth. In addition, the quota restriction, like its predecessors (i.e.,
dual foreign exchange rate system in the 1980s) could not fully curtail the market
behavior as it used to.

b. The 18th Party Congress
On the part of foreign investment and trade, the 18th Party Congress called for
“integration” and “win-win” cooperation with foreign business under the

451

Ibid.

452

Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu wanshan waizi binggou waihui guanli wenti de tongzhi (国家外

汇管理局关于完善外资并购外汇管理有关问题的通知) [Notice of the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues on Perfecting Administration of Foreign Exchange Relating
to Merger and Acquisition with Foreign Funds ] adopted by SAFE on January 24, 2005.
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globalization.453 Furthermore, it made a promise that “innovative” channel would be
adopted to utilize foreign investment, which suggested the possibility of a more relaxed
regulatory regime.454 However, these new policies might be conditioned, as the Party
Congress emphasized that foreign investment would be constructed under the principle
of mutual benefit.455

453

“Expand opening up in scope and depth and improve our open economy. Adhering to the
basic state policy of opening up, we will better integrate our ‘bring in’ and ‘go global’ strategies,
expand the areas of opening up, optimize its structure, raise its quality, and turn our open
economy into one in which domestic development and opening to the outside world interact
and Chinese businesses and their foreign counterparts engage in win-win cooperation, and one
that features security and efficiency, in order to gain new advantages for China in international
economic cooperation and competition amid economic globalization.” See, Resolution of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available at:
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
454
We will make innovations in the way of using foreign capital, improve the structure of foreign
investment utilized, and let the use of foreign capital play a positive role in facilitating
independent innovation, industrial upgrading and balanced development among regions. We
will make innovations in our way of overseas investment and cooperation, support domestic
enterprises in carrying out international operations of R&D, production and marketing, and
accelerate the growth of Chinese multinational corporations and Chinese brand names in the
world market. : Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available
at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
455
“We will deepen the opening up of coastal areas, accelerate that of inland areas and upgrade
that of border areas, so that opening up at home and opening to the outside world will promote
each other. We will expedite transformation of the growth mode of foreign trade, stress quality,
adjust the mix of imports and exports, promote transformation and upgrading of processing
trade, and energetically develop service trade. We will vigorously carry out mutually beneficial
international cooperation in energy and resources. We will implement a strategy of free trade
zones and expand bilateral and multilateral trade and economic cooperation. We will adopt
comprehensive measures to maintain a basic equilibrium in the balance of payments. We must
guard against international economic risks.” Ibid.
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On November 15, 2013, the 3rd Plenary session of the 18th National Congress of
Communist Party of China adopted Resolution of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensive Deepening
the Reform [the Resolution].456 The Resolution acknowledged the necessity and
inevitability of continuing reform. More importantly, it acknowledged the main theme
of the reform is to “strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the
market.” 457The Resolution understood the difficulty of the task, which was why it laid
out a cautiously worded assessment about China’s problems:
To deepen the reform comprehensively, we must bear in mind the fact that
China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time
to come. We should adhere to the major strategic judgment that development is
still the key to solving all problems in China, take economic construction as our

456

“Economic system reform is the focus of deepening the reform comprehensively. The
underlying issue is how to strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the
market, and let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources and let the government
play its functions better.” See, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15,
2013, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/201401/16/content_31212602.htm.
457
It is a general rule of the market economy that the market decides the allocation of
resources. We have to follow this rule when we improve the socialist market economy. We
should work hard to address the problems of market imperfection, too much government
interference and poor oversight. Also see: We must actively and in an orderly manner
promote market-oriented reform in width and in depth, greatly reducing the government's role
in the direct allocation of resources, and promote resources allocation according to market
rules, market prices and market competition, so as to maximize the benefits and optimize the
efficiency. See, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available
at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
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central task, give full play to the leading role of economic system reform, balance
the relations of production with the productive forces as well as the
superstructure with the economic base, and promote sound, sustainable
economic and social development.458
This assessment implied the relationship between policy and development: policy is
created to serve development, if the policy fails, it must move forward to ensure the
progress of development.459 In the context of foreign investment framework, the
Resolution suggested that “too much intervention” from the government without
proper oversight.460 It emphasized the importance of “market rule”: letting market
instead of the government directly allocate the resource. The Resolution redefined the
duty of the government as:
● maintain the stability of the macroeconomy,
● strengthen and improve public services, safeguard fair competition, strengthen
oversight of the market, maintain market order,

458

Ibid.
“the national business system has carefully implemented the decisions and deployments of
the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, built a favorable business environment and
cultivated and consolidated the new advantages of foreign investment focusing on constructing
a new open economic system, strengthened the mission and took the initiative to make
contributions.” See MOC, “2017 National Foreign Investment Work Conference Held in Beijing,”
MOC, March 1, 2017,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201703/20170302525718.s
html.
460
Ibid.
459
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● promote sustainable development and shared prosperity, and intervene in
situations where market failure occurs.461

One of the highlights for the Resolution was to call for unified market access
without invisible barrel discriminate against private sectors and foreign investors. The
2004 Constitution proclaimed to protect “private property ownership.”462 The political
rhetoric under the Resolution expressed a more modernized view, which provided that
“public property ownership, as well as private property ownership, are inviolable.”463
The Resolution listed numbers of guidelines to promote new market reform, as it
provided:
1. Private sector and public-sector property are equally inviolable,464

461

Ibid.
Art. 11, PRC. Constitution. “The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the nonpublic sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The
State encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the
economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and control over the non-public
sectors of the economy.”
463
Improving the property rights protection system. Property rights are the core of ownership.
We need to improve the modern property rights system with clear ownership, clear-cut rights
and obligations, strict protection and smooth flow. The property rights of the public sector are
inviolable, as are those of the non-public sector. See, Resolution of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the
Reform, November 15, 2013, available at:
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
464
The resolution also emphasized the importance of the non-public sectors. “Supporting the
healthy development of the non-public sector. The non-public sector plays an important role in
sustaining growth, stimulating innovation, increasing employment, increasing tax revenues and
so on. We will persist in equality of rights, opportunities and rules, abolish all forms of irrational
regulations for the non-public economy, remove all hidden barriers, and adopt specific
measures for non-public enterprises to enter franchising fields.” See, Resolution of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively
462
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2. Unified transparent market access,465
3. Promoting mixed economy with cross holding by both state and non-state
sectors,466
4. National treatment for foreign investors. 467

It is important to point out that the first principle concerning the interest of private
sector is an extension of the commitment made by the 16th Party Congress. The second
principle “unified market access” concerning market reform, which refers to the

Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available at:
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
465
Vigorously developing a mixed economy. A mixed economy with cross holding by and mutual
fusion between state-owned capital, collective capital and non-public capital is an important
way to materialize the basic economic system of China...Enacting market rules that are fair,
open and transparent. We will implement a unified market access system; and on the basis of
making a negative list, all kinds of market players may enter areas not on the negative list on an
equal basis and according to law. We will explore a management model for foreign investors
with pre-entry national treatment plus the negative list. We will make the business registration
system more convenient by reducing the number of items that require qualification verification,
turning certification before licensing into licensing before certification, and gradually changing
the paid-in capital registration system into a subscribed capital registration system. We will
propel reform of our domestic commodity distribution structure while building a business
environment under the rule of law. Ibid.
466
The state protects the property rights and legitimate interests of all economic sectors,
ensures that they have equal access to the factors of production according to the law,
participate in market competition on an open, fair and just footing, and are accorded with equal
protection and oversight according to the law. Ibid.
467
We will reform the market oversight system, implement uniform market oversight, tidy up
and annul all sorts of regulations and methods that impede the national unified market and fair
competition, strictly ban and punish all unlawful acts extending preferential policies, combat
regional protection, and oppose monopoly and unfair competition. We will establish and
improve a social credit system to commend honesty and punish dishonesty. We will improve the
market exit system in which the good eliminates the bad, and perfect the enterprise bankruptcy
system. Ibid.
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proposed policy of reforming “dualist legal system” by giving domestic firms and
foreign-invested firms equal status and treatment. In addition, this principle was
evidenced by the Shanghai Free Trade Zone experiment. 468

Comparing with the general expression of 17th CPC Party Congress, the 3rd
plenary session of the 18th Party Congress stated more detailed policies on China’s
financial reform. First, it clearly indicated qualified private sector could engage in the
banking sector. Financial innovation is encouraged.469 Second, it started to speed up
RMB exchange rate market reform and convertibility under capital account.470 Third, it

468

Shanghai Free Trade Zone Zhongguo Shanghai ziyou maoyi shiyanqu zongti fangan (中国（上

海）自由贸易试验区总体方案)
469

Improving the financial market. We will open the financial industry wider, and allow qualified
non-governmental capital to set up, in accordance with law, financial institutions such as small
or medium-sized banks on the precondition that this comes under stronger oversight. We will
push ahead with reform of policy financial institutions. We will improve the multi-layer capital
market system, promote reform toward a registration-based stock-issuing system, promote
equity financing through diverse channels, develop and regulate the bond market, and increase
the proportion of direct financing. Ibid.
470
We will improve the mechanism for market-based Renminbi exchange rate formation,
accelerate interest-rate liberalization, and improve the national debt yield curve that reflects
the relationship between market supply and demand. We will promote the opening of the
capital market in both directions, raise the convertibility of cross-border capital and financial
transactions in an orderly way, establish and improve a management system of foreign debt and
capital flow within the framework of macro-management, and accelerate the realization of
Renminbi capital account convertibility...We will carry out reform measures and stability
standards for financial oversight, improve the mechanism for oversight and coordination in the
financial sector, and define the oversight functions and risk management responsibilities at both
the central and local levels. We will build a deposit insurance system, and improve the marketbased exit mechanism for financial institutions. We will strengthen financial infrastructure
construction to ensure that the financial market operates in a safe, efficient and stable way.
Ibid.
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asserted that the government would stay out of investment barrel in cases not involving
strategic resource and substantial public interest by reforming administrative
verification process.471 An objective and historical observation on these statements
would come to some cautionary conclusions. For example, although the authority
clearly acknowledged the structure issues with current investment regulations and
pledged to reform such system, it emphasized “strategic and public interest” would be
excluded from these reforms. It was noted that the 1992-2005 investment framework
adopted similar rhetoric to insulate SOEs from market reform, which did not lead to
desired results.

The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central CPC Congress focused on the market
access and administrative verification process. The 4th Plenary Session focused on

471

We will deepen the reform of the investment system, and ensure the dominant role of
enterprises in investment. All enterprise investment projects, except for those concerning
national security or ecological security, distribution of the major productive forces, strategic
resources development and major public interests, should be decided by the enterprises
independently in accordance with the law, and no longer require government approval. Market
access standards will be reinforced regarding energy, land and water conservation,
environment, technology, security, etc. and a long-term mechanism will be established and
improved for preventing and dissipating excess production capacity. We will improve the
development progress evaluation system, correct the bias of evaluating political achievements
merely by the economic growth rate. We will increase the weight of other evaluation indicators
such as resources consumption, environmental damage, ecological benefits, excess production
capacity, sci-tech innovation, production safety and new debts, while more emphasis will be put
on employment, residents' income, social security and public health. We will establish a unified
national accounting system, formulate national and local balance sheets, and promote
information sharing between government departments by setting up a nationwide database
containing real estate and credit and other basic information. Ibid.
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judicial system reform.472 On October 23, 2014, the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th
Central CPC Party Congress adopted Resolution concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward
[hereinafter the Resolution on Law]. 473 The Resolution stated that rule of law
construction still falls short of the expectation of the popular masses, which require a
sober understanding by Party and State.474 The Resolution further outlined some issues,
which can be categorized as legislative issues and law enforcement issues. These issues
are either technical issues of the legislation, which can be fixed with better law making;

472

“The effectiveness of implementing the rule of law will be a significant indicator in judging
the work of officials at various levels and will be taken into consideration when evaluating their
performance. The government will promote the implementation of the rule of law at the
community level by giving full play to the key role of community-level Party organizations.” See
“Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China (Excerpts),” Beijing Review, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.bjreview.com/Beijing_Review_and_Kings_College_London_Joint_Translation_Proje
ct/2014/201703/t20170321_800091805.html.
473
CCP Central Committee Resolution concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively
Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward (中共中央关于全面推进依法治
国若干重大问题的决定), October 28, 2014,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decisionconcerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-countryaccording-to-the-law-forward/.
474
“At the same time, we must soberly be aware that, in comparison with the development
needs of the undertakings of the Party and the State, in comparison with the expectations of the
popular masses, and in comparison, with moving ruling the country according to the law
forward and modernizing our governing ability, rule of law construction still displays many
problems where it is not adapted or unsuited.” See: CCP Central Committee Decision
concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country
According to the law Forward, October 28, 2014,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decisionconcerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-countryaccording-to-the-law-forward/.
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or principal issues, which would be harder to fix without a comprehensive economic and
judicial reform and an effective anti-corruption structure. On the part of the legislation,
the Resolution pointed out the lack of transparency and clarity and the tendency of
place department interest over the legislative goal and people’s will.475 On the part of
the law enforcement, the Resolution criticized the problem of lack of transparency and
corruption.476As the Resolution concluded that:
“These problems violate the principles of the Socialist rule of law, harm the
interests of the popular masses, impede the development of the undertakings of
the Party and the country, and we must spend great efforts to resolve them.” 477
475

some laws and regulations have not been able to completely reflect objective laws and the
will of the people, they are not strong in terms of focus or feasibility, there are tendencies of
departmentalization in legislative work, turf battles and shifting of responsibility are relatively
prominent; See, CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, October 28,
2014, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committeedecision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-countryaccording-to-the-law-forward/.
476
“One of the significant achievements was the Plan designed to improve the quality of the
judges. Prior to the First Reform Plan it was common to find judges who were not legally
qualified or who lacked experience in commercial transactions. In 2001, the Judges Law of the
PRC was amended to impose stringent qualification requirements. In addition to holding a
university degree, judges appointed after January 1, 2002 have to pass a national judicial
examination, the same bar examination taken by private practitioners.12 On January 1, 2001,
the Supreme People's Court's Judge Training Regulation came into effect, which requires courts
to provide continuing legal education to judges, regardless of seniority. Another objective of the
First Reform Plan has been the enforcement of anti-corruption regulations. One example of this
effort was the issuance of guidelines regulating interaction between judges and lawyers, the
breach of which will give rise to disciplinary sanctions, and, in more serious cases, criminal
liability.” Eu Jin Chua, “The Laws of the People's Republic of China: An Introduction for
International Investors,” Chicago Journal of International Law 7 no.1 (2006): 133-140.
477
“laws exist but are not followed, law enforcement is not strict and law-breakers aren’t
punished are relatively grave, separation of powers and responsibilities in the law enforcement;
multi-headed law enforcement and selective law enforcement still exist, law enforcement and
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The ideological and constitutional framework within the context of foreign
investment law and policy mainly focused on the issue of market access and
transparency of the investment environment. The Party Congress acknowledged these
issues by proposing new reform policies and measures, such as the Shanghai Free Trade
Zone experiment and Yuan Internationalization. The Party Congress also acknowledged
the challenge of the reform, such as China’s foreign exchange issue, by offering cautious
assessment and promise for “future reform.” In general, the ideological and
constitutional framework during this period demonstrated a historical continuity by
further relaxing the restrictions on the market with reasonable readjustment on the role
of government intervention. The results were not always perfect, but the commitment
to a better and open investment environment with further global integration did not
change.

the judiciary are quite prominently not standardized, not strict, not transparent and uncivilized,
the masses’ strongly react against the problems of judicial unfairness and corruption; the
consciousness of a number of members of society to abide by the law, trust in the law, respect
the law, use the law, and safeguard their rights according to the law is not strong, some State
personnel and especially leading cadres’ consciousness about handling affairs according to the
law is not strong, and their abilities are insufficient, and it still occurs that laws are knowingly
violated, one’s word replaces the law, the law is suppresses through power, and the law is bent
for relatives and friends.” See: CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major
Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward,
October 28, 2014, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-centralcommittee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governingthe-country-according-to-the-law-forward/.
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3. New Development in FDI Legal Framework
a. Preferred Stocks
On November 30, 2013, State Council issued State Council Guiding Opinion on
launching Preferred Share Pilot Program, which signified a new era of preferred share
experiment, as an alternative to China’s long established “equal share, equal rights”
Company Law principle.478 A month later, CSRC and CBRC (China Banking Regulatory
Commission) and other regulatory agencies adopted supplementary rules to enforce
this reform. “According to the pilot project, companies listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are allowed to issue preferred stocks to
qualified public investors. Blue-chips listing companies are expected to gain support
from the first stage of the preferred stock pilot project as they are likely to be among
the first batch piloting the new program.”479 Unlike US rules and regulations concerning
preferred stocks, the Chinese experiment was silent on conversion rights. The preferred
stock enjoyed preference on dividends distribution, attendance of the shareholders’
meeting and voting rights. 480
Two principals were outlined by the educational material on preferred share
provided by CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission), “an effective and functional
legal and policy system is the foundation of market development, otherwise small

478

State Council issued Guowuyuan guanyu kaizhan youxiangu shidian zhidao yijian [State
Council Guiding Opinion on launching Preferred Share Initiative] On Nov30, 2013.
479
Xu Donggen, “Rule for Preferred Stock in China: Overthrow of the Principle of ‘Equal Shares,
Equal Rights’ From A Comparative Perspective,” Frontiers of Law in China 11, no.3 (2016): 538550.
480
Ibid.
225

investors interests will be harmed” and “Financial Innovation is beneficial to the further
development of the market.”481
CSRC listed a few reasons for China’s preferred share reform, which are:
1. China’s A Share Market (RMB quoted shares only listed in Shanghai Stock,
Exchange and closed for purchasing by Chinese investors) underperformance
since the fall of 2007, 482
2. Majority public listed company do not provide dividends,
3. Chinese bank needs new financing tools to supplement capital market,
4. Diversifying investment market. 483
The legal basis for China’s preferred shares experiment by CSRC rested in PRC
Company Law.484 PRC Company Law Article 132 provided that: State Council can issue

481

“Zhongguo Zhengjianhui youguan fuzeren jiu youxiangu shidian da jizhe wen” （中国证监会

有关部门负责人就优先股试点答记者问）CSRC Head Q&A on Preferred Shares Pilot Program.
CSRC, December 13, 2013,
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ztzl/zcjd/201406/t20140604_255431.html.
482
A-shares are defined in opposition to B-shares. B-shares are quoted in foreign currencies
(such as the U.S. dollar) and are open to both domestic and foreign investment, although they
are difficult to access for most Chinese investors, most notably for currency exchange reasons.
A-shares, on the other hand, are only quoted in Chinese renminbi. Some companies have their
stock listed on both the A-shares and B-shares market. Due to the limited access of Chinese
investors to B-shares, stock of the same company often trades at much higher valuations on the
A-shares market than on the B-shares market. Available at:
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/a-shares.asp#ixzz4oWJlLCab.
483
“Zhongguo Zhengjianhui youguan fuzeren jiu youxiangu shidian da jizhe wen” （中国证监会
有关部门负责人就优先股试点答记者问）CSRC Head Q&A on Preferred Shares Pilot Program.
CSRC, December 13, 2013,
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ztzl/zcjd/201406/t20140604_255431.html.
484
See, CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively
Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, October 28, 2014,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision226

additional rules or regulations regarding different types of shares for a company to issue
permitted shares under this law.485 Article 2 of PRC Security Law provided that “this law
applies to stocks, bonds, any other state Council recognized security instruments...” 486
The preferred share pilot project ended the traditional principle under Company Law
was “equal share, equal rights.” This project was one step forward of the voting rule
under the WFOE Law, EJV Law, and CJV Law, which adopted the unanimous voting rule
for major corporate affairs. 487 As the previous chapter discussed, an LLC under China’s
Company Law is similar to a limited partnership under U.S. corporate law.488 This new
reform concerning preferred shares could be an important boost to China’s investment
and equity market because it offers alternative financing tools to help investors develop
modern corporate governance. In addition, to protect the minority shareholder’s rights
under the pilot project, the project stipulated that “preferred stockholders gained the
right to attend the shareholders’ meetings and the ability to vote together with

concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-countryaccording-to-the-law-forward/.
485
Art. 132, PRC Company Law.
486
Art. 2, PRC Company Law
487
Art. 32, EJV Implementing Rule “The resolutions on the following matters shall be subject to
unanimous adoption by the directors who attend the board meeting:
(1) Amendment of the articles of association of the EJV;
(2) Suspension or dissolution of the EJV;
(3) Increase or decrease of the registered capital of the EJV; and
(4) Merger or division of the EJV.
The resolution on other matters may be made in accordance with the rules of procedure set
forth in the articles of association of the EJV.”
488
See chapter 3 on PRC Company Law.
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common stockholders if, in three cumulative fiscal years or two consecutive fiscal years,
the dividend payments owed to preferred stockholders were missed.” 489

b. Shanghai Free Trade Zone experiment

China’s traditional FDI registration and verification framework required foreign
investors to study the Foreign Investment Catalogue first and then use the catalog as
the reference to prepare administration permit from relevant government entities. The
current FDI verification system requires a MOC verification and approval for a FIE
project. Depends on the forms of the investment structure, the verification period can
last from 30 days to 90 days.490 Taiwanese investors enjoy a special 45 days verification
period for all types of investment projects.491 Thus, preparation works for establishing a
FIE could last quite a long time even before the investor started the registration process.
In response to the complaints from the investment communities and 3 rd Plenary Session

489

See article 11 of the Rule for Preferred Stocks. Also see article 10 “Preferred stockholders
shall be entitled to attend the shareholders’ meeting and vote separately from common
stockholders for the following items, each preferred stock has one voting right except for
preferred stocks owned by the company itself: (1) Amendment of the articles of association of
the issuing company about items in connection with preferred stocks; (2) Reduction of the
registered capital of the issuing company up to more than 10% though one time or cumulatively;
(3) Merger, split, or dissolution of the issuing company, or to change the legal form of the
issuing company; (4) Issuance of preferred stocks; (5) Other items determined by the articles of
association of the issuing company. he resolution of the above items needs the consent of twothirds of the common stockholders attending the shareholders’ meeting, in addition to the
consent of two-thirds of the preferred stockholders attending the shareholders’ meeting.”
490
Typically, EJV project generally requires 30 days verification, CJV project requires 45 days, and
WFOE requires 90 days. See relevant discussion in previous chapters.
491
See Taiwanese Investor Protection law in previous chapters.
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of the18th National Congress of the CPC policy of promoting foreign investment and
improving transparency and market access, China adopted Shanghai Free Trade Zone
experiment. On August 30, 2013, Standing Committee of NPC adopted Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Administrative
Examination and Approval on Authorizing the State Council to Temporarily Adjust
Relevant Legal Provisions in the China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone [Hereinafter
Adjustment of Law in SFZ], which officially started the SFZ experiment. 492 A few weeks
later, State Council adopted Overall Plan for the China Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone
[hereinafter SFZ Overall Plan] on September 18, 2013.493

The main purpose of the SFZ was to streamline China’s complicated FDI
regulatory framework by allowing certain FIE project register the business without prior
administrative permission. According to the Adjustment of Law in SFZ, certain provisions
under EJV, CJV, and WFOE Law and supplementing regulations would be suspended for

492

Quanguo renmin daibiaodahui changwuweiyuanhui guanyu shouquan guowuyuan zai
zhongguo shanghai ziyou maoyi shiyanqu zanshi tiaoheng youguan falv guiding de xingzheng
shenpi de jueding (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于授权国务院在中国（上海）自由贸易
试验区暂时调整有关法律规定的行政审批的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on the Administrative Examination and Approval on Authorizing the
State Council to Temporarily Adjust Relevant Legal Provisions in the China (Shanghai) Free Trade
Zone] adopted by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on August 30, 2013.
493

Zhongguo Shanghai ziyou maoyi shiyanqu zongti fangan (中国上海自由贸易试验区总体方

案) [Overall Plan for the China Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone] adopted by State Council on
September 18, 2013.
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3 years.494 Based on the Adjustment of the Law in SFZ, the FIE would obtain national
treatment under this reform. In addition, the SFZ reform removed various additional
review and approval process for foreign investors’ business. Traditionally, government
agencies must approve the establishment or major changes in corporate finance or
contract disputes between the investors in JVs. The SFZ experiment removed such
cumbersome mechanism by implementing the new “record filing” mechanism.495
Essentially, this was a form of public disclosure, a common form of regulatory
mechanism in a market economy. This public disclosure mechanism allowed investors to
file a public record with the agency for any major changes in the company business. The
beneficial policies apply to FIEs not on the “negative list.”
Figure 3. Old verification and approval mechanism.
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“it has been decided at the fourth session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National
People's Congress that the State Council is authorized to temporarily adjust relevant
administrative examination and approval items (see Appendix hereto for the list) prescribed
under the Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, the Law
of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures and the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures that are applicable to
foreign investments other than those subject to special market entry management measures of
the State within the China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone” see: Overall Plan for the China Shanghai
Pilot Free Trade Zone.
495
The suspended the laws listed here:
1. Art. 6, Art. 10, Art. 20, WFOE Law
2. Art. 3, Art. 13, 14 EJV Law
3. Art. 5, 7, 10, 12, 24 CJV Law
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Under traditional FDI regulatory framework, the foreign investor must obtain a permit for the
project. In the course of the business, major changes in JV contract or changes of registered
capital also require permits from government authority.496

Figure 4. SFZ verification and approval mechanism.
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Under the new FDI mechanism, any investment project not on the “negative list” can enjoy the
national treatment, which means the investors can be exempt from the verification process. The
investor can file record to the agency for registration.

State Council SFZ Overall Plan offered an overview of the proposed FDI
regulatory reform plan. It proposed to further open financial service, shipping sector,
and consulting sectors by promoting open market access, and the rule of law.497 With
496

Relevant permit restrictions can check previous chapters.
“accelerating the transformation of government functions; actively promoting further
liberalization of the service sector and the reform of the foreign investment management
system; vigorously developing headquarters economy and new trade patterns; quickening the
exploration of capital account convertibility and full liberalization of the financial services
industry; exploring the establishment of a classified regulatory model based on cargo status;
striving to create a policy support system promoting investment and innovation; exerting efforts
to foster an internationalized business environment emphasizing the rule of law; and striving to
build the FTZ into a world-class pilot free trade zone boasting investment and trade facilitation,
free currency exchange, efficient and convenient regulation and a sound legal environment, so
that the FTZ can be used to explore new ideas and channels for China to expand opening-up and
deepen reform, and be relied upon to better serve national development.” See SFZ Overall Plan
497

231

the progress of the reform, the SFZ experiment expanded to Tianjin and Guangdong in
2015.498 The Tianjin, Guangdong, and Fujian Free Trade Zone. There were few
noticeable differences between the 2015 FTZ and 2013 SFZ. First, the 2015 FTZ
experiment acknowledged the interest of Taiwanese investors, which were not duly
represented by the SFZ experiment.499 Since Taiwanese investors have not been
categorized as a foreign investor for obvious reasons, the 2015 FTZ particularly
highlighted that certain verification rules under Taiwanese Investor Protection would be
suspended under the 2015 FTZ experiment.500 Second, the main task of 2015 FTZ
emphasized the part of promoting the rule of law by creating advanced investment legal
environment. It asked for public participation in the legislation process. In addition, it
encouraged private professionals in participating legislation process for a better
lawmaking.501

The FTZ experiment started in 2013 and ended in 2016. It expanded to western
regions in China between 2014 and 2015. It was a success for the foreign investors and

498

See Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the "Overall Plan for the China
(Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone" and Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing
the "Overall Plan for the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone," adopted by State Council on
April 8, 2015.
499
See previous chapters on Taiwanese investor protection.
500
See NPC Standing Committee Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Authorizing the State Council to Temporarily Adjust Relevant Administrative
Examination and Approval Items Prescribed by Pertinent Laws in the China (Guangdong) Pilot
Free Trade Zone, the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade
Zone and the Expanded Areas of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.
501
For example, see Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the "Overall Plan for
the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone."
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policymakers. The Standing Committee of 12th National People’s Congress adopted
these reform measures by promulgating Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on Revising the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Foreign-invested Enterprises and Other Three Laws on September 3, 2016. This
legislation affirmed that all relevant verification and approval process would be
removed if the FIE project not on the “negative list” of the regulation.502 Under the
“negative list” mechanism, the process of establishing FIE mirror to domestic firms. For
example, the Shenzhen government illustrated the registration process as the follows:

Figure 4. New FDI registration process under Shenzhen local rules.
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Figure 5. required documents for FIE registration under Shenzhen local rules

502

Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Revising the Law of

the People's Republic of China on Foreign-invested Enterprises and Other Three Laws （全国人
民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国外资企业法》等四部法律的决定 ）
adopted by Standing Committee of National People’s Congress on September 3, 2016. For
example: A new article shall be added as Article 23, which shall read: "Where the establishment
of a foreign-invested enterprise does not involve the special market entry management
measures prescribed by the State, the examination and approval matters prescribed by Article 6,
Article 10 and Article 20 herein shall be subject to administration by record-filing. Special market
entry management measures stipulated by the State shall be promulgated by the State Council
or promulgated upon approval by the State Council."
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The negative list is a new generation of the catalog. Any industry outside of the
“negative list” can be treated as a domestic investor. However, investment involved
certain industry may require Nation Security Review, some M&A and Shareholding
investment require traditional Antitrust Review. For example, the 2017 Negative list
require foreign investor in internet news service sector must approve by National
Security Review.

c. National security review
Although the new reform measures removed complex verification process for
the foreign investor, this does not exempt them from a new form of reviewing process.
On February 12, 2011, the State Council announced national security review (NSR). It
formally set up the rules on the scope, content, mechanism, and procedures of the NSR
in enforcing relevant articles of Anti-Monopoly Law. These rules will operate in parallel
with the AML's anti-monopoly merger review provisions (AML Merger Review).503 The

503

On February 12, 2011 the State Council of China announced that China would institute a new
national security review (NSR) regime applicable to a proposed foreign investment in, or
acquisition of, a domestic Chinese enterprise. It did this by publicly announcing a Circular
(adopted on 3 February 2011) which formally implements certain articles of China's Anti234

NSR framework designed to assess concerns raised by a proposed M&A transaction. A
special panel formed by NDRC and MOFCOM would review and assess the
transaction.504 The panel could make a request ask the foreign investor to provide a
written explanation to explain why such project should be allowed under NSR.505

The NSR Review defined the scope of the review, which including two scenarios:
1. M&A between certain Chinese firms and foreign investors506
2. Foreign Investor become the actual controlling shareholder of the firm507
The companies mentioned by above quotations include:
•

domestic enterprises that engage, or are involved, in military industry, are
located close to a military site that is key or sensitive, or any other entities
related to defense and national security.

•

key domestic market players in certain industries or sectors (such as agriculture,
energy, and resources, infrastructure, transportation, technology, and

Monopoly Law (AML) and sets out rules on the scope, content, mechanism and procedures of
the NSR. These rules will operate in parallel with the AML's anti-monopoly merger review
provisions (AML Merger Review) Lucas Xu, Hannah CL Ha, Timothy J Keeler and Michael A
Wallin, Mayer Brown, “China's new M&A review rules: a comparison with the US,” THOMSON
REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, March 1, 2011, https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-5059049?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170503180652541&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1.
504

See （国务院办公厅关于建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度的通知）[Notice of

the General Office of the State Council on Launching the Security Review System for Mergers
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] adopted by State Council on
February 3, 2011. [hereinafter NSR Review]
505
See NSR Review
506
Art. 1 (2) NSR Review
507
Art. 1(3) NSR Review
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manufacturing) but only if the transaction may affect the interests of Chinese
national security; and that as a result of the transaction, the foreign purchaser
would obtain control of the new entities. 508
The NSR review further defined what constituted as control:
•

a foreign investor, together with its parents and subsidiaries, or several foreign
investors together, obtaining ownership of 50% or more of the share capital of
the relevant Chinese enterprise as a result of the transaction;

•

a foreign investor, holding voting rights (though less than 50%) that are sufficient
to exercise a major influence on corporate decisions; or

•

taking actual control over decision-making, finance, human resource or
technology of domestic enterprise through any other means.

Figure 6. NSR Review Process.

508

Lucas Xu, Hannah CL Ha, Timothy J Keeler and Michael A Wallin, Mayer Brown, “China's new
M&A review rules: a comparison with the US,” THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, March 1,
2011, https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-5059049?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170503180652541&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1.
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The NSR review is a substance review, which concerned the effect of M&A on
economic stability, national security, and social services, and impacts on key technology
development. According to the NSR Review, the process of review involved several
stages. First, the M&A investors must apply for NSR review through MOC. The MOC
then forward the application to the review panel. The panel would forward the
application to relevant department within five days. These departments provide written
recommendations to the panel within 20 days. Upon receiving opinions from relevant
department, the panel would issue opinions within five days for approval or disapproval.
A special investigation process would be initiated within five days since the disapproval
opinion. The panel must investigate within 60 days. State Council would make the final
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decision when the panel cannot reach an agreement.509 The problem with this NSR
review system was the lack of clear dispute resolution process. The review detailed the
process of the review and application procedure without mention to any complaints
mechanism, which means there is no remedy provided under NSR to address such
concern.

3. Challenges to FDI framework
a. Outflow of the capital
In 2014, China’s foreign exchange reserves “fell by $100bn in the third quarter,
which was the largest drop ever, despite a trade surplus and foreign direct investment
inflows. China had registered a $51 billion outflow beyond the current account in the
second quarter.”510 “The reserve shrinking $323 billion in four months during 2006
before the PBOC sold dollars to limit declines in the yuan. The number declined to $3.17
trillion in September 2006.”511 “The problem has only worsened in 2016,” as Bloomberg
reported, “it was estimated that outflows would total more than $900 billion this year,
despite new restrictions on yuan movements, including prohibitions on using credit and

509

Art. 4 (3) NSR Review.
See, Henny Sender, “China’s anti-corruption push may drive wealthy overseass,” Financial
Times, November 11, 2014, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/cb9308f26983-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0. Also see , “Xi Jingping's Power-play Leaves Chinese economy
Exposed,” Forbes, January 17, 2015, accessed July 22, 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellingenheld/2015/02/17/xi-jingpings-power-pla.
511
“Goldman Warns China’s Outflows May Be Worse Than They Look,” Bloomberg, October 10,
2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-1010/goldman-warns-china-capital-outflows-may-be-worse-than-they-look .
510

238

debit cards to pay for insurance products in Hong Kong.”512 Chinese media have
categorized the outflow of the capital as “capital flight” (资本外逃 pinyin: Ziben
Waitao): as refugee escaped from a war zone, the term capital flight captured an
undesired economic reality, which awkwardly in juxtaposition to China’s pledge for
economic leadership and Yuan internationalization. 513

The free flow of capital presented an increasing tension between Chinese
authority’s political interest of maintaining a stable economic development and the
reality of globalization. China tried to maintain a desired economic growth by caging the
“freedom of the contract.” This form of thinking followed the traditional pattern of
centralization, a familiar form of regulation in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the
effectiveness and impact of this strategy have consistently been challenged by the
decentralized global economic reality. The new globalization reality required the

512

see Christopher Balding, “Why China Can't Stop Capital Outflows,” Bloomberg, December 5,
2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-06/whychina-can-t-stop-capital-outflows.
513
“Capital outflows began gathering steam in 2012, when the government liberalized currentaccount payment transactions in goods and services. Enterprising Chinese figured out that while
they couldn't officially move money abroad to buy a house via the capital account -- individuals
are barred from moving more than $50,000 out of the country each year -- they could create
false trade invoices that would allow them to deposit money where they needed it. The result
was a huge discrepancy between payments recorded for imports and the declared value of
goods passing through customs, amounting to $526 billion in hidden outflows last year.”
“significant part of the new capital is likely to find its way abroad through mis-invoicing in
international trade, smuggling, and other channels of capital flight since the people who are
creating the new capital have strong incentives to diversify domestic risks and to seek better
protection of property rights.” See Ibid. Also see Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s RoundTripping: FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, 2004),
accessed July 31, 2017, http://hdl.handle.net/11540/3595.
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application of new forms of soft regulations or smart regulations to manage, guide and
facilitate freedom of contract, rather than mechanically restrict it. This section would
exclusively discuss the conventional foreign investment regulations and challenges it
faces.

The purpose of this section is to illustrate that conventional regulation has
difficulty in successfully manage and channel market resource into a more reasonable
and beneficial space for the betterment of everyone in the case of managing free flow
of capital, which also offers a sharp contrast with the new regulatory approach that
would be discussed in the next section. First, it will introduce the development of return
investment scheme under Chinese foreign investment regime: how investor use special
purpose vehicle (SPV) to conceal the identity of the true controller in order to bypass
Chinese foreign investment regulations. Second, it will discuss the issue of corruption
under central authority’s foreign investment framework. Third, it will conclude that
these restrictive regulations created a self-fulling that affected China’s economic
modernization. The next section will focus on the opportunity of China’s FDI framework
and new regulatory measures and soft law regulation through the case of “wechat
economy.”

The outflow of capital can be categorized into three scenarios based on the
purpose of the capital. First: liquidate Chinese investment for cashing profits or
minimize investment losses. Second, outbound investment; the holder of the capital
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transfer funds overseas for an investment project. Third, return investment (round-trip
investment).514 It is a subcategory of the outbound investment. Under return
investment scheme, outbound investment project is an intermediary for capital to come
back to China. The investor transfers funds overseas for creating an overseas entity
(commonly known as Special Purpose Vehicle). The overseas entity will be a foreign
investor investing Chinese projects. In this process, foreign entity served as a strawman
for the convenience of domestic investment. This happens either because of poor
domestic PE market requiring offshore financing, or preferential tax policy favoring
foreign investors. The second and third scenarios require the application of an overseas
entity. To engage in ODI or return investment, the investor must establish a special
purpose entity (SPE) or special purpose vehicle (SPV).
Special Purpose Entities (SPE) or Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a legal creation
designed to circumvent China’s security and foreign exchange control, and FDI
framework by concealing the identity of the actual beneficiary or actual controller of the
investment activity.515 There are five main reasons for a company to apply SPV. As the
following indicates:

514

Bian Yongmin, “A Revisit to China’s Foreign Investment Law: With Special Reference to
Foreign Investment Protection,” Journal of East Asia & International Law 8, no. 2 (2015): 447448.
515
“Chinese shareholders often set up offshore SPVs as a means of financing existing Chinese
businesses, allowing them to gain the benefit of certain tax and foreign exchange preferences
only available to foreign investors.” See, “Chinese offshore special purpose vehicles,” OutLaw.com February, 2013, https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/projects--construction/projectsand-procurement/chinese-offshore-special-purpose-vehicles/.
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1. Strict rules by CSRC on public offering make it impossible to be listed in the
domestic stock market. SPV is applied for domestic company to be listed in a
foreign market;
2. Strict rules by CSRC, SAFE, and NDRC on overseas financing make it impossible to
be listed overseas stock market. SPV is applied for domestic market directly
obtain funds from private investors.
3. A Foreign investor cannot invest in restricted industry. SPV is applied for
concealing foreign investor’s identity.
4. Domestic firm intent to enjoy the special privilege of a foreign investor. SPV is
applied for concealing the true controller of the business.
5. Money laundry, tax evasion or conceal the identity of the company. SPV is
applied for concealing the actual controller of the business.

Figure 7. SPV legal structure explain. Domestic firm overseas IPO.
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Under this model, the domestic firm A wishes to be listed in a foreign stock market
because it cannot meet the minimum standard under Chinese IPO regulations. (many
internet companies cannot meet this standard) a Variable Interest Entities (VIE) was
created to resolve this problem. The SPV B would be established in a foreign jurisdiction.
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The SPV B would enter into a private agreement with A that agrees all equity and
security of the A would be transferred to B. Although SPV B is listed in a foreign
jurisdiction, A is the actual firm operate in reality.

Figure 8. SPV legal structure explain. Domestic firm offshore financing.
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Under this VIE scheme, domestic A operated in a restrictive industry that prohibits
foreign investments (internet company). Domestic A would form SPV B in a foreign
jurisdiction. SPV B establishes WFOE C in China. C and A would enter into private
agreement to transfer all equity and security from A to C. Thus, B became the actual
owner of the A through the private agreement between A and C.

Figure 9. SPV legal structure explain. Domestic firm tax evasion.

domestic A

A establish
SPV B

A sale B
products at
low price

243

B sale
products at
international
market

Great low tax
profit

Under this SPV scheme, a foreign entity B would be established by A. A and B entered
into an international trade agreement for sale of goods at an extremely low price. B
would sell the goods to international market with high profit. In this process, firm A
avoided high tax.

The above diagrams illustrate the application of SPV in bypassing China’s
investment regulations. The first two examples relate to China’s strict PE market
regulations and foreign exchange control. It is important to note that, China’s foreign
exchange control policy seems disconnected with the rhetoric expressed by Chinese
reform agenda. Foreign exchange control designed to maintain payment of balance
strictly. It was recorded that the central authority would take intrusive and disruptive
measures to insulate Chinese foreign exchange reserve from the demands of the
market. Such practice created an unpredictable foreign exchange regulatory framework
for foreign investors. For example, investment community complained that State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) would issue regulations require the bank to
process transactions involving foreign exchange for trading company only if the buyer
deposit equivalent amount of RMB to the bank. Or WFOE could not distribute stock
dividends in foreign exchange because Chinese authority wants to maintain annual
payment of balance.

The above diagram illustrates domestic firms’ aggressive offshore financing
practice. The domestic firm would establish an SPV for debt financing. The second step
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for SPV offshore financing would bring the money back to China, which is commonly
known as return investment or round-trip investment. Return investment or round-trip
investment is an important part of the foreign investment, although some would argue
this is a pseudo foreign investment because the actual investor is not a foreign-born
citizen. 516This study defined return investment as a domestic investor, Chinese investor
or domestic Chinese investor registered domestic firms transfer assets, in the form of
capital or equity, to an oversea entity. Such entity would then engage foreign direct
investment in China. Another form of return investment refers to reverse merger and
acquisition between a domestic firm and foreign entity. Normally return investment
requires direct control of multiple levels of shell companies with affiliated transactions.
Through these shell companies (registered in tax haven: BVI, Cayman island), the actual
owner is normally a Chinese investor. The most common reason for return investment
was offshore financing. Another reason for return investment was to obtain the
privileges and benefits of a foreign investor. Foreign investor enjoys certain preferential
treatments that a domestic firm cannot have. Private sectors have been discriminated in
the area of tax, land use fees, and public utility fees. Return investment transformed a
domestic firm into a foreign firm, which opened a gate to various “privileges” to
domestic firms. Interestingly, Chinese scholar support to punish return investment for
the reason of disrupt government plan.

516

“The World Bank 2002 studies showed the scale of China’s round tripping investment could
be as high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows into PRC, Geng Xiao’s study later indicated the
percentage might be higher with a range of 30%-50%. ”Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s
Round-Tripping: FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank,
2004), accessed July 31, 2017, http://hdl.handle.net/11540/3595.
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Although some voices in mainland criticized return investment by emphasizing it
is a dishonest act deceived government, Geng Xiao offered different opinions: first,
round tripping investment created revenues for investors and jobs for China. Second,
part of return investment was a reasonable market behavior in reaction to China’s
inadequate PE market and property right system. 517 This study holds the same position
with Geng for the following reasons. First, the Chinese government has a legitimate
interest and constitutional obligation to create investment policy that it sees fit to the
socio-economic development and China’s reality. To that end, the Chinese government
can pick and choice preferential policy for one group over another. However, such pick
and choice is reciprocal, which means the investor has a legitimate interest and financial
obligation to make the best possible business decision based on the market condition.
The investors have no obligation to promote political agenda of the central authority.
Since private sectors are not designated beneficiary of central authority’s policy, there is
no contractual or legal obligation for them to avoid legally acceptable solutions in
making a business decision.

One direct consequence of the return investment is the outflow of the capital.
Thus, strict foreign exchange control has been adopted to curtail the outflow of the

517

Lucas Xu, Hannah CL Ha, Timothy J Keeler and Michael A Wallin, Mayer Brown, “China's new
M&A review rules: a comparison with the US,” THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, March 1,
2011, https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-5059049?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170503180652541&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1.
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capital.518 China’s current foreign exchange framework is quite massive and
complicated. Depends on the target of the regulation, it can be categorized as
regulation concerning banks, regulations concerning individuals, or regulations
concerning business entities. According to the Catalogue of Current Effective Foreign
Exchange Laws and Decrees,519 by the end of December 31, 2016, 209 foreign exchange
related regulations and rules issued by SAFE were effective. 520 The Administrative
Measures for Personal Foreign Exchange and its Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the People's Republic of China were two important administrative regulations
concerning the purchase and sale of foreign exchange by Chinese individuals. The 2007
Individual Foreign Exchange Implementing Regulation formerly established the annual

518

“China's new restrictions on outbound investments and remittance,” Allen & Overy,
December 30, 2016, http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Chinas-newrestrictions-on-outbound-investments-and-remittance.aspx.
519

“Xianxing youxiao waihui guanli zhuyao fagui mulu,” (现行有效外汇管理主要法规目录)

[Catalogue of Current Effective Foreign Exchange Laws and Decrees], SAFE, December 31, 2016,
see
http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/wcm/connect/97d532004004cf9e848c94bf3842e0e1/%E7%8E%B
0%E8%A1%8C%E6%9C%89%E6%95%88%E5%A4%96%E6%B1%87%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E4
%B8%BB%E8%A6%81%E6%B3%95%E8%A7%84%E7%9B%AE%E5%BD%95%EF%BC%88%E6%88%
AA%E8%87%B32016%E5%B9%B412%E6%9C%8831%E6%97%A5%EF%BC%89.pdf?MOD=AJPERE
S&CACHEID=97d532004004cf9e848c94bf3842e0e1
520
List of effective Foreign exchange control regulations based on category:
1. General regulations, 20
2. Current account (23)
3. Capital account (76)
4. Financial Institute and foreign exchange business regulation (40)
5. RMB Currency and foreign exchange market (19)
6. Balance-of-Payments statistical declarations (12)
7. Inspection and rule application (11)
8. Management and technology (8)
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individual foreign exchange purchase quota. 521 The article 2 provided that:
“Administration of the annual total amount shall apply to the settlement of personal
foreign exchange and domestic purchase of personal foreign exchange. The annual total
amount is the equivalent of USD50,000 per capita per year. 522The State Administration
of Foreign Exchange may adjust the annual total amount based on the balance of
payments.”523 Although China’s Household Income per Capita increased from 1960
dollars to 4805 dollars in 2013, this quota has never changed since 2007. 524

On January 24, 2005, SAFE adopted Notice of the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange on Relevant Issues on Perfecting Administration of Foreign Exchange Relating
to Merger and Acquisition with Foreign Funds [hereinafter SAFE No. 11 Notice], which
formerly blocked the free movement of capital through government oversight on
overseas M&A. 525 On November 19, 2009, SAFE issued Notice of the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the Administration of the
Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale [hereinafter 2009 Notice].
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Geren waihui guanli banfa shishi xize(个人外汇管理办法实施细则) Implementing Rules of

the Administrative Measures for Personal Foreign Exchange, adopted by SAFE on January 5,
2007.
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Ibid.
523
Ibid.
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See: CEIC, “China Household Income per Capita 1985 - 2013,” accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/annual-household-income-per-capita.
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Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu wanshan waizi binggou waihui guanli wenti de tongzhi (国家外

汇管理局关于完善外资并购外汇管理有关问题的通知) [Notice of the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues on Perfecting Administration of Foreign Exchange Relating
to Merger and Acquisition with Foreign Funds ] adopted by SAFE on January 24, 2005.
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526The

main purpose of the 2009 Notice was to assist financial institution further

implement foreign exchange quota control by defining some techniques applied in
foreign exchange quota evasion. 2009 Notice provided a detailed description on what
considered as “irregular transaction” triggered the suspicion of foreign exchange quota
evasion.527 For example:
1. Same foreign institute or individual transfers foreign exchange to 5 different
individuals or above in mainland on the same day, every other day or on a
consecutive day basis.
2. Five individuals or above purchase foreign exchanges in the mainland at the
same day, every other day or on a consecutive basis, transfer foreign exchange
to a same individual or institute.
3. Individual withdraws the amount of foreign exchange through five different
times within 7 days from the same bank account in the mainland, and the total
of the withdraw equal to or close to 10,000 dollars. Alternatively, five or more

526

The 2009 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the

Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale (国家外汇管
理局关于进一步完善个人结售汇业务管理的通知). Available at:
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DDX7qaY8GUsJ:rmyh.zunyi.gov.cn/jr
fg/201507/W020150717721146845444.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
527
The 2009 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the
Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale (国家外汇管
理局关于进一步完善个人结售汇业务管理的通知). Available at:
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DDX7qaY8GUsJ:rmyh.zunyi.gov.cn/jr
fg/201507/W020150717721146845444.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
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individual purchase foreign exchange about 5000 dollars within the same day
from the same bank.
4. One individual transfers funds from the bank account to five or more direct
relatives. Such relatives would then purchase and transfer foreign exchange to
such individual within the same year.

If the buyer of the foreign exchange or recipient of the foreign exchange meets any of
the conditions listed above, the bank would require the customer provides details
documents and papers showing the purpose of foreign exchange.528

Chinese individuals have been prohibited from purchasing investment
instruments or foreign property, such as real estate, stocks or insurance. A large amount
of foreign exchange control concerned capital account regulations. The punishments
normally including a 2-year ban from buying foreign exchange, 30% penalty on the
amount of foreign exchange involved in the transaction. 529 The market was not
impressed by these new measures, as one buyer told the news media “any transaction
below 10 million dollars” would not be substantially prevented by these measures.
Reasons for individual buyers’ need for foreign exchange includes investment,

528

BBC, “Yingmei: renminbi guojihua-dachao huilu,” (英媒：人民币国际化——大潮回落)

[British media: Yuan Internationalization—the Up and Downs ] BBC Zhongwen, December 12,
2016, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/press-review-38287689.
529

Gabriel Wildau, Liu xinyu, Zhangqi, “中国人不在意购汇新规 ,” [Chinese ignoring New

Foreign Exchange Measures] FT China, January 4, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001070844.
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education, and traveling. For example, some individual buyer may wish to purchase
foreign assets as a form of long-term investment when Chinese market is less profitable.
530

In order to further managing the negative impact and reduce the risk of the
inflow and outflow of the foreign exchange, the SAFE issued 2016 Notice of the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the Administration of the
Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale [hereinafter 2016 Notice]
with new countermeasures.531 According to the 2016 Notice, individual foreign
exchange business such as settlement and purchases of foreign exchange must be
handled through “individual foreign exchange business monitoring system” by the
qualified banks. 532 Such bank must forward full and accurate transaction information to
authority promptly. Any irregular transactions suspected of foreign exchange quota
evasion would trigger a “watch list” warning.533 The bank would issue a “Risk Reminder

530
531

Ibid.
2016 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the

Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale (国家外汇管
理局关于进一步完善个人结售汇业务管理的通知), December 31， 2015 adopted by SAFE,
accessed July 31,
http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gPZxdnX293
QwN_f0tXA08zR9PgYGd3Yx8fE_2CbEdFAM9sw9Y!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/conn
ect/safe_web_store/state+administration+of+foreign+exchange/rules+and+regulations/19f518
804b4b7d33b1abf5196274af30
532
Art.1 2016 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the
Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale.
533
Foreign exchange authorities will issue the Risk Reminder Notification for Individual Foreign
Exchange Business as a risk reminder to individuals who lend their quota to another individual
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Notification” as a warning for the first time. When it happened again, the recipient of
the notice will be placed on a “watch list.”534 The foreign exchange buyer (individual)
would be required to present identification card and other papers showing the
legitimate reason for buying foreign exchange for three consecutive years. 535

Figure 10. Forms of foreign exchange quota evasion.

Conspiracy with relatives and friends
o When one individual's foreign exchange quota used up, the buyer can borrow
quota from friends or relatives.

HK bank account
o Chinese buyer opens HK bank account with RMB then obtain foreign exchange
through HK bank.

FIE
o A foreign FIE obtains foreign exchange from overseas, then privately sell sthe
foreign exchange to Chinese buyer.

Virtual currency
o Foreign exchange buyer uses RMB purchase virtual currency, such as Bitcoin.
Bitcoin will be the intermediary to obtain foreign exchange.

for the evasion of quota and authenticity management. If this happens again, these individuals
will be put on a watch list by foreign exchange authorities. See 1 (1) 2016 Notice.
534
Foreign exchange authorities will put individuals who borrow another individual's quota for
the evasion of quota and authenticity management on a watch list and notify them through the
Notification on Watch List for Individual Foreign Exchange Business issued by banks. See 1(2)
2016 Notice.
535
“The watch period of an individual on a watch list is the year the individual is put on the
watch list and the two consecutive years that follow. During this period, the individual has to
present his/her valid ID card and evidencing materials indicating the trading amount to go
through procedures for settlement and sales of foreign exchange for individuals. Banks shall
review relevant evidencing materials in strict accordance with the authenticity review
principles.” See 1 (3) 2016 Notice.
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The World Bank 2002 studies showed the scale of China’s round tripping investment could be as
high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows into PRC, Geng Xiao’s study later indicated the
percentage might be higher with a range of 30%-50%.536

The above chart lists four most common forms of foreign exchange evasions.
Although an individual is restricted for only $50,000 annual foreign exchange quota,
such individual can conspire with his or her friends and families by ‘borrowing’ their
quotas. The HK bank account scheme requires gray financial institute. HK Bank
regulation restrict the applicant of bank account to HK resident. Thus, a local
underground Institute would open a bank account in China to accept RMB cash. Such
Institute would then transfer equivalent dollars to Chinese individual’s mainland bank
account. The third method involves a FIE selling foreign exchange to the individual. The
last scheme requires individual to turn one commodity into currency. As many reports
indicate, the skyrocketing of virtual currency value relates to China’s foreign exchange
control. 537

Disregard the effectiveness of these measures; it already produced undesired
negative effects on China’s investment market. The first victim of these actions was
China’s FDI market and economy. The latest data shows, “foreign direct investment

536

"Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s Round-Tripping: FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications
(Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, 2004), accessed July 31, 2017,
http://hdl.handle.net/11540/3595.
537
Gabriel Wildau,“Chinese regulators have taken steps to ensure bitcoin is not used to facilitate
capital flight, even as investors in the cryptocurrency say they doubt it is being used to transfer
large amounts of cash out of China.” Financial Times, January 10, 2017,
https://www.ft.com/content/bad16a88-d6fd-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.
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(FDI) into the Chinese mainland dropped 1.2 percent year on year in the first seven
months to 485.42 billion yuan ($72.79 billion), In the first seven months, 17,703 new
foreign-funded companies were established, up 12 percent year on year.” 538 “ Nonfinancial outbound direct investment (ODI) by Chinese companies dropped 44.3 percent
year on year in the first seven months to $57.2 billion, mainly due to government
measures to curb irrational investment. Outbound investment in real estate, culture,
sports, and entertainment sectors saw substantial declines during the period, the
ministry said.” 539

In fact, China’s countermeasures against capital outflow presented a selffulfilling quagmire. The stronger the reaction by the authority, the weaker Chinese
economy perceived from the outside. These measures have been sending wrong signals
about the Chinese market, which might defeat investors’ interest and confidence. In
return, the decline in investors might cause politicians to take more extreme measures.
Thus, it has become a self-fulfilling nightmare: the market fluctuation causes political
intervention, the intervention sends a wrong signal about the market, which causes the
decline of investment. The decline of investment would justify more interventions by
the government. More importantly, these measures suggest a form of thinking that the
freedom of contract or freedom of the will belong to a “superior group” in the power
structure. The superior group must maintain the order and law by restricting the

538

Xinhua, “China FDI falls 1.2%, ODI down 44.3%,” August 16, 2017,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-08/16/content_30672704.htm.
539
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“freedom of the contract “because such freedom cannot produce desired outcomes
that defined by such group.

Figure 11. The paradox of China’s foreign exchange control.

Yuan Independency
(internationalization)

No Yuan
Internatioanlization

Free flow of capital

foreign exchange
control

imbalance in payment
of balance

Chapter 3 explained Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) policy paradox: the more
preferential policy for SOE sector, the poorer the performance. The poor performance
requires more policy supports, which lead to a self-fulling loop. The same paradox
applies to China’s foreign exchange control. China’s obsession with the payment of
balance put great pressure on China’s currency policy. This means China have to rely on
the value of dollars by anchoring the value of Yuan on dollars. The only solution for
China’s currency independence requires Yuan’s Internationalization. This means China
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needs to promote an open and robust market with free flow of the capitals. The free
flow of the capitals would result in capital outflow, which led to the beginning of the
loop that requires payment of balance.

The short-term solution to foreign exchange control might create more
problems than solutions in this self-fulfilling quagmire. Although the authority has
legitimate interest and obligation in maintaining a sustainable and balanced investment
environment without illegal and unethical transactions, the reactions by the authority to
the outflow capital created a self-fulfilling prophecy of the unstable economy without
properly addressing the true motivations caused the capital flight. In response to the
outflow of capital, the authority enforced stricter rules to pressure the investors and
banks. For example, in order to prevent outflow of capital, Chinese authority restricted
China’s outbound investment, offshore financing, and payment of trade by foreign
investors.540

540

For example, “In other words, balance wasn't achieved by increasing exports or investment
into China, but rather by preventing Chinese from buying from and investing in the rest of the
world. Some of the government's restrictions on currency-exchange transactions-- such as
cracking down on fake trade data and overpayments for imports -- were justified and sensible.
But others were more dubious and have led to significant distortions.”
“Last week, the government added yet another restriction. It announced that all international
capital-account transactions of more than $5 million will need to be approved by the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange. This has businesses deeply concerned, given that the
administration likely doesn't have the manpower for the sheer number of transactions it will
need to review. And if such restrictions can be placed on the capital account, it seems only a
matter of time until they're imposed on goods and services transactions.” see Christopher
Balding, “China Finally Halts Outflows. Now What?” Bloomberg, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-10/china-finally-stems-capital-outflowsnow-what.
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The outflow of capital is a sensitive issue for Chinese policymaker due to
economic and political reasons. A free movement of capital is a sign of modern
economic power because it shows confident of a robust and healthy investment market.
China’s uncomfortable position with the outflow of the capital shows the gap between
China and world-class capital institutions. However, China does have a legitimate
interest in maintaining a stable and ordered economy. The economic and political
implication of the outflow of capital makes this task harder than it sounds. There are
sufficient economic reasons to support China's concern for outflow of capital. This
negative impact can be explained by the following: when an investor sold his or her
RMB to the bank in exchange for dollars in cash, the bank would have fewer dollars and
more RMB in cash. A large wave of outflow would result in a substantial loss of dollars in
foreign exchange reserve and a large increase in RMB cash. There would be two
undesired consequences result from this scenario. First, devaluation of RMB and
revaluation of dollars. This happens because a large loss of dollars and sudden increase
in RMB cash would force the bank to pay more RMB to purchase dollars to satisfy
market demands. Second, sudden domestic inflation. Sudden surplus of RMB supply
would cause inflation in the domestic market, which further destabilizes the market.
Under the conventional theory, a sudden devaluation of RMB would be beneficial to
China’s export-oriented economy. However, this theory has its limits. The power of
export industry reached to its limits since China became the world factory. The benefit
of a sudden RMB devaluation is marginal to China’s export and national economy. In
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addition, the increase in foreign trade could not mitigate the loss results from increasing
domestic production cost. On the contrary, a sudden RMB devaluation has an adverse
effect on the internationalization of Chinese currency. Also, it produces negative
publicity for Chinese investment market.

Chinese authority concerned the political implication of the outflow of the
capital. Although the outflow of capital can be explained by profit-seeking behavior
under most market economy without strong reactions by the authorities, Chinese
authority has always been extremely sensitive to market fluctuation. Political rhetoric
normally portraits financial fluctuations as war, crisis or enemy. On the one hand,
investment and economy are about people, about creating the best possible conditions
for prosperity and greater goods. The authority has a legitimate interest in maintaining
an ordered economy. Since the Reform and Open up, the principle of economic growth
and modernization had been contextualized by the Party and the State Constitution.
Economic data, such as the inflow and outflow of the investment are the benchmark to
evaluate the career path of a politician, and a basis for a new policy to policy makers.
The outflow of the capital paints a bad image of Chinese economy . It signified a weak
and declined economy, which raised concerns by many savvy politicians. Thus, a
politician not only has an ideological interest in preventing outflow of capital but also a
personal interest in preventing outflow of the capital.
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The outflow of the capital also produces another legal and ethical issue for
Chinese policy makers. It is interesting that China’s sudden restrictions over foreign
exchange regulation aligned with the launch of China’s Anti-Corruption campaign and
expansion of outflow of the capital.541 In fact, money laundry or transfer of illegal funds
by corrupt officials might also contribute to China’s sudden outflow of the capital. For
example, 200 million RMB, the equivalent of 31 million dollars, in cash was discovered
by prosecutors from one of the residents of “Wei Pengyuan, a former deputy director of
the coal department at the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s
economic planning agency.”542 The news report suggested that “anti-corruption
campaign may also be spurring a growing number of wealthy Chinese to send their
money out of the country – accelerating capital outflows at a time when concerns about
weaker growth are also making the Chinese currency less attractive.”543

541

It is formally understood by the outsider that China’s anti-corruption campaign started since
the 18th National Congress of CPC in 2012. The most high profile case was the case of Bo xilai,
the former Chongqing Party Chief. Buckley, Chris, "China’s Antigraft Push Snares an Ex-General".
The New York Times, June 30, 2014, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/world/asia/china-moves-against-one-of-its-topleaders.html.
542
“The money is the largest amount prosecutors have retrieved in cash from a corrupt official
in a single operation since the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, state media
reported.” Henny Sender, “China’s anti-corruption push may drive wealthy overseass,” Financial
Times, November 11, 2014, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/cb9308f26983-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0. Also see , “Xi Jingping's Power-play Leaves Chinese economy
Exposed,” Forbes, January 17, 2015, accessed July 22, 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellingenheld/2015/02/17/xi-jingpings-power-pla.
543
For example: “Today, private bankers in Hong Kong are offering mainland clients a panoply of
investment choices abroad that have the added attraction of qualifying the buyer for a foreign
passport. Henny Sender One prominent lawyer who used to specialize in corporate mergers and
acquisitions now helps groups of wealthy Chinese acquire real estate in the US. Such
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b. Corruption
“China’s ranking on Transparency International’s (TI) 2016 Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) continues to improve, moving up four places to 79.”544 “The CPI was initially
introduced in 1995 as a composite indicator used to measure perceptions of corruption
in the public sector in countries around the world. Since then, it has been used as an
important gauge of companies in managing corruption risks when conducting
businesses in foreign countries.”545 “Scholars and experts stressed that, the anticorruption measures should be founded on the basis of respecting human nature and
protecting human rights, correcting the traditional anti-corruption views that
"emphasize attacks and ignore protection" and "emphasize punishing decadent acts and
ignore human rights protection", and correcting acts that are carried out under the
influence of the traditional views.”546 According to findings of a survey conducted by the
Central Discipline Inspection Commission, “people were least satisfied with the anticorruption work in 1996, with only 32.8 per cent of the interviewees saying they were

transactions do not attract as much scrutiny and often come with residency rights for the buyers
and their families.” Ibid.
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Mini vandePol, Simon Hui and Vivian Wu, “China Climbs Four Places in Transparency
International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index,” January 27, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017,
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Jen Hui, “Hong Kong paper views China's new anti-corruption measures,” BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific February 15, 2006, https://search-proquestcom.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/docview/460660636/fulltext/F3BC85B4E9384327PQ/1?accounti
d=13158.
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satisfied. The rate only reached beyond 50 percent for the first time in 2003 when 51.9
per cent of the interviewees expressed satisfaction.” 547

More critically, Chinese state-owned business sector creates a risk of corruption
by blurring the line between official corruption and business corruption. Senior
managers in SOE are also appointed government officials. These officials move back and
forth between the government and SOE sector with both business and political
positions. Thus, the conflict of interest became quite prevalent in China’s commercial
system. Critics of China, for example, Pan Wei asserted that “there is rampant
corruption in China that stems from the ‘the contradiction between China’s newly
installed market system and the Party-State's unchecked power...decentralization has
led to the feudalization of administrative power, and power monopoly of the Party has
become the personal power monopoly of each chief administrators... 548

The issue of corruption is nothing new during the recent years, in fact, it already
widespread at the beginning of the 21st century. Various forms of bribes by FIEs:549
1. Direct bribe in the form of refunds, rebates, or inflated “referral fees,”
“commissions.”

547

Ibid.
John Garrick, “Theorizing China’s Legal Reform," in Law, Wealth and Power in China:
Commercial Law Reforms in Context (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010),6.
549
Andrew Wedeman,“The Dark Side of Business with Chinese Characteristics,” Social Research
80, No. 4 (2013):1225, 1213-1236, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385657.
548
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2. Bribery through Intermediaries
3. An inducement in the form of pre-sale/ post-sale traveling expenses and cash
allowance.
The main purpose of the bribes:
1. Bending the rules or obtaining special treatments by the administrators
2. Obtain administration’s supports for statutory rights guaranteed by laws
3. Winning government contract with an inflated price
4. Conspired with government official to push competitor out of business

For example, one corporate executive from a U.S. WFOE explained in a 2002
interview that because the main business for his company is to sell products to SOEs or
government through government procurement, he needed to maintain “close
relationship” with staffs and procurement officers. The WFOE would devise special
training sessions to display technics of building a relationship with local officials.
Normally, such relationship involved conferring monetary interest or gift to those
officials. Clearly, since the increasing exposure of corruption and criminal prosecution,
later FIEs already abandoned that early practice by hiring PR firms to manage such
relationships. 550 One corporate executive explained that senior officials, as well as his
subordinates and staff members in the target department, needed to be taken care of in

550

Shen Yaxin, “ Zenyang yu guojia gongwuyuan goutong waiqi zongjian tan xinghui jiqiao,” (怎

样与国家公务员“沟通”——外企总监谈行贿技巧) [ How to Communicate with the
government employee--FIE executive gave about bribe tips],” September 13, 2002, see
http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200209130153.htm.
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the process. When each offeror provided special private financial incentives to the
targeted official and his staff members, you have to go after such official’s superior or
family members of an influential politician to pressure the target.551
Foreign investment verification and approval process have been one of the most
criticized areas for lacking transparency and accountability. Foreign investors, while
attracted to China's booming economy and huge consumer market, “have found it
difficult to seal deals, in part because of government intervention.”552For example, The
process of establishing FIEs, M&A, Shareholding investment must be approved by MOC,
particularly reviewed by Department of Foreign Investment and Department of Treaty
and Law. This process also triggers other compliance requirement involved with SAFE,
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For example, “in addition to direct bribes, some foreign companies relied on an indirect
technique wherein they bribed engineers and planners to draw up plans that would ensure the
purchase of the company's products. Beginning in 2003, for example, Rockwell Automation
Power Systems (Shanghai), a subsidiary of Rockwell Automation, a Milwaukee-based maker of
industrial automation products used in coal mines, gave $615,000 (¥3.03 million) to employees
of state-owned design institutes and paid $450,000 (¥3.60 million) for sightseeing trips During
2002-5, employees of Avery China, a subsidiary of California-based Avery Dennison, hired a
former employee of the Wuxi-based Traffic Management Research Institute whose wife still
worked for the institute. They conspired to award Avery China a contract worth $677,494 (¥5.43
million) to provide reflective materi als for 15,000 police cars. The contract, from which Avery
would have earned profits of over $360,000 (¥2.88 million), included a 3 percent margin of
$41,000 (¥328,000) that Avery China would kick back in the form of a "consulting fee."
Sometime, these companies offered "inducements in the form of tourist junkets. UTStarcom, a
California-based telecommunications manufacturer, spent $7 million (¥56 million) on trips to
the United States for 235 employees of firms that bought its equipment. UTStarcom not only
paid for the trips, which included stops in popular tourist destinations, but also gave travelers an
$800 to $3,000 (¥6,400 and ¥24,000) cash allowance (US SEC 2009c).” Ibid. Also see Andrew
Wedeman,“The Dark Side of Business with Chinese Characteristics,” Social Research 80, No. 4
(2013):1225, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385657.
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accessed July 31, 2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-foreigninvestment-approvalsidUSTRE49U3I120081031.
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CSRC, National Development, and Reform Commission (NDRC), State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This time-consuming process
would create rent-seeking behavior, such as a bribe.

“Guo Jingyi, a former high-ranking inspector of the treaty and law department of
the Ministry of Commerce, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve for
accepting 8.45 million yuan ($1.24 million) in bribes.”553 According to the procuratorate,
“from 2004 to 2007 Guo accepted bribes twice, totaling 1.1 million yuan, from home
appliance giant Gome Group to help it transfer equity and pass an anti-monopoly
inspection.”554 Huang Guangyu, former chairman of Gome Group and once China's
richest man, was sentenced to 14 years in jail for illegal business dealings, insider
trading, and corporate bribery.

In Guo’s case, he was the “director-general of the treaty and law department at
the commerce ministry is responsible for interpreting China's foreign investment rules,
making his role particularly important when a deal is considered sensitive to China.
Deng, deputy head of the foreign investment division at the ministry, is responsible for
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August: MOC official Guo jingyi was under Shuanggui investigation, and attorney Zhang
yudong and Liu Yang was under criminal investigation, September: MOC Official Deng zhan was
under investigation, October: MOC Official Du baozhong was under arrest, and SAIC official Liu
wei was under arrest. See, Wang Jingqiong, “High-ranking inspector convicted,” China Daily,
May 21, 2010, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201005/21/content_9875015.htm.
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issuing approvals and licenses to foreign investors and often works with Guo to review
deals. Foreign investors must seek approval from the commerce ministry for any deal
valued at over $50 million when it involves investment in a sector that Beijing defines as
a restricted industry.555 “For a deal valued at more than $100 million in an area where
the government encourages foreign investment, commerce ministry approval is also
required. The case has attracted growing concern among China-focused foreign
investors, including big multinational corporations and global private equity firms fearful
that the probe will lead to a crackdown on planned deals.” 556 Guo, Zhang, Du, and Deng
conspired together to pressure foreign investors provide special interests to them.557 In
Guo Jingyi’s case, FIE would hire lawyers from a law firm run by Guo’s co-conspirator,
Zhang, to lobby Guo’s office. The law firm would serve as an intermediary to
communicate with Guo and foreign investors. Through such intermediary, FIEs would
pay inflated “consulting fee” to the targeted official. In this case, Guo conspired with
Deng and Du by taking advantage of their authority and position to make sure FIE’s
application would pass the administrative screening process. Guo’s experience in
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legislation, policymaking, and rule interpretation helped him taking advantages of the
loophole in the existed rules and regulations.

Figure 12. Guo Jingyi Corruption ring explained.

MOC Department
of Treaty and Law

MOC Department
of Foreign
Investment

Bureau for
Registration of
Foreign-Invested
Enterprises

Law firms

Corruption wing
●

Guo Jingyi: Inspector of MOC Department of Treaty and Law

●

Zhang Yudong and Liu Yang: lawyers work for FIEs

●

Deng Zhan: Deputy Director-General of MOC Department of Foreign Investment

●

Du Baozhong: Director of the Administrative Law Office of MOC Department of Treaty
and Law.

●

Liu Wei: Deputy Director of Foreign Investment Registration of SAIC

Caijing news commented that the case of Guo suggested a pattern of regulatory
prejudice and twist: the enforcement of law alienated from the central authority's policy
of promoting law and order to attract high-quality FDI. By arbitrarily blank ban on all
forms of investment with strict rules in hope to protect domestic industry, the
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administration of the law created a strong demand for rent-seeking. The fact that
officials selectively lift the “ban” in exchange for personal favor reminiscent to the time
when black foreign exchange market supplement the market demands during the 1980s
and early 1990s.

The booming of offshore financing has produced tremendous pressure on
China’s policymakers due to its undesired political implication. First, it facilitates a
narrative of the undesired domestic investment market, an aversion to modernization
and political commitment to fostering economic growth. To further legitimize those
investment restrictions or defend those limitations, Chinese investors need to be
perceived as a destructive force of the market, which is the classic thinking reminiscent
China’s central command era. The problem of China’s offshore financing presents a
perfect case for China’s financial market reform. Most importantly it presents an
imminent question, whether the past three decades reform designed to build “a society
based on economic power and rights or societies developed on politico-social relations
with economic power reinforce institutions expand their control and favor development
advance their power and rights.558”

Second, China’s foreign exchange control for the past few years seems anti
thematic. On the one hand, the 2004 Constitution Amendment and Three

558

Benedict Sheehy, “Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law 26,” Northwestern J. of
Int’ Law & Bus’ no. 225 (2006): 235.
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Representative Theory suggested bourgeois’ interest will be represented by CPC. On the
other hands, recent counter capital outflow measures seem to part away from the
interest of those savvy investors and business person. The new economic policy appears
to facilitate a narrower scope of real economy excluding significant capital player. In
addition, these restrictions increase the risk of corruption by forcing the market to seek
politicians for favors.

When political rhetoric paints China as a new super star on the world stage with
glorified economic data, these regulations and rules are the sober reminders of China's
challenges and potential. These regulations suggest Chinese authority’s frustration with
the globalization, more importantly, they indicate a lack of confidence in the global
market in providing a stable long-term growth through a mechanism controlled or
managed by the central authority. Also, these regulations illustrate the incompatibility
between China's economic power and inadequate market mechanism.

Third, globalization is the winner for the past decade's development in China.
These “walls” created by Chinese authority not only failed to protect and facilitate
meaningful SOE development as they were intended to but also alienated Chinese
investors from the domestic PE (private equity) market in an unexpected manner. As a
consequence, the mechanism designed to protect China’s SOE through the
discriminatory regulations and policies dominated by protective thinking ultimately
created an undesired domestic environment that pushes creative investors into the arm
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of offshore financing market. This issue mirrored to China’s two-track foreign exchange
policy in the 1980s. As a result, it created more problem than it resolved.

5. Opportunity of the FDI framework
With the growing popularity of corporate pyramid scheme, offshore corporate
vehicle, gray banking and fraudulent trade invoice scheme, traditional mechanism of
anti-corruptions, anti-money laundry and anti-tax evasion by the sovereign state
suffered from challenges induced by creative minds to conceal their identity and assets
in a decentralized global economy. However, there are also exciting new opportunities
for the regulatory authority when the decentralized economy itself offering new
perspective and approaches to the regulatory issue by creating new conceptual and
implementing framework that could be applied for the public good.

This part of the discussions exclusively focuses on mechanisms adopted by
foreign jurisdictions and Chinese authority in fighting against illegal financial activities
for a transparent and robust investment environment. In addition, it considers China’s
“wechat economy,” which provides a new and smart approach to China’s FDI regulatory
challenges. First, the section would outline the public disclosure mechanism adopted by
sovereign state and international law. Then it will provide an in-depth analysis of China’s
new wechat economy to illustrate the future of soft regulation.
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a. New international legal framework on public disclosure
i.
OECD Beneficial Owner
In November 2014, G20 Summit in Brisbane adopted “High-Level Principles on
Beneficial Ownership and Transparency.” 559 The Principales, which builds on existing
international instruments and standards, encourage countries
(1) to have a definition of “beneficial owner” that captures the natural person(s)
who ultimately owns or controls the legal person or legal arrangement,
(2) to ensure that beneficial ownership and control information is adequate,
accurate, current and accessible, and
(3) to have a legal framework that enables national authorities (including law
enforcement and prosecutorial authorities, supervisory authorities, tax
authorities and financial intelligence units) to participate in information
exchange on beneficial ownership both domestically and internationally.560

“High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership and Transparency” is only the
first step of establishing next generation of a global regulatory framework designed to
enhance the transparency and reduce the market risk and illegal activities for crossbroader investment. OECD defined beneficial owner as, “a natural person who is
ultimately entitled to the benefits accruing from the beneficial ownership of the
securities, and/or has power to exercise controlling influence over the voting rights

559

Erik Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control in Listed Companies in Asia,
OECD, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-BeneficialOwnership.pdf.
560
Ibid.
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attached to the shares (even if another person holds the legal title) of an entity, or as
the ultimate beneficial owner of an organization.” 561

As OECD research shows, each jurisdiction has different regulations. HK law
adopted the concept of the substantial shareholder, which is also a BO under OECD
definition, is required to notify the company of his interests and subsequently any
change in his interests. The Chinese law referred BO as “actual controller.” Under
Chinese law, “persons who have an interest in 5% or more of the voting shares of a
listed company; and directors and chief executives who have an interest in any shares of
a listed company are required to comply with public disclosure. 562 Offshore corporate
vehicles and pyramid structures are common methods for investors who intend to
conceal the identity. 563 Chinese law requires disclosure of the ultimate layer for the BO.
However, the regulatory framework is not equipped well to prevent these activities.564

561

“Although it is usually argued that a beneficial owner is always a natural person, it must be
noted that a legal person can also be the ultimate owner if the ultimate beneficial owner is the
State or a state-owned entity.” See Erik Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and
Control in Listed Companies in Asia, OECD, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-Beneficial-Ownership.pdf.
562
China require disclosure of ultimate BO See, Ibid.
563
For example, “The natural person, the state-owned asset management department, or the
other institution that could be considered as the ultimate controlling shareholder must be
disclosed. If the ultimate controlling shareholder(s) cannot be determined, the ultimate
beneficial owners who own more than 5% must be disclosed.” Ibid.
564
For example, “Most jurisdictions distinguish between “de jure” and “de facto” beneficial
ownership.
Because it is the rule rather than the exception to look at de facto beneficial ownership in
addition to de jure beneficial ownership, a pertinent issue is the content of such de facto
ownership. In general language, applying such a concept will result in shares held under
the name of third parties also being counted under the control of the beneficial owner.” Ibid.
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Table 9. Disclosure requirement for investors under different jurisdictions.
China

HK

Malaysia

Disclosure
requirement

disclosure is required
from persons who
have
an interest in 5% or
more of the voting
shares of a listed
company; and
directors and chief
executives who have
an interest in any
shares of a listed
company.

No express
requirement for
update info unless
substantial
shareholder

No express requirement
for update info unless
substantial shareholder

BO definition

NA

Proposed for
amendment

ultimate owner and is
entitled to all
rights, benefits, powers
and privileges and
subject to all liabilities,
duties, and obligations
, and does not include a
nominee of
any description.

Substantial
shareholder

10% threshold of
10% threshold
entire equity securities
of an issuer

10% threshold

Source of information and data: see OECD Report on Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership
and Control in Listed Companies in Asia565

565

Erik Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control in Listed Companies in Asia,
OECD, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-BeneficialOwnership.pdf.
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ii.
UK Practice and US Practice
The United Kingdom adopted a similar mechanism of requiring public disclosure
for “Person of Significant Control” (PSC) through the 2015 amendment to Company
Act.566 Under this new amendment, PSC must make information available to the public
by April 6, 2016. Failure of disclosure would result in a criminal offense, which may
result in fines or imprisonment. In addition, the relevant transaction would be void
under this new mechanism.567 Two types of business entities are excluded from
disclosure. First, this new public disclosure ruled out companies that subject to Chapter
5 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules ("DTR 5"),
which reserved for public traded companies. 568 Second, limited partnership is excluded
from disclosure because it does not have a separate legal personality “Individuals who
are limited partners will not be registrable themselves under any of the first three PSC

566

For example, “Changes to the Companies Act 2006 as a result of the Small Business,
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 are intended to increase transparency over the ownership
and control of UK companies and LLPs from 6 April 2016. They see the UK lead the way on
implementation of the EU Fourth Money Laundering Directive.” See, Marcus Booth, Veronica
Carson, “People with Significant Control: Implications of New Regime for Corporates,” March 14,
2016, accessed July 30, 2017, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/peoplesignificant-control-implications-new-regime-corporates.
567
“Companies and directors who fail to comply will commit an offence (punishable by
imprisonment or fine). If a registrable person fails to comply with the disclosure obligations, the
company can serve a warning notice that it intends to follow-up with a restrictions notice. A
restrictions notice can be served one month later if the original notice has still not been
complied with. This means that any transfers of those shares are void, no rights may be
exercised in respect of them and the company may not pay any sums due on them except in a
liquidation.” See White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with Significant Control for
Sponsor controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-bd235fa87d58.
568
Shepherd and Wedderburn LLP “Are you ready for changes to the PSC regime?” LEXOLOGY
June 16, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=78d3b2d4-278a-4bf4-8fe9-c320f9a08627.
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conditions solely by virtue of being a limited partner in a limited partnership with an
interest in a company, as long as they do not participate in management of the
partnership business and there is no separate basis of SIOC.”569The amendment defined
the SPC as any individual, legal entity or government or government departments meet
any of these conditions:
1. holding, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares in the company;
2. holding, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting rights;
3. holding the right, directly or indirectly, to appoint or remove a majority of the
board;
4. having the right to exercise, or actually exercising, significant influence or control
over the company ("SIOC");
5. being an individual, which has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, SIOC
over a trust or firm which itself satisfies at least one of the above conditions. 570
The required disclosure includes information such as name, country of residence,
nationality, and date of birth for an individual. For legal entities, it contains information

569

“However, the general partner will usually be a PSC and, depending on the legal form and
structure, either the general partner and/or individuals or RLEs behind the general partner who
are PSCs will usually be registrable.” White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with
Significant Control for Sponsor controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July
31, 2017, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8abd235fa87d58.
570
Shepherd and Wedderburn LLP “Are you ready for changes to the PSC regime?” LEXOLOGY
June 16, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=78d3b2d4-278a-4bf4-8fe9-c320f9a08627.
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such as the name of the entity, registered office, legal form and law under which it was
formed. 571

Align with the SPC mechanism; the amendment also proposed the concept
"significant influence or control" (SIOC). The purpose of the SIOC was to create catch-all
conditions that designed to prevent some creative ways to circumvent SPC regulation.
For example, this included:
● “such as adopting or amending the business plan, changing the nature of the
business or making additional borrowing from lenders.
● However, veto rights for the purpose of protecting a minority interest are
unlikely alone to be so. "Absolute" for this purpose means a person has the
ability to make or veto a decision without referring to or collaborating with
anyone else.” 572
It is noted that the determination of SIOC would be a case by case situation based on
many factors.573

571

White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with Significant Control for Sponsor
controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-bd235fa87d58.
572
Ibid.
573
White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with Significant Control for Sponsor
controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-bd235fa87d58.
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The U.S. security regulation adopted a different definition on BO, under CFR Title 17
Commodity and Securities Exchanges Determination of Beneficial Owner, the BO was
defined as: 574
(a) For the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act a beneficial owner of a
security includes any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract,
arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares:
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of,
such security; and/or,
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the
disposition of, such security.
(b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, creates or uses a trust, proxy, power of
attorney, pooling arrangement or any other contract, arrangement, or device
with the purpose or effect of divesting such person of beneficial ownership of a
security or preventing the vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a plan
or scheme to evade the reporting requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the Act
shall be deemed for purposes of such sections to be the beneficial owner of such
security.
(c) All securities of the same class beneficially owned by a person, regardless of

574

17 CFR 240.13d-3, accessed July 30, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13d-

3.
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the form which such beneficial ownership takes, shall be aggregated in
calculating the number of shares beneficially owned by such person.575

iii.

HK FSTB Proposal

Recently Hong Kong’s Financial Services and Treasury Bureau (FSTB) issued a
consultation document on amending the Companies Ordinance law, which concerning
the disclosure of BO with Hong Kong Companies Registrars. 576 Unlike the UK Company
Law 2016 amendment excluded limited partnership, this proposal included those
limited by shares, by guarantee, and unlimited companies. 577 The proposal adopted a
similar definition of BO as other western jurisdiction.578 It provided that:

575

17 CFR 240.13d-3, accessed July 30, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13d-

3.
576

Dezan Shira, “Hong Kong Announces Changes to Beneficial Ownership Regime, “ China
Briefing, March 22, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.chinabriefing.com/news/2017/03/22/hong-kong-announces-change-beneficial-ownershipregime.html.
577
Ibid.
578
“The FSTB adopts a similar definition of “beneficial owner” as that proposed by Financial
Action Task Force, an inter-government body developing and promoting policies to combat
money laundering and terrorist financing, and that adopted by the UK, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and
Switzerland. Under the proposed amendments, a beneficial owner in relation to a company is an
individual who meets one or more of the following specified conditions” “Hong Kong Announces
Changes to Beneficial Ownership Regime, “ Also “Hong Kong has been a member of the FATF
since 1991. As the international community strengthens regulation in accordance with the FATF
recommendations, Hong Kong is obliged to implement a credible regime to enhance
transparency of beneficial ownership, so as to safeguard the integrity of our financial markets,
and to ensure that our reputation as an international financial center is reinforced by an open,
trusted and competitive business environment.” See, “Enhancing Anti-Money Laundering
Regulation of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions,” HK Financial Services and
the Treasury Bureau, http://www.cr.gov.hk/en/publications/docs/consult_eaml-e.pdf.
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● Directly or indirectly holding more than 25 percent of the shares;
● Directly or indirectly holding more than 25 percent of the voting rights;
● Directly or indirectly holding the right to appoint or remove a majority of
directors;
● Otherwise having the right to exercise, or actually exercising, significant
influence or control;
● Having the right to exercise, or actually exercising, significant influence or control
over the activities of a trust or a firm that is not a legal person, but whose
trustees alternatively, members satisfy any of the first four conditions (in their
capacity as such) in relation to the company, or would do so if they were
individuals.579
Scholars and legal experts commented that with Hong Kong’s reputation for promoting
world-class financial institution, this new proposal would revolutionize the HK’s
regulatory framework. More importantly, HK’s geographic proximity to Mainland
attracted many offshore shell corporation schemes. This new proposal might be able to
contain a certain level of illegal and unethical investment that abuse HK’s investment
environment.

579

Dezan Shira, “Hong Kong Announces Changes to Beneficial Ownership Regime, “ China
Briefing, March 22, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.chinabriefing.com/news/2017/03/22/hong-kong-announces-change-beneficial-ownershipregime.html.
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iv. China Practice
On December 16, 2015, China became the 77th signature states of OECD
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, MCAA, which support the Common
Reporting Standard, CRS.580 The MCAA mechanism is an international legal framework
designed to curtail global tax invasion and money laundry by enhancing transparency
and the rule of law through public disclosure. The advantage of MCAA is to have
information sharing between tax authorities. The shortcoming of the MCAA framework
linked to its limited information sharing between tax authorities. The new developed BO
information sharing framework would make information available for anti-money
laundry, anti-terrorist, and even anti-corruption operations.
China’s CRS legislation adopted the popular concept of the “actual controller” from the
foreign market. The article 13 provided that:
(1) An individual who, directly or indirectly, holds over 25% of the company's
equities or voting rights;

580

People’s Republic of China became the 77th jurisdiction to sign the Multilateral Competent
Authority Agreement (MCAA), which allows it to move forward with plans to activate automatic
exchange of financial account information in tax matters and commence exchanges with other
countries in 2018. The G20 Leaders have repeatedly stressed their commitment to automatic
exchange of information, most recently at their November meeting in Antalya, Turkey. See,
OECD, “China takes important step to boost international co-operation against tax evasion,”
accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/chinatakesimportantsteptoboostinternationalcooperationagainsttaxevasion.htm.
Also see, OECD, “What is the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement,” accessed July 31,
2017, https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/technicalassistance/aeoi/whatisthemultilateralcompetentauthorityagreement.htm.
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(2) An individual who controls the company via personal or financial arrangements
or other means; or
(3) A senior management person of the company.The controller of a partnership
enterprise shall refer to an individual who owns over 25% of the rights and
interests in the partnership. The controller of a trust shall refer to the settlor,
trustee or beneficiary of the trust or any other individual who exercises ultimate
and efficient control of the trust. The controller of a fund shall refer to a person
who owns over 25% of the equity units of the fund or any other individual who
controls the fund.581

The actual controller framework could be found in the PRC Company Law, SSE
Regulations on Public Listed Shares, SZSE Regulations on Public Listed Share, Measures
for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed Companies. These laws formed the
framework of China’s actual control regulations. It is important to note that the SSE
Regulation does not mention the situation where the person has a substantial impact on
shareholder meeting, In addition, it takes a different approach by recognizing the actual
controller, which is defined as the largest shareholder in the register. Below is the

581

Fei jumin jingrong zhanghu sheshui xinxi jinzhi diaocha guanli banfa (非居民金融账户涉税信

息尽职调查管理办法)Administrative Measures for the Due Diligence Investigation of the Taxrelated Information of Non-resident Financial Accounts, adopted by SAT, MOF, CSRC, CIC and
POB on May 9, 2017.
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detailed description of the statutory language under these rules. 582 Art. 216 of PRC
Company Law provided that:

(3) "actual controller" shall refer to a person who is not a shareholder of a company but
who is able to actually control the acts of the company through investment relations,
agreements or other arrangements; and
(4) "affiliation" shall refer to the relationship between a controlling shareholder, actual
controller, director, supervisor or senior management person of a company with an
enterprise under the direct or indirect control thereof, or any other relationship that
may lead to the transfer of the interests of the company, provided that the enterprises
in which the State is the controlling shareholder are not necessarily affiliated with each
other solely on the ground that the State controls the shares thereof.583

The actual controller does not need to be a shareholder of a company, but it has
to be someone who is able to actually control the acts of the company through
investment relations, agreements or other arrangements.584 The control means the

582

Fei jumin jingrong zhanghu sheshui xinxi jinzhi diaocha guanli banfa (非居民金融账户涉税信

息尽职调查管理办法)Administrative Measures for the Due Diligence Investigation of the Taxrelated Information of Non-resident Financial Accounts, adopted by SAT, MOF, CSRC, CIC and
POB on May 9, 2017.
583
PRC Company Law 2014. Art. 216 (3) ,(4).
584
China Opens Up The Securities Investment Fund Management,
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-opens-up-the-securities-58290/ (accessed August 21,
2017).
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capacity to determine the financial and operational decision for the company for-profit.
Control would be found when at least one of the following conditions are met:
1. The largest shareholder in the register of shareholders,
2. Can direct or indirectly invoke voting rights as the largest shareholder in the
register of the shareholders,
3. The voting rights can determine more than half of the board of the director
member,
4. Other conditions recognized by CSRC.585

Under Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Regulation on Public listed shares, The
actual control means person able to actually control the acts of the company through
investment relations, agreements or other arrangements. The control means the
capacity to determine the financial and operational decision for the company for-profit.
Control would be found when at least one of the following conditions are met:
1. Hold more than 50% of shares of a public traded company,
2. Actual control more than 30% of the voting rights of a public trade company,
3. The voting rights can determine more than half of the board of the director
member,
4. Voting rights can have substantial impact on shareholder meeting,

585

SH Stock Exchange (SSE) Regulation on Public listed Shares, art. 18.1
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5. Other conditions recognized by CSRC. 586

Under CSRC Measures for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed
Companies, Control existed when it met at least one of the following conditions:
1. Hold more than 50% of shares of a public traded company,
2. Actual control more than 30% of the voting rights of a public trade company,
3. The voting rights can determine more than half of the board of the director
member,
4. Voting rights can have substantial impact on shareholder meeting,
5. Other conditions recognized by CSRC. 587

As the above discussion indicates, China’s actual owner regulatory framework is formed
by the PRC Company Law, stock exchanges rules, and stock commissions’ regulations.
This framework is fairly new, which subjects to future adjustment. More importantly, it
established a foundation for China’s investment market by promoting the “public
disclosure” mechanism. Also, the fact that China entered into OECD CSR agreement
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Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyi suo gupiao shangshi guize (深圳证券交易所股票上市规

则)Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Regulation on Public listed shares, adopted by SESZ in 2014.
587

Zhongguo zhengjianhui shangshi gongsi shougou guanli banfa (中国证监会上市公司收购管

理办法)Measures for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed Companies, adopted by CSRC
in 2014.
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suggested China’s interest in continuing reforming China’s regulatory framework and
promoting principles compatible with the global standard.588

b. The future: Wechat Economy
In fact, China’s new economy cultural and transaction pattern has already
emerged and integrated with the globalization: free and open-access without “walls”
created by sovereign states, although not fully displaying its potential yet. This
government-less and self-regulating commerce cultural have been cultivated by the
robust growth of E-commerce economy. A true freedom of contract can be liberated by
this new phenomenon. More importantly, this new structure should be read as a good
sign because it is offering new and creative approaches to China’s regulatory issue. This
can be exemplified by wechat economy. This new structure has the following features:
● Cashless
● Web-based virtual transaction
● Government-less

Wechat is a web-based message application on your cell phone, tablet, and
computer. The power of wechat comes from its add-on social media function and virtual

588

“Chinese financial institutions have started carrying out due diligence on customer’s tax
residency.” See “Time to comply: China implements OECD's financial info exchange”
International Financial Law Review, accessed July 31, 2017,
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3744696/Time-to-comply-China-implements-OECDs-financial-infoexchange.html.
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money transfer function (wechat pay). The social media function creates a memberbased social media platform.589 Users can display their products or service to the public,
but only “friends” can make transaction or transfer of funds (through wechat pay). Any
interested user can contact the seller directly through wechat and finish the transaction
through money transfer function. This modern transaction model demonstrated three
features: 1. Cashless. 2. The virtual transaction, 3. Government-less. First, Under this
model, the transaction of funds are tied up in the bank accounts of the user, which is
regulated by the contract between bank and user, and the contract between bank and
operator of the wechat, and Chinese bank regulations. With the development of ecommerce, China’s cashless transaction increased dramatically.590 Under such
decentralized business structure, users do not need to worry about any regulations or
risk involved with the cash. Business savvy investors would not ignore this, just this
month, Caesars Palace became the first casino in Las Vegas to accept wechat pay.591

589

“WeChat Pay is part of WeChat, a Chinese social media giant that also offers a popular
messaging service similar to Facebook’s Whatsapp and e-commerce. WeChat has 938 million
monthly active user accounts globally while WeChat Pay has 600 million active users.” Todd
Prince, “Caesars launches WeChat Pay for Chinese visitors,” Las Vegas Review,August 8, 2017,
available at:https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/tourism/caesars-launches-wechat-payfor-chinese-visitors/.
590
“In the first quarter alone, smartphone-originated QR code-based payments saw transaction
growth of a staggering 113 percent according to the consulting firm iResearch. That increase
carries a dollar value of about $337 million, and it was split nearly entirely by Alibaba’s Alipay
and WeChat Pay, as the two firms collectively represent 94 percent of the QR code payments
market.” see PYMNTS, “UnionPay’s Cashless Headache,” August 9, 2017, available
at:http://www.pymnts.com/ecosystems/2017/unionpays-payments-market-battle-in-china/ .
591
Caesars Entertainment Corp. this week become the first Strip operator to allow tourists from
the world’s most populous country to pay for goods and services using one of their nation’s
leading mobile payment apps. Todd Prince, “Caesars launches WeChat Pay for Chinese visitors,”
Las Vegas Review,August 8, 2017, available
285

Second, the cost of investing a virtual store or displaying of the commodities is
basically free. The investor does not need to pay for storage space or wechat because
wechat can profit from advertising or data mining. Unlike traditional market, the
investor needs to ensure the inflow of customer to the established business, wechat is a
semi-private social media platform, which means transactions can only occur between
users identify as the circle of “friends.” This inner circle design ensures both the buyer
and seller that transaction occurs at a less casual buy-sale relationship. In addition, it is
beneficial to the investor because the business owner can directly contact with the user
in a more intimate manner.

Third, the wechat transaction model promoted a government-less and selfregulatory commerce structure. In fact, the wechat transaction was the true
embodiment of the globalization: free and open-access without “walls” created by
sovereign government. It revolutionized the foreign investment and trade. A French
vineyard in southern France can open a public account on wechat display fine wine on
such account. Users can either order wine directly through wechat or through an agent
appointed by the vineyard. The cost related to conventional sale network and overseas
branch office could be saved by this new transaction structure.

at:https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/tourism/caesars-launches-wechat-pay-for-chinesevisitors/.
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In fact, the beauty of the new economic model is the pattern of decentralized
business transaction structure without intrusive government involvement. Without a
physical store, there is no need to pay any cost associated with space or business license
or even an accountant for a smaller business. Without a business license, it is harder for
the government to enforce soft regulation through loan qualification or tax incentive.
More importantly, this lucky French vineyard from the above example can enjoy unique
privileges that any foreign investor could ever dream of in the 1980s: there is no foreign
exchange control because the cashless payment will be conducted on Chinese banks
and foreign banks through cashless wechat pay channel. There is no import license or
import quota, or royalty restrictions because the French vineyard is not “officially”
presence in China. The only investment for this French vineyard, maybe a small
“contribution” to China’s e-commerce in the form of agency fees. This truly
revolutionizes the way conduct business for smaller foreign investors.

In addition, this new economic model is self-regulatory in nature. A “friend”
based virtual transaction demonstrated the feature of self-regulation. Since a “friend”
based virtual transaction business relies more on the user experience and customer
satisfaction, it reduced the incentive for an investor or business owner to engage shortterm profiting behavior. For example, a florist can easily lose business under this model
by selling inferior quality products to the customer because “friends” based customers
can spread the words and “block” the seller faster and cheaper than a conventional
business model does.
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Wechat economy liberates freedom of contract for investors and marketplace
participants. The essence of this wechat economy is the new free and open access to
the marketplace. Under the conventional economic structure, the government asserted
regulatory power through physical presence in the marketplace in the form of tax, loan,
ordinance, court and economic policy to manage the relationship between the
participants of the marketplace. Freedom of contract is restrained, maintained and
regulated by the government with different political agenda. Occasionally, political
power can be corrupted and commoditized to satisfy the needs and demands of the
market.

Under this new commerce structure, the business transaction occurred on a
virtual platform. E-commerce provider creates a framework to manage the relationship
between the buyers and sellers in the form of meditation and public disclosure. This
structure established new conceptual and practical framework for us to approach the
idea of “regulation.” The transition from public regulation in the form of legislation and
policy guidance transformed into the private regulation through the vehicle of
“contract.” “Freedom of contract,” the most conventional and basic structure, yet most
powerful tools that managing human relations was given new meaning to China’s new
economic reality.

288

In fact, the freedom of contract is the most democratic and powerful tools that
empower each individual consumer as the guardian of law and order. Unlike individuals
passively accept orders from the centralized authority under a central planning
economy to enforce rules censor behaviors that the leaders dislike, freedom of contract
and “wechat economy” empower each consumer to enforce the basic values and ethics
that promoted by the authority through guidance and inspiration. With proper guidance
and education, the consumer can engage the behavior of self-monitoring and selfregulating. Chinese consumer protest Korean pop-star or Chinese consumer pressure
Apple or KFC are the perfect examples to illustrating this idea.592

In addition, “We chat economy” is not a substitute but a useful supplementary to
China’s regulatory framework. As a Chinese company, Wechat has an obligation to obey
Chinese law and regulations. Although the physical location of Wechat’s users may be
outside China’s jurisdiction, the digital virtual presence of these users and their
behaviors are located in the server of Wechat, which subject to the jurisdiction of
Chinese law. With the free flow of information, wechat not only invite more integrated
communication and business transactions, but also invite Chinese law and regulations
into the global space without Chinese authority to invest a great deal of political and
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diplomatic transaction. Although globalization creates challenges for Chinese regulators,
wechat presents a new venue for the modernization of Chinese regulatory framework.

Thus, Wechat transaction structure offered alternative channels for China’s next
generation of foreign investment regime in the context of Yuan Internationalization and
One Belt One Road. A decentralized transaction pattern not only fits into the narrative
of China’s “go out” policy in the context of socialist modernization but also compatible
with the globalization. The popularity of wechat transaction is not “directed” by the
government or “promoted” by the government, but decided by the collective consumer
power of the Chinese people through the market decisions. It is the triumph of the
“freedom of contract,” an important vehicle to truly realized the core of Deng Xiaoping’s
political legacy: to improve the welfare of the people, to improve the living standard of
the people. Wechat structure represents a new thinking that restored the freedom of
contract by giving the power back to the individual, investor, and the market.

c. New approach to Rule of Law under public disclosure scheme and wechat
economy

As an abstract concept or meaning referring to a form of human activity and
phenomenon, the law has a peculiar relationship with power. Although fallen out of
favor by modern thinkers, the traditionalist natural law view developed since the early
Roman Empire of Cicero day asserted law in society as “part of eternal nature of the

290

universe as organized by the divine.”593 Such view later intrinsically linked to another
source of power, institutionalized Christian religion in the western society. The founding
father of the United States designed a new principle of “separation of church and state”
manifested the need to decouple the link between the law and power that vested
within institutionalized religion in order to form the New Republic without disturbance
and complication from multiple sources of power in the early 19th centuries594.

Discourses about Chinese feudal times indicating the naturalist view of the law in
Chinese culture. The source of law is divine power, which vested within institutionalized
empire political system. The empire, a sign or intermediary connect law and order on
earth with the divine power in heaven. Functionally, the law is taken as a tool to manage
and regulate the subject of the state, which refers to as “rule by law.” Apparently,
comparing with the modern conception of “Rule of Law,” the law in China’s feudal time
manifest the expression of supreme order due to its lack of transparency, clarity,
fairness, and predictability.
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Confucian view of Law has been a hot topic for the academics, Confucian school
craft a philosophical view on the relationship between enforcement of rule or law and
self-regulation motivated by shame, as he provided that:
The Master said if the people be led by fa (rule/ order/ law), and uniformity
sought to be given them by punishment, they will try to avoid the punishment
but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue (li), and uniformity sought to
be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and
moreover will become good. 595

Confucius’ argument provides us a fresh perspective over Rule of Law in a postmodern,
globalized world. It is preferable to have rule or law enforced willingly by an individual
that motivated by their own interest for the utility of virtue than to have rule or law
enforced by an external party. 596 The development of modern legal mechanism such
“disclosure” by business and government entity, the UN Business and Human Rights
Accord, Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund model and China’s social credit initiative all
illustrate new approaches to the meaning of law and justice in regulating rights and
obligations in different forms of human interactions. A traditional approach would
consider divine power, religious institution, or political institution as a source of law,
which requires a mechanism of external enforcement. However, a thousand years ago,
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Confucius would point out that the source of law comes from ourselves, designed by
our nature, our society, the pattern of communication, enforced naturally by our
desires. This law, as he considers as “li” is far superior because it is truly universal and
intricately connected with anyone. In other words, everyone is equal before li, and li is
above everyone.

The superiority of “li” lies on the part of “self-regulation,” which is a powerful
element create a sustainable legitimacy for the rule. An inadequately developed law not
only being perceived as a command that hurting the interest of the subject but also selfdefeating because the legitimacy of the law is unsustainable. By modern design, the law
is not command; the law provides a forum of fairness, openness, and reasonableness
when conventional “li” fails or inadequate to function in a given context. There has been
a strong opinion that Chinese prefer informal and unconventional ‘li’ over law and such
preference might be the basis for China’s lawless society or even lack of interest for the
rule of law. This legal “orientalism” just as its predecessor, “cultural orientalism”
romanized a vision of China and West that may or may not mirror the reality. The
development of the wechat transaction pattern provided one great example of future
generation of the rule of law development in promoting a fair, open and efficient
investment environment.
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Summary: The Evolution of FDI Policy and Law in the Context of China’s
Rule of Law Development

A centralized command economy in its pure condition is naturally accompanied
by a society that lacks basic legal infrastructure, as there is no need for “law” to
adjudicate the dispute; or, one may argue that the “law” was understood differently
under such a system. Theoretically, when all meaningful decisions concerning social
production are made by the central command and its branch offices, it excludes private
entities from engaging in economic activities, which lowers the possibilities of private
disputes involving social production. Essentially, the whole society is incorporated into a
central command system, and the central authority would develop goals and plans for
the whole nation. A complicated and layered bureaucratic system affiliated with
enterprises and trading companies would be installed to enforce, monitor and control
the process of production and transaction. Factories, trade companies, banks, farmers,
and any other economic units are merely the tools to implement central or regional
commands. There is no labor market everyone is assigned to a job based on the plan,
not based on his or her merit or talent. There is no need or incentive for individuals to
create anything since everything is planned. Thus, under a centralized command
economic system, the concept of private disappears when the individual or other entity
is “merged” into a centralized unit. The purpose of the individual is constructed as an
enforcer of the centralized plan.
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In addition, the concept of “law” may also disappear under the centralized
command structure. One of the functions of law is to adjudicate conflict of private
actions based on individual’s freedom of choice. When everything is controlled,
monitored and planned by the authority, there is no space for freedom of choice
because there is no private will. Thus, failure to implement a plan or violation of a plan
by any unit can be easily fixed through plan readjustment.

Essentially, the structure of the command system extended a logic that free will
is inefficient and prone to abuse. The freedom of contract “belongs” to a certain group
in the power structure. The private market “takes” the power from the authority,
disturbs the order and causes trouble. However, the reality is opposite. Although a
central authority can plan the price, the distribution and supply of the resource, and
output, it cannot control and manage the natural needs of the people. The free will of
production can be socialized, but the free will of consumption is harder to control. If we
consider a perfectly functioning central plan as a modern computer, then we would
understand no computer can satisfy a user’s changing demands. Thus, no central plan
system is humanly possible to adapt to the unpredictable free will of demands. The
inherited issue with the planned system was that the central authority’s political agenda
is incoherent and incompatible with the economic needs of the people.

The central authority can manipulate the process of production and sale to
facilitate certain political goals, but it cannot control basic needs for individuals.
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Essentially, the centralized command system is unsustainable because one cannot
socialize the private will of consumption. People’s role as a consumer is incompatible
with people’s role and function as the operator of the planned system.

In a planned system, there is no sufficient institutional capacity to know or an
incentive to know the needs of the people because people are the element to enable
and operate goals set up by the authority, an authority without sensibility to promptly
and efficiently respond to people’s demands. When resources are allocated for central
planning that disregarded the needs and demands of people, shortage occurred. The
chronic shortage under the central command economy system illustrated the failure of
the plan, which triggered more dated plan adjustments.

However, such practices all started to change when China started Reform and
Open up, although much of the FDI regulatory framework in our discussion
demonstrated the strong tendency of central planning. During the 1980s, Chinese EJV
regulatory framework introduced a concept “jingji zhixu” (economic order). Economic
order is the element built on the need for law and order because, for the first time in
the mainland China, there would be free will by the foreign investors to compete with
the state plan. As foreign investors cannot be “commanded” to act as a Chinese entity,
the government needed “law” to regulate and manage the action of free will.
Interestingly, the nature of “economic order” is more complex than it appeared to be.
On the one hand, economic order is a legal concept derived from the needs of the
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government to manage and control the free will of the foreign investors. Violation of the
“economic order” would result in punishments and compensations. On the other hand,
“economic order” is not a conventional legal concept because there is no clear
definition of the essence of “economic order.” The central authority and regional
authority may adopt conflicting plans, or the central authority may change its mind on
certain plans. Thus, there is no consistency, predictability, and coherence of the
“economic order.”

In a market-based system, the market will be the source to reflect the needs and
demands of people, which allows individual actors to make independent decisions in the
transaction. Due to that fact that the consumer has almost no restricted freedom of
contract besides his or her financial capacity under the market system, it requires a
highly sophisticated and independent entity to optimize and resolve issues within
transactions activities. A highly developed legal system and a professional legal service
market both serve and regulate the freedom of contract under a market system.
Without political obligation to a system, people’s freedom of contract can be only
regulated and restricted by its financial capacity and social, legal norms and values.

The evolution of China’s FDI policy and law in the context of the rule of law
perfectly demonstrated a struggle between government legitimate regulatory interest
for the public good, which is expressed by the central authority’s intent of maintaining
stable, balanced, and long-term economic growth as it planned, and the interest of the
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freedom of contract in promoting efficiency and prosperity, as expressed by
transparent, unified market access, and fair regulatory treatment. Such struggle
facilitates a strange narrative of “China’s exceptionalism” in defending or criticizing
China’s FDI regulatory framework. There are two types of arguments developed during
the past decades within the academics and investment communities. As the second
chapter discussed, the first type, which was popular at the beginning of the 1980s but
now faces more questions, attributed Chinese attitude on the rule of law to Chinese
culture, and the concept of Guanxi. The second type argues that Chinese political and
constitutional system is incompatible with the rule of law. The “cultural argument,”
unfortunately was a form of “cultural prejudice,” as it simplifies a problem by confusing
the symptom and cause of the issue. The evolution of Chinese FDI policy, and law and
the complexity and legal creativity involved in China’s return investment are the best
example showing that the lack of a sophisticated market economy for the past decades
is the real reason that Chinese consumers and investors cannot fully enjoy the benefits
of the rule of law. The development of China’s ODI and China’s Wechat economy are the
best examples showing Chinese culture does not necessarily reject the rule of law.

The second type of the argument relates to a more complex issue with the
meaning of the rule of law. In fact, the evolution of FDI framework implied that China
could not develop a robust foreign investment environment without the rule of law. The
traditional pattern of Chinese FDI policy has three features: first, the centralized
planning system produces a preferential policy for foreign investors targeting labor-
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intensive exportation sectors. Second, a dualist legal and regulatory framework that
insulates SOE from the competition of the market. Third, a strong and powerful central
authority changes the market rule as it sees fit without external restriction. Under
traditional FDI policy and law, the framework is ambiguous, unpredictable and
unaccountable. However as the last chapter indicated, the traditional pattern has
reached its limits.

The core of the problem as the previous chapters and last chapter discussed is
not Chinese culture, but the difficulty in understanding the relationship between
freedom of contract and the public good. The traditional centralized planning, in
essence, is a form of economic censorship: it curated a vision of an economic system
that pleased the central authority by filtering and censoring any elements that the
central authority sees unfit. The quality and effect of economic censorship are
questionable because it cannot coordinate everyone’s desire for different things; it is
unsustainable. Foreign investment introduces a new element to China’s economic
censorship, as it showcased the possibility of an alternative approach to protect the
public good. The rule of law is compatible with the desire and interests of Chinese
people. The new economic structure in China and the new international legal
framework produce challenges to the traditional pattern of FDI framework, but they
also facilitate opportunities for a more sustainable, effective and less intrusive and
disruptive regulatory system in the future.
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Appendix
Here is the list chronologically list foreign investment related law, policies, government
rules, order from 1978-216:

1978

3rd Plenary Session of 11th Central CPC

1979

Standing Committee of NPC, Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law
EJV Law
Measures for the Import and Export Goods by Enterprises Doing Processing,
Assembling and Small & Medium- Scaled Compensation Trade

1980

State Council, Interim Regulation on Foreign Exchange Control, repealed and
replaced by 1996 Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Interim Regulation for certain
questions in Implementing Measures for the Import and Export Goods by
Enterprises Doing Processing, Assembling and Small & Medium- Scaled
Compensation Trade, repealed in 1993 [Interim Regulation in implementing
Measures for Compensation Trade]
NPC, Income Tax Law of Sino EJV
State Council, Provisions on Labour Management in Sino-Foreign EJV, repealed and
revised by 1994 PRC Labor Law, 2001
State Council, Measures on Administration of Sino-Foreign EJV Registration,
repealed by Regulations on the Administration of Enterprise Legal Person
Registration
Standing Committee of NPC, Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress Approving the Regulations on Special Economic Zones in
Guangdong Province
Measures for Providing Short-Term Loans in Foreign Currency by the Bank of China,
revised and repealed by 1995 Law on PRC Bank, Law on PRC Commercial Bank
Interim Provisions of the State Council on the Administration of Foreign Enterprises'
Permanent Representative Organizations
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Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law
Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control
1981

BOC Interim Measures on processing loan application for Sino-Foreign EJV repealed
by 1987 BOC Measures on loan application for Foreign Invested Enterprise.
General Bureau of Industry and Commerce Notice on Implementing Sino-Foreign
EJV Registration Approval Procedure.
Interim Measures on BOC Processing Loan Application by Sino-Joint EJV repealed by
BOC FDI Loan Rules
Central CPC, State Council Notice on Circulating Memorandum on Guangzhou and
Fujian Province Special Economic Zone Working Meeting.
State Council Interim Provisions on Implementing Responsibility System on
Industrial Production, repealed in 1993 by Interim Provisions on Contractual
Operation Responsibility System of the Enterprises Owned by Whole People

Ministry of Finance, MOF Opinions concerning certain financial issues in Chinese
investors’ contribution in Sino-Foreign EJV.
NPC, PRC Economic Contract Law
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Rules for the Implementation Foreign
Exchange Control Relating to Individuals, (repealed in 1996 by Regulation of Foreign
Exchange Control)
Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications by
Individuals for Foreign Exchange (repealed in 1996)
1982

General Bureau of Industry and Commerce, Interim Provisions on Registration Fee
Standard for Sino-Foreign EJV.
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of
China for Foreign Enterprises
State Council Interim Provisions on Nationwide Specialized Company

1983

Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Ministry of Finance, China People’s Bank
Provisions on Sino-Foreign EJV Payment of Tax and other business Transaction with
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Enterprise or individual through cash.
Report on Further Improve the FDI
Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises and ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures
Implementing Regulations for the "Sino-Foreign EJV Law
Interim Measures for Administration of Plan that Making Use of Foreign Investment
1984

Interim Regulations on the Licensing System for Import Commodities
Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Implementing Measures for the Provisions on
Labor Management in Sino-Foreign in EJV
Provisions of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental
Protection Concerning the Administration of Private Houses Owned by Foreigners
Supervision and Reduced Tax for Import and Export Goods by Sino-Joint EJV
Circulation of State Council Memorandum on Certain Coast Cities Meeting
Shanghai Municipality Implement Measures on Approval Process for Sino-Foreign
EJV and FDI
Interim Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Reduction of and Exemption
from Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the
Special Economic Zones and the Fourteen Coastal Port Cities, REPEALED BY
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding
the Application of Provisional Regulations on Such Taxes as Value-added Tax,
Consumption Tax and Business Tax to Enterprises with Foreign Investment and
Foreign Enterprises
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of
China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises
Circular of the State Council on Relevant Issues Concerning Adjusting the Taxation
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Policy for Financial and Insurance Industries
1985

Standing Committee of NPC, Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic
Contracts Involving Foreign Interest

Regulations of the People's Republic of China for the Administration of the Foreign
Banks and Chinese-Foreign Joint Banks in the Special Economic Zones
Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications by
Individuals for Foreign Exchange
Implementing Rules on Punishment of Violation of Foreign Exchange Control
Regulations on Administration of Contracts Introducing Technology， repealed by
2001 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration over
Technology Import and Export
Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Reply on Whether jointly
managed entities financed by foreign capital provided by International Trust can be
treated as Sino-Joint Venture Enterprise
State Administration for Industry and Commerce Notice on Certain Issues Relate to
Review Registration Application by Foreign Invested Enterprises.
State Council Regulations on Border Control within Shen Zhen and Zhu Hai
Economic Zone
Notice on the Issues relate to the paid-in investment percentage of registered
capital for Sino-Foreign EJV, repealed by 1988 Supplementary Provisions for the
"Certain Provisions on Capital Contribution of the Parties to a Sino-Foreign Equity
Joint Venture Enterprises"
Interim Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on
Preferences for the Construction of Ports and Piers with Chinese and Foreign Joint
Investment, repealed by 2001 Sino-Joint EJV
Report on Further Promote Foreign Investment Work
1986

Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Issue of Balance of Income and
Expenditure in Foreign Exchange of Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
State Council Notice on Circulating Memorandum on Guangzhou and Fujian
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Province Special Economic Zone Working Meeting. (1981,1986, 1990)
MOF State Tax Administration Notice on Regulations on certain issues relate to
Income Tax for Sino-Joint EJV, CJV, and WFOE.
Economic and Technological Development Zone Procedure on applying and
approving Sino-Joint EJV.
State Council Notice on Further Improve the Operation Condition for FDI
Regulation on WOFE, Sino-Foreign Joint Venture and CJV Application and Review
Circular of Exemption from Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for export
goods Produced by Sino-Foreign EJV and WOFE.
The People's Republic of China on the Financial Administration of Foreign
Investment Enterprises
Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment
Supplementary Notice on Circular of Exemption from Consolidated Industrial and
Commercial Tax for export goods Produced by Sino-Foreign EJV and WOFE
Notice on How to Collect Tax for New Entity merged between Sino-Foreign EJV and
Domestic Enterprises
Administrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Land Use by Foreign-Invested
Enterprises
Official Reply on the Issue “Whether a branch of Hong Kong and Macau registered
Bank by private Chinese individuals in SEZ can enjoy the priority of compensation
1987

Reply on General Office of State Council Special Economic Zone’s Request on
Simplify Chinese Personnel of Sino-Foreign EJV’s Application Procedure for Exit and
Entering Chinese Border.
PRC Custom Law
Measures of the Bank of China Concerning the Granting of Loans to Enterprises
with Foreign Investment
PRC Commercial Bank Law, Guarantee Law, Contract Law,
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State Council’s Decision on BOC Measures on Loans from Foreign Invested
Enterprise
Department of Economy and Trade, Interim Measures on Distribution of Profit for
Chinese Investor in Sino-Foreign EJV
Law on Technology Contracts, Repealed by 1999 Contract Law
Administrative Measures on Chinese personnel in Sino-Foreign EJV.
Notice on Strictly Review Chinese Investor’s Legal Person qualification for setting up
Sino-Foreign EJV.
Measures Concerning the Substitution of Products Manufactured by ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures and Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures for
Similar Imported Products
Supreme Court Interpretation on Application of Economic Contracts Involving
Foreign Interest
Notice on Supplement Explanation Rule for Sino-Foreign EJV Annual Finance Report
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Notice on Certain Issues Relate
to Sino-Foreign EJV
Notice on Certain Issues relate to Foreign Exchange rate in Sino-Foreign EJV.
SH Standing Committee of NPC, Regulations of the Shanghai Municipality on Labor
and Personnel Management in Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures
1988

Certain Provisions on Capital Contribution of the Parties to a Sino-Foreign Equity
Joint Venture Enterprise
Rules for the Implementation of the Regulation of the People's Republic of China
on Administration of Technology-Introduction Contracts
Interim Provision on Industry Enterprise Owned by Whole People’s Contractual
Operation Responsibility System
Resolution of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of the Hainan
Special Economic Zone
Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law
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CJV Law
Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Approval and Transmission
of the Proposals Submitted by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Personnel
Concerning Further Implementation of the Policy of Granting Decision-Making
Power to Enterprises with Foreign Investment for the Employment of Working
Personnel
Circular of the State Council Concerning the Extension of the Limits of Power Vested
with the Inland Provinces, Autonomous Regions, Municipalities Separately Listed in
the State Plan and the Departments under the State Council Concerned with
Examining and Approving Foreign Investment Absorption
[Extension of Examining and Approving Power for Foreign Investment vested in
certain entities]
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Notice on circulating State
Council Extension of Power
State Council Response and Comments on Percentage of Foreign Exchange Reserve
in Special Economic Zone and Three Trial Industry.
1989

Decision of the National People's Congress Regarding the Proposal Submitted for
Deliberation by the State Council on Authorizing the Municipality of Shenzhen to
Formulate Regulations and Rules for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Supplementary Notice on Issues Relate to Foreign Invested Enterprises self use for
exported equipment and goods.
Regulations on Certain Issues Relate to Processing and Assembling for Export
Production
Registration Issues for Company invested by WOFE, Sino-Joint EJV
Regulations on Governing Trade Unions in Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures in
Shanghai Municipality

1990

State Administration of Foreign Exchange Replies to questions concerning
Supplementary Rules on Chinese investors’’ profit retention in Sino-Foreign Joint
Venture.
Interim Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment in and Development of
Plots of Land
State Council 1990 Special Economic Zone Working Meeting Memorandum
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Provisions Concerning Reduction of an Exemption from Enterprises Income Tax
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for the Encouragement of Foreign
Businessmen to Invest in the Shanghai Pudong New Zone,
Replaced by Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with
Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises
Procedures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China for the Control over
the Goods, Means of Transport and Personal Articles Entering or Leaving the
Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone of the Shanghai Municipality
Measures for the Administration of Foreign-Capital Financial Institutions and
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Financial Institutions in the Shanghai Municipality
Provisions of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce on Contracting Operations of SinoForeign Equity Joint Ventures
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Foreign-capital Enterprises
Interim Provisions on the Duration of Operation of A Sino-Foreign Equity Joint
Venture Enterprise
Beijing Municipality Regulations on Trade Unions in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Rules for the
Implementation of the Foreign Owned Enterprises Law, revised in (2001, 2014)
1991

Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises
Rules Implement Income Tax Law, repealed by 2007 Enterprise Income Tax
Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on Issues
Concerning Implementation of the "Interim Provisions on the Duration of Operation
of A Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise"
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises
Measures for Implementing the Administration of Enterprise Name Registration
State Council General Office, Notice on the Control of the number of Inland persons
Travel to Hainan Special Economic Zone without proper purpose.
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Interim Measures on RMB Denominated Special Shares Open Account
Measures for the Control of Renminbi-Deno Minated Special Shares in the Shanghai
Municipality
Shen Zhen Municipality Interim Measures on RMB Denominated Special Shares
held by Foreign Capital, Repealed by 1995 Provisions on Joint Stock Companies'
Listing Foreign-Invested Shares in China
Shen Zhen Rules Implement the Administration of Special Shares
1992

Interim Measures for the Control of Renminbi-Denominated Special Shares in the
Shenzhen, repealed by in 1995 Provisions on Joint Stock Companies' Listing ForeignInvested Shares in China
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on
Authorizing the People's Congress of Shenzhen City and Its Standing Committee and
the People's Government of Shenzhen City to Formulate Regulations and Rules
Respectively for Implementation in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Measures Implement Administration of Enterprise Registration
Interim Measures on Administration of Export Goods. Repealed by 2001 PRC
Regulations on the Administration over Export and Import of Goods.

1993

Notice of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade on Review and Approve Foreign
Invested Enterprise Contract and Article of Association in accordance with the State
Law and Rules
FERT, GBIC Letters regarding authorize local administration the power of approving
non-manufacturing EJV project Contract and Article of Association
State Council Special Economic Zone Office Provisions on Simplify the Approval
Procedure for Chinese personnel of Foreign Invested Enterprises exit and entry the
Border
Measures for Granting Administration Authority over Registration of ForeignInvested Enterprises
Measures for Implementing the Administration of Enterprise Name Registration
Economic Contract Law
Notice on WOFE, Sino-Joint EJV Certificate
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Implementing Regulations for the "Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law
Shen Zhen Municipality Interim Provision on RMB Special Shares Account
State Council Notice on Further Improve FDI Administration
Supplement Provision on FDI enforce New Accounting Rules
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding
the Application of Provisional Regulations on Such Taxes as Value-added Tax,
Consumption Tax and Business Tax to Enterprises with Foreign Investment and
Foreign Enterprises
Interim Measures for the Administration of the Import Quota for General Goods
1994

Implementation Rules on PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law
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